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 I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Health economics is a relatively new discipline which came to life amidst the 
economic and social modernisation processes that have taken place in recent 
decades, as did a number of disciplines in other areas of economics. In public policy 
analyses and in welfare and public service implementation, the economic approach 
has been observably upgraded and integrated in public policy decision-making. 
[Jenei 2005]  
These tendencies are even more conspicuous in health care as the rapid development 
of health-care technologies and the social and demographical processes have brought 
about significant changes in the socio-economic environment of health-care policies 
and schemes. Public expectations vis-à-vis health-care delivery have soared in 
developed countries. While the development of medical technology has broadened 
the options in medical care, aging societies, people’s increasingly conscious 
attitudes, and easier accessibility of information have boosted demands for health-
care delivery. These tendencies are likely to lead to cost increases, thus generating a 
striking tension between technological possibilities, social expectations and 
economic potential. [Callahan 1990, Eddy 1994]  
In Hungary, health economics has been cultivated for only a few years, yet it has 
made a significant progress. It is incorporated in higher education curricula and also 
made its appearance in health-care policy decision-making, where the use of the 
achievements of health economics is endorsed by the institutional and legal 
environment. [Boncz 2006, Gulácsi 2009] 
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I.1 Presentation of the initial problem 
 
The scarcity of economic assets may be posed as one of the basic tenets of 
economics as well as a practical reality. Consequently, only a part of the social 
demands can be met. Owing to the scarcity of economic assets, it is necessary to set 
up certain priorities and introduce rationing, on the basis of which it can be decided 
which targets are to be funded from the available resources, and which are to be 
denied such funds. Economic issues are gaining bigger scope in the process of 
resource allocation in health care, and beside the three traditional principles of health 
policy, i.e. safety, efficacy and quality, cost-effectiveness has become a new factor 
that is referred to as the so called “fourth hurdle” in the literature. [Gulácsi 2004] 
Prioritisation is no novel issue in health care. Ever since medicine has been practised, 
decisions have had to be brought in one way or another as to which patients are to be 
treated and which therapies are to be applied. [Ryynänen et al 1999]  
Cochrane was the first in the 1970s to set forth the necessity of rationing1 in a 
systematic way. [Cochrane 1971] He argued for effectiveness and efficiency in 
health-care provision, as is expected in view of the scarcity of financial assets and 
also out of ethical considerations. In light of this, the first step in rationing is the use 
of health-care technologies (e.g. medicinal products) that bring about a positive 
effect in the patients’ condition and which generate health gain, while the use of 
inefficient treatments should be abandoned. 
The concept of rationing in health care was defined by Williams as a process in the 
course of which patients are denied certain medical treatments which people 
otherwise wish to receive and about which there is a general consensus is that they 
‘do you good’. [Maynard-Bloor 1998] In other words, because of the scarcity of 
resources, certain therapies have to be ruled out, even though they can generate 
health gain.   
The allocation of resources takes place predominantly along lines or patterns 
distorted by historical tradition or political considerations, and this leads to a sub-
optimal allocation of the scant resources. While health-care reforms follow one after 
another all over the world, in many places, measuring ‘return on investment’ is still 
                                                 
1 The concept of rationing may differ to some degree from its use in other areas of sciences, such as 
statistics. Rationing here gains meaning in examinations of the compliance of medical treatments to 
certain criteria. Health care technologies can be rationed, for instance, on the basis of cost efficiency, 
and poor cost efficiency may justify the rejection of financing a technology from social insurance.     
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inadequate. The efficiency of reforms remains questionable as long as decision-
makers are reluctant to undertake responsibility for the necessity and delivery of 
prioritisation. Needless to say, prioritisation calls for a clear and systematic 
approach, which is based preferably on fair scientific evidence, and which takes into 
account, as well as can harmonise, the views of all the agents affected, and last but 
not least, which is operational in the often irrational environment of health-care 
schemes. [Mitton-Donaldson 2003]  
Some expect the solution to, or at least the alleviation of, the shortage of resources from 
Evidence Based Medicine. However, as Sackett explains, Evidence Based Medicine in 
patient care endorses the most efficient medical interventions which maximise the 
patient’s life span and quality of life. This, however, is likely to increase, rather than 
decrease, health-care costs. [Sackett et al 1996]  
Maynard rounds out the above opinion on two points. On one hand, no due attention is 
paid in this approach to the patient’s right to choose a therapy. On the other hand, in 
case scientific evidence is regarded as the principal or sole criterion in the allocation of 
resources, it may lead to significant cost increase, because opportunity costs are 
ignored. Eliminating inefficient treatments from heath-care practice, however, is 
undeniably an advantage of the use of scientific evidence, and is conducive to cost 
reduction. [Maynard-Bloor 1998]  
In principle, priority setting in health policy is a systematic decision-making method 
aimed at allocating the available resources according to needs. Decision-makers have to 
decide which illnesses, patient groups and medical interventions are to be allocated such 
resources. In practice, however, priority setting is often performed in an ad hoc and 
intransparent way. One reason for this is that prioritisation in decision-making is a 
highly complex, multi-faceted task. [Baltussen-Niessen 2006]  
As yet, no universal method or decision-making rule exists which could function in all 
contexts. As for resource allocation in health care, however, alongside sustainable 
financing [Kornai 1998], two generally accepted goals can be formulated: 1) health gain 
maximisation2 in society in view of the available resources (aspect of efficiency); and 
2) reduction of social inequalities that are manifest in health care (aspect of equity). The 
assertion of these two considerations can be of equal importance. [Hauck et al 2004]  
                                                 
2 Health gain may be operationalised and measured in several ways, such as life years gain, quality 
adjusted life year, etc. [Evetovits 2005] 
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While the reduction of social inequalities manifest in health care is a generally 
accepted goal, the concept of equity is difficult to capture in practice. Even less clear is 
the way health-care policies should relate to those measures in which the aspects of 
efficiency and equity conflict and can only be asserted at one another’s expense. 
Characteristically, this dilemma often does not even surface overtly in professional 
disputes, and health policy makers refrain from taking stands in the matter, which tends 
to lead to inconsistent decisions. [Sassi et al 2001]  
Priority setting decisions are supported from the side of economics by health 
economics analyses, in which health consequences and the costs of certain health-
care technologies are measured, evaluated and compared, as well as cost-effective 
health-care technologies are identified. Taking into account cost-effectiveness results 
is also advocated by the World Bank and the WHO. [Baltussen-Niessen 2006]  
Health economic analyses do help explore the most efficient ways of resource 
distribution. Yet in reality, health policy decisions are often inconsistent with cost-
effectiveness results. One possible explanation is that health economic analyses often 
ignore equity considerations, and it is indifferent who are to gain more health. In 
other words, the normative basis of health economic analyses is health gain 
maximisation, and their approach is utilitarian; the social distribution of health gain 
is ignored and indeed, the viewpoint of distribution itself is disregarded. [Stolk 2005]  
With its specific means, health economics tries to address the problem that the value 
of health services is defined not merely in terms of achievable health gain but also in 
terms of their social distribution. Wagstaff points out that equity and cost-
effectiveness considerations can be combined in case a system of weights conditional 
on the illnesses, the patients’ age, their social and economic condition, etc. is used 
[Wagstaff 1991] At the same time, such weighting can also shed light on the extent 
of health loss which society is prepared to sustain in the interest of a more equitable 
health distribution. Wagstaff also avers that more equitable distribution is possible 
only at the price of lower average health level. He calls this the ‘equity–efficiency 
trade off’, i.e. the exchange between considerations of efficiency and equity. 
[Wagstaff 1991] 
A number of considerations in the social distribution of health gain have been 
successfully identified, which include the patients’ age, their social role, etc. [Nord 
1999] These considerations have been widely examined in international studies, 
however, in many cases the empirical results are contradictory. The uncertainty as to 
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the intensity of preferences for certain considerations, the willingness of people to set 
priorities according to the given consideration, or conversely, their refusal of it as a 
criterion of rationing, prevails.  
Despite several open questions as to the direction and intensity of preferences, there 
is a consensus in literature in that the above factors have a bearing on the social value 
of health gain, and they play a role in people’s preference system even if they are 
made aware of a partial loss through such decision in the maximum achievable health 
gain. In view of this, people are likely to expect health policy decision-makers also to 
uphold such considerations and bring their decisions on resource allocation in line 
with the value judgment of the society. [Dolan 1998]  
 
 
I.2 Rationale for the choice of subject and the importance of research 
 
As is apparent from the previous chapter, health economics as a new area of science 
has made significant contribution to supporting policy decisions and resource 
allocation in health care. In the course of elaborating new methods and conceptions, 
however, new solutions and answers have been found as well as new questions have 
arisen. One such question which, in view the proliferation of health economic 
analyses, cannot be side-stepped is the system of criteria in the social distribution of 
health gain – a kind of social value judgement that often runs counter to it, limiting 
the choice based on benefit maximisation, a central assumption of economic 
thinking. The practical significance of the issue has been highlighted by analyses of 
concrete health policy decisions, which establish that such considerations are 
endorsed in health policy decisions.3 If decision-makers do indeed aim to increase 
social welfare, the maximisation at the social level of health gain should be 
superseded, with respect to the concept of utility, and further value-creating factors 
related to the social distribution of health gain should be more thoroughly 
investigated.  
Understandably enough, there is a vigorous interest in the international literature in 
finding modes of creating a balance between social value judgement and economic 
rationality in decision-making. The significance of the issue is highlighted by the 
                                                 
3 See, for example, Devlin’s analysis of decisions brought in the National Institute of Clinical 
Excellence (UK). [Devlin 2004]  
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research project4 spanning several years that has been recently launched and 
financed by the European Union in the recent past with the participation of 10 
member states and which is aimed at clarifying the methodological problems of the 
subject. As I have participated in this research project and my earlier works and 
professional activity also focussed on this area, it was a matter of course for me to 
carry on further researches on this subject. 
With the issues of social distribution coming to the front in health economics, 
methods for obtaining a wider knowledge of social value judgement – such as 
preference measurement and attitude studies – gain more and more attention. At the 
time of writing this dissertation, such researches were, to my knowledge, conducted 
in Hungary in the area of health economics only by Akkazieva and colleagues 
[Akkazieva et al 2006], who made a survey of patient preferences for the health-care 
system reforms.  
In my opinion, research in Hungary into the above issues is thus of a novel type both 
as regards the problematic and the area in which the methods are employed. It is my 
hope that this dissertation will contribute a small segment to a more thorough 
exploration of the subject.  
 
 
I.3 Goals and methods 
 
In my dissertation dealing with the societal aspects of the distribution of health gains 
I set out two goals. 
 
a) Through a survey of the literature I intend to identify, from both theoretical and 
empirical angles, those social values and equity aspects which society considers 
important when distributing health gains among individuals (patients). 
 
b) With my empirical studies – with different methodologies – I conducted two 
studies with Hungarian medical doctors to investigate the preferences and the 
opinion of the responders on which factors are considered important and acceptable 
for the distribution of health gains. 
                                                 
4 European Value of a Quality Adjusted Life Year (EuroVAQ), http://research.ncl.ac.uk/eurovaq
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 The subjects of both studies were medical doctors. Other responders, such as the 
general public, and health policy decision makers, etc. would be a reasonable choice 
of subjects, too. Understandably, for each responder group we would get answers 
from a different point of view. I deemed important however to get know the 
preferences and attitudes of medical doctors for the following reasons: 
 
- Patient level decisions are usually made by medical doctors in the health care 
system; 
- Medical professionals are likely to be the most familiar with this decision 
making situation, as they are to make such decisions every day.  
 
The subjects of the first empirical study were general practitioners and the study used 
the method of the discrete choice experiment. The aim of this study was to elicit the 
preferences for selected characteristics (as prioritization criteria) of the patient and of 
the disease that were considered to be important in the literature and in medical 
decision making. The discrete choice experiment that was first used in the field of 
marketing, is a method for getting know stated preferences and considered to be a 
choice-based method that is deeply rooted in economic theory. (The method of 
discrete choice experiment is described in more details in Chapter V.1.2.) 
Responders are to choose among goods considering different characteristics of the 
goods simultaneously. In the present study, to elicit preferences for distributional 
criteria, general practitioners were asked to choose among patients described by 
different patient and disease characteristics. Responders were told that the choice 
was necessary because of limited resources.  
 
The second empirical study related to an international research project (EuroVaQ 
project).5 This international project aimed to investigate the views and opinion of the 
general public and health policy decision makers on the relationship and relative 
importance of health gains derived from rescuing a life, prolongation of life time or 
the improvement of health related quality of life. Also, the project aimed to study 
those factors (e.g. age and income of the patient, family background) that are 
                                                 
5 Further information is available at the official website of the project: 
http://research.ncl.ac.uk/eurovaq
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considered to be important by responders in the allocation of health services and 
therefore in the allocation of health gains among patients. This survey used the Q-
method that serves for the study of subjectivity: it provides insight in personal 
attitudes, opinions on a given issue. Regarding the way of questioning, the Q-method 
is more affiliated with qualitative methods; regarding the way of data collection and 
data analysis however this method is linked up with quantitative techniques. (A more 
detailed description of the Q-method is given in Chapter V.2.1.) The study in the 
dissertation adds a new point of view to the international project. As it is assumed 
that attitudes can be different in different groups, I chose another responder group 
and made a survey with Hungarian medical doctors.  
 
Both empirical works investigate the societal aspects of the distribution of health 
gains, but with different methodological approaches. The discrete choice experiment 
yields quantifiable results on the strength and the directions of preferences, but 
because of the limitations of the method it is not able to study all the potential factors 
– i.e. attributes - in one experiment. The number of investigated attributes (i.e. the 
characteristics of the goods) has to be narrowed to 6-10 attributes as responders are 
not able to consider more of then jointly. On the contrary, the Q-method is able to 
identify families of opinions, i.e. to describe and distinguish between similar and 
different opinions but does not provide quantifiable outputs. One of its advantages 
however that distributional factors can be studied in the broadest possible circle. As 
the subjects and the methods of the two studies were different, I aim to investigate 
the main question from two perspectives but there is no way for the direct 
comparison of the results. 
 
I must emphasize at this point, that it was not my intention to deal with related 
ethical or philosophical issues in a systematic way. I do not touch upon the question 
of how to aggregate the individual preferences in the social welfare function so to 
maximize the social benefit. In my opinion, addressing of these issues would deserve 
dealing with separate dissertations. 
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I.4 The structure of the dissertation 
 
I set out two goals in my paper on the social aspects of the distribution of health 
gains, and accordingly I built up its structure to serve the realisation of these goals. 
 
After a summary of the research, in Chapter II., I offer a brief description of the types 
of analysis employed in health economics and of the theoretical conception of quality 
adjusted life year (QALY), which is currently the most widely accepted central 
measure of health consequences and a source of the problems of distribution 
discussed in this study. In this chapter I also introduce the theoretical and practical 
contribution which health economic analyses (especially cost-utility analysis based 
on QALY) make toward decisions on resource allocation. After a review of the 
economic analyses, I give a brief description of examples from two countries, in 
order to illustrate the kind of factors which limit the usability of these analyses in 
decision-making. One example is that of the United Kingdom, the country where 
health economics was a pioneering branch of study both as regards theory and the 
practical use of results. The other example is that of Hungary, where the practical 
importance of health economic analyses are shown through a research I conducted 
earlier. 
In Chapter III., I offer a literature-based summary of those social and equity 
considerations which question the relevance of the utilitarian approach to analyses, 
and highlight the importance of social value judgment. The literature review includes 
theoretical issues and summarizes the most important results of several international 
studies in the field. 
In Chapter IV, the fundamental questions and hypotheses of the research are posed. I 
aim to support the first two hypotheses with the help of a preference elicitation study 
conducted among general practitioners. In order to answer hypotheses 3, I conducted 
an examination of the attitudes among medical doctors. 
After the literature review and the hypothesis, I describe the empirical researches I 
carried out in Chapter V. As the dissertation consists of two empirical studies, for the 
sake of perspicuity and an easier follow, I describe these studies separately. 
Description of both empirical works follows the logic below: 
- general, theoretical description of the research method, and the rationale for 
the choice of the method; 
13 
- current application of the method in the research of my own (study design, 
subjects, data collection, data analysis, etc.); 
- presentation of the results; 
- discussion of the results; 
- limitations of the research. 
 
Finally, in Chapter VI, I give a summary of the most important results of my 
researches and make proposals for further research as well as for the practical 
utilisation of such researches.  
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 II. HEALTH ECONOMICS IN RESOURCE ALLOCATION 
 
 
II.1 Health economic analyses 
Scarce resources in health care force resource allocation decisions, i.e. to choose 
between alternative technologies (e.g. drugs, prevention programmes, medical 
aidances, and medical procedures) in health care. The aims of health economic 
analyses are 1) to find those contesting alternatives that are relevant for comparison 
and subject to decision making; 2) to define the relevant perspective of the analysis 
(e.g. health insurer, society); 3) to decrease the uncertainty of the decision. Health 
economic analyses can take different forms, but two criteria should always be 
satisfied: 1) inputs as well as outputs should be taken into consideration in the 
analyses, i.e. both cost and health consequences should be analyzed; 2) the analysis 
needs to be comparative, i.e. at least two interventions should be considered to 
choose from. The explicit criteria of choices of this sort (i.e. the criteria of resource 
allocation) are pursued by health economic analyses.[Drummond 2001]  
Classification of health economic analyses is based on the type of outcome measure 
the analysis uses.6 Cost-minimization analysis (CMA) is considered when the 
contesting interventions are proved to be generating the same health benefits. In this 
case it might be sufficient to analyse and compare the cost side only. Cost-
effectiveness analysis (CEA) uses natural units for the measurement of health 
benefits: e.g. life-years gained, blood pressure. As a consequence, CEA is suitable 
for the comparison of those health technologies which measure the health outcome 
with the same natural units. The special outcome measure of the cost-utility analysis 
(CUA) is the quality adjusted life year (QALY). QALY combines health gains from 
improved life time and health related quality of life, and is considered to be a general 
outcome measure suitable for the comparison of different health technologies. 
Finally, the cost-benefit analysis (CBA) measures health benefits in money terms. 
Theoretically, this is the type of analysis that is able to compare any technologies; 
however it has not become the standard one in health economics because the 
valuation of human life in money is not without difficulties. [Gulácsi 2005] 
                                                 
6 More and more health economic analyses of different types are made in Hunagry as well. See e.g. 
[Boncz 2003, Péntek 2008] 
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For our purposes it is the CUA that is of importance.7 Recently, CUA has been 
widely used and several guidelines on health economic analyses prefer this sort of 
analysis. The Hungarian guideline also mentions CUA as the most preferable 
analysis in the health economic submission dossiers [Egészségügyi Minisztérium 
2002]. As health economic analyses are comparative, the results are expressed with 
the incremental cost-effectiveness ratio (ICER). In the case of cost-utility analyses 
the ICER for technology A and technology B takes the following form: 
 
Cost A – Cost B
ICER = 
QALYA - QALYB
 
A technology is considered to be cost-effective if it generates 1 unit of health gain 
with less cost than the other one. Using the incremental cost-effectiveness ratio, the 
technologies (Technology B at the origin) can be presented in the cost-effectiveness 
plane (Figure 1). Depending on the place of Technology A in the plane, different 
decisions can be made. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
7 For more details on health economic analyses see e.g.: [Drummond 2001, Gulácsi 2005] 
 
16 
Figure 1 The cost-effectiveness plane 
 
QALY 
difference – +
+
–
 
A 
Cost difference 
Acceptance of 
Technology „A” 
Rejection of 
Technology „A” 
B
I. 
II. 
III. 
IV. 
Technologies in quarter IV should be accepted, while technologies in quarter II 
should be rejected. The decision about those technologies that are in quarter I or III is 
not straightforward. In the first case, Technology „A” generates more QALY than 
the other one, but costs more, too. Regarding quarter III, Technology „A” is less 
costly, but at the same time it results in less QALY than the comparator technology. 
 
Hereinabove I briefly described the types of health economic analyses. In the 
following chapters, I will focus on the use of the cost-utility analysis. Health benefit 
is measured by QALYs in the CUA, and the research question of this dissertation is 
closely related to the criticism of the QALY concept.  
 
 
II.2 The concept of the quality adjusted life year 
 
Representatives of welfare economics usually recommend the use of cost-benefit 
analyses for decision making in the allocation of public sources. CBA measures the 
cost and benefits of alternative programmes in money terms and the decision 
criterion is based on the sign of the net benefit. CBA pursue to maximize the sum of 
welfare, and from a theoretical point of view this is the only method able to express 
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the absolute benefits of different programmes. In health economics, however, it has 
not gained ground as several issues in ethics and methodology have arisen when 
human life is valued in money. Consequently, new output measures (e.g. QALY) 
were developed in health economics. [Dolan 2002] 
In the QALY concept (used by cost-utility analyses), only the health gain is captured, 
that is why the CBA and not the CUA would be preferred in welfare economics. To 
solve this theoretical problem, however, no bridging solution has been found yet. 
[Dolan 2002] 
After all, it is the CUA that is widely spread in health economics. The QALY, as a 
measure of health benefit, combines the health gains deriving from reduced 
morbidity (gain in health related quality of life) and from reduced mortality (gain in 
life time).8 [Drummond 2001] The QALY measure is characterized by three 
properties: 
 
1) The health related quality of life in different health states is given by weights 
between [0;1], zero belongs to the state of death, 1 refers to perfect health.9 2) These 
weights are based on preferences, i.e. bigger weight is to belong to the more 
preferred health state. 3) Weight are measured on interval scale.10  
Figure 2 shows an example for the health related quality of life a patient over time 
with and without medical intervention: under-the-curve areas are to present the 
available amount of QALY in both cases. The patient is expected to live for a shorter 
time and in a worse quality of life without intervention. Due to the treatment, the 
patient experiences an improvement in her quality of life (area „A”), and also, she 
lives longer (area „B”). 
 
 
 
                                                 
8 The content of the QALY concept was first published by Klarman, although he had not use the 
„QALY” terminology, yet. [Klarman 1968] Klarman highlighted the importance of quality of life, as 
he revealed that the health related quality of life of transplanted patients was better than that of 
patients on kidney dialysis. The term of QALY appeared in the literature some 10 years later in a 
publication at the Harvard University. [Weinstein 1977]  
9 QALY weights can be derived with different methods (e.g. standard gamble, time-trade-off, visual 
analogue scale). See e.g. [Drummond 2001] 
10 Interval scale is sufficient as cost-effectiveness analyses always compare two or more technologies, 
i.e. they calculate the QALY difference of the therapies; and differences can be subject to any 
mathematical operations. [Drummond 2001]  
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 Figure 2 QALY gain with and without treatment 
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Source: Drummond, 2001, Figure 6.6. 
 
One QALY equals to one life year in full health.11 In the cost-utility analysis, based 
on the criterion of QALY maximization, individual QALY gains are aggregated and 
maximized in the patient population. The QALY maximisation is here described on 
the base of Dolan. [Dolan et al 2005] 
The simplest case is to assume one individual and no uncertainties. The QALY gain 
from the treatment of the individual (QALYg) can take the following form:  
 
QALYg = T1Q1 – T0Q0                              (1) 
 
Where Q is the value of the health state (QALY weight), T stands for the number of 
years spent in the health state, and index 1 and 0 refer to the situation with and 
without treatment, respectively. 
If uncertainty exists, the expected QALY gain for the individual is described with the 
following formula: 
                                                 
11 One QALY equals one year in full health but e.g. two years in „half” health (weight = 0,5) amount 
to one QALY, too.  
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 QALYg = ΣhΣtp1htQht - ΣhΣtp0htQht                           (2) 
 
Where h= 1, …, H (the body of possible health states); t = 1, …T (time periods, the 
number of subsequent periods amount to time duration T, see Eq. (1)); p1ht and p0ht 
are the probabilities for the individual to be in health state h in time period t with and 
without treatment, respectively. Qht is the value of health state h in time period t. In 
the case of a patient population, individual QALY gains are aggregated and 
maximized over the population.  
Each member of the patient group (i = 1,...,N) is in health state h in time period t 
with a probability of phti. The sum of individual probabilities amounts to ΣNi=1phti, 
which equals to the expected number of patients in health state h in time period t in 
the population: nht. Following this train of thought, the aggregated QALY gain in the 
patient population (QALYG) is described as: 
 
QALYG = ΣhΣtn1htQht - ΣhΣtn0htQht                 (3) 
 
Parameters are measured on interval scale and the social value is linear in each 
element of the formula. This means that the social value of the health gain is 
determined by the product of the improvement in health related quality of life, the 
gain in life time and of the number of patients, consequently, the distribution of 
health gains among the individuals do not play a role. The model assumes that Qhti = 
Qhtj (j ≠ i), i.e. to be in health state h in time period t carries the same value for each 
individual in the QALY maximization, independently of who the patient is. This 
assumption is a limiting one and the question arises whether other issues (e.g. the age 
of the patient) affect the social value of the health gain. [Dolen et al 2005] 
 
 
II.3 Theory of ranking based on health economic results 
 
As it was mentioned before, CUA is more preferred by decision makers in 
reimbursement and coverage decisions than CBA that is more difficult to interpret 
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and is usually based on the method of willingness-to-pay (WTP). [Cookson 2003] 
Using the results of cost-utility analyses in coverage decisions and resource 
allocation, however, means that some money value is finally attached to the health 
gain (e.g. QALY gain). The decision maker is to decide if the technology has an 
acceptable cost-effectiveness or not, i.e. whether the technology generates 1 QALY 
gain at an acceptable cost level or not. This issue of decision making led to the 
concept of the cost-effectiveness threshold (or financing threshold). 
 
Theoretically, the cost-effectiveness threshold is the point where the value of 
marginal benefits equal to the value of marginal sources. In general, there are two 
approaches to derive and use the threshold; hence there exist two decision rules. Both 
approaches are based on the assumption that there exists a so called „league table” of 
the health technologies. In the field of health economics, the league table – assuming 
perfect information – is a list that contains all the potentially available health 
technologies and ranks those according to their cost-effectiveness. The technology 
with the most favourable cost-effectiveness stands at top of the list, and the one with 
the least favourable cost effectiveness takes place at the bottom of the list.12 
Assuming, that such a list is available, the approach to the financing threshold can be 
the following [Benedict 2005]: 
 
Approach I.: A fixed, externally determined health care budget represents 
the willingness to pay of the society for health care services. This budget is to 
be allocated among different health care programmes; sources are first 
allocated to the programme at the top of the league table with the most 
favourable cost-effectiveness, then for the next ones in the list, etc. Allocation 
mechanism stops when the budget is consumed. The ICER of the last 
technology – i.e. the technology with the least favourable cost-effectiveness 
but still financed from the budget - represents the shadow price for the 
budget. If the size of the budget truly reflects the society’s preference for 
                                                 
12 The main goal of league tables is to enhance the efficiency of the health care sector, and to 
maximize health benefits with the available resources. Currently, league tables have not proved to be 
much of a help to achieve this goal. For more details on the concept and the criticism of league tables 
see e.g. [Nord 1993, Gold et al 1996, Mauskopf et al 2003, Hutubessy et al 2001]. 
 
21 
health care, this shadow price equals to the marginal value of one unit health 
gain (of 1 QALY).  
 
If all health technologies are ranked in the table, this allocation mechanism would 
result in the most health gain at the level of the population. However, the creation of 
a complete league table seems to be an infeasible task. [Mauskopf 2003] 
 
Approach II.: A fixed, externally determined price represents the societal 
value of unit of health gain (of 1 QALY). Health technologies with an 
incremental cost-effectiveness ratio bigger than this price would not be 
financed, and technologies with an ICER below this price would be covered. 
The decision rule is whether the ICER of the technology is above or below 
this price (the threshold). All those technologies that have a favourable ICER 
will determine the size of the budget necessary for the coverage of all these 
technologies. 
 
An example for the use of Approach II when the cost-effectiveness ratio of a new 
technology is compared to the cost-effectiveness of another one widely used. It is 
also possible to determine an absolute value for the threshold (e.g. 
30 000 GBP/QALY). In this case the cost-effectiveness of the technology is 
compared to this reference point, and this is the basement to decide if the technology 
is of good value for money or not. [Mauskopf 2003] The two examples above 
suggest that recently Approach II seems to be a more pragmatic one, as it is 
applicable without a complete league table.  
 
Determination of the financing threshold may play a significant role in the long term 
sustainability of the health care systems. The aim of the threshold is to attach a value in 
money to health benefits and so to provide a reference point to decide which technology 
is of good value for money and is worth financing. If health care markets functioned in 
a perfect way, than it would be sufficient to observe the evaluation of the market. If it is 
not so – health care markets usually suffer from different market failures – other 
methods are needed to retrieve this value. Here is it worth mentioning, that based on 
theoretical considerations, such a societal financing threshold would be consistent with 
health economic analyses taking a societal perspective; this is however is not a 
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requirement in many countries. [Benedict 2005] From a normative perspective, it is 
the societal preference that should determine the provision of health care services, 
because this is the perspective that incorporates equity considerations. In most of the 
health economic analyses, however, it is the individual’s preference for health gain 
that is measured, and the implicit assumption is made that this sort of evidence 
provides sufficient information for decision makers. [Gyrd-Hansen 2003] 
Different methods are available for the determination of the financing threshold13; 
and each of them may result in different values even in the same context. Benedict 
identified the following methods: expert opinion, value of statistical life, human 
capital method, revealed preference method, stated preference method (e.g. 
willingness-to-pay), analyses of decisions in the past. It is worth noting however, that 
in those health care systems, where some financing threshold is used, it is difficult to 
see how these thresholds were calculated. It seems that these thresholds are more or 
less the results of some kind of arbitrary decisions based on financing decisions in 
the past or on a presumed value of the society’s willingness to pay for health care 
programmes and services. [Benedict 2005] Nevertheless, developed countries aim to 
attach an explicit or implicit money value to the QALY gain, and the financing 
threshold is an issue in coverage and reimbursement decisions. [Brandtmüller et al 
2005] 
Neumann et al. made a study on the use of thresholds. They reviewed 228 CUAs 
published between 1976-1997 and found that 38% of the CUAs compared their 
results to explicit financing thresholds. [Neumann et al 2000] We can assume that 
nowadays thresholds are even more frequently used. On one hand, it is likely that a 
number of the CUAs created for submission purposes were/are not published, on the 
other hand, the concept of the financing threshold is a hotter issue in many health 
care systems, than it was during the previous decades. 
In chapter II.3.1. I will give a theoretical overview on the potential use of financing 
thresholds in decision making. 
 
 
                                                 
13 Here, I limit myself to list the possible methods of defining a threshold. On one hand, the research 
question of this dissertation does not link directly to the calculation of the financing threshold, on the 
other hand, each method is widely discussed in the literature. 
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II.3.1 Financing threshold in the cost-effectiveness plane 
 
The cost-effectiveness plane can be used to present the relationship of a health 
technology and the financing threshold. A technology may be above or below the 
threshold, or can be around the threshold. This latter case is shown on Figure 3 The 
incremental cost-effectiveness ratio of a technology is usually presented with an 
elliptical area around the point estimate, to demonstrate the uncertainty of the ICER; 
costs and benefits always carry some degree of uncertainty in health economic 
analyses. Uncertainties may derive from methodological issues, from data used in the 
analyses, and assumptions made in health economic models. Also, another potential 
source of uncertainty may be the subjective interpretation or presentation of the 
results of the health economic analyses. [Briggs 1999] 
 
Figure 3 Technology on the financing threshold 
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It is important for decision makers to get know the probability with which the ICER 
of a technology is under the threshold, that is why it is a requirement in health 
economic analyses to explicitly show the uncertainties in the results.14 Therefore, the 
                                                 
14 Deterministic and stochastic methods of sensitivity analyses are available to show this uncertainty. 
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cost-effectiveness acceptability curve was developed to present the uncertainty in the 
cost-effectiveness of a health technology (Figure 4). The curve shows the probability 
that the ICER of a technology is under the threshold for different threshold values. 
As the acceptable threshold increases so increases the probability that the ICER of 
the technology is under this value, and can be accepted by the decision makers. 
[Fenwick 2001] 
 
Figure 4 Standard cost-effectiveness acceptability curve 
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Figure 5 shows the case when there exist two subgroups of the patients and the cost-
effectiveness of the technology is significantly different in the two groups. The cost-
effectiveness is favourable for group „A”, but it is not for group „B”. 
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Figure 5 Financing threshold in the case of two subgroups of patients 
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The situation on Figure 5 arises a particular issue for financing and reimbursement 
decisions and for the health policy. Is it acceptable to leave group „A” without 
treatment because for some reason (e.g. age of the patient, severity of the disease, co-
morbidities) the cost effectiveness of the technology is unfavourable in the group?  
A number of examples of this situation can be found in health policy decisions. A 
number of technologies are eligible only for a well-determined subgroup of patients. 
Beyond the cost-effectiveness of the technology, of course, there are other factors 
playing a role in these decisions: e.g. the technology is recommended only for patients 
with high risk, for those who did not react on or do not tolerate other therapies. Also, it 
is possible that the technology is not recommended as a first-line therapy or its use is 
conditioned on medical parameters.15  
 
The next chapter gives the example of the United Kingdom for the use of the 
financing threshold in real life decision making. United Kingdom was chosen 
because it is one of those countries that is in an advanced phase of making health 
economic analysis and using their results in policy decisions. Chapter XX will 
                                                 
15 See e.g. the therapeutic recommendations by the National Institute of Clinical Excellence in the 
United Kingdom. (www.nice.org.uk) 
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summarize the results of a previous case study of mine. This case study intended to 
give a picture on the use of health economic analyses in the Hungarian coverage 
policy and to see whether this sort of information are available for decision makers. 
 
II.4 The use of health economic results in decision making – UK 
 
The majority of the developed countries have established institutions for health 
economics or health technology assessment. These institutions are to support health 
care decision making and several of them intend to define and use a financing 
threshold. In Hungary – and probably internationally, as well – one of the most 
acknowledged institutions is the NICE16 (National Institute of Clinical Excellence, 
United Kingdom) with its well-developed and transparent decision making processes 
and with a great number of recommendations publicly available. The accepted 
financing threshold in the UK is app. between £20-30.000/QALY; in case of a higher 
cost-effectiveness ratio important considerations should emerge for the 
recommendation of the technology. [Gulácsi 2005] 
The use of the financing threshold was investigated by Devlin [Devlin 2004] through 
the analysis of the NICE’s activities and decisions. Devlin was interested in those 
factors that play a role in the NICE’s decisions and the way these considerations (e.g. 
equity) balanced with the requirement of cost-effectiveness. 
Assuming a single financing threshold the decision rule suggested that the 
recommendation or the rejection of a technology depends solely on whether the 
ICER is under or above this threshold representing the shadow-price of the budget 
constraint or the willingness-to-pay for health improvement in the society. In 
practice, however, it is not so easy to establish this threshold as several factors come 
into play and a single threshold is not sufficient. A low and a high threshold value are 
likely to exist: below the low value the technology is accepted, beyond the high value 
it is rejected. In the range of these values, however, only the probability of the 
rejection can be estimated (Figure 6). Between the lower and the upper limit the 
probability of the rejection depends on other factors that might counterbalance the 
cost-effectiveness considerations. [Devlin 2004] 
 
                                                 
16 The NICE was established in 1999 to make recommendations on the use of health technologies for 
the National Health Service. (www.nice.org.uk) 
27 
Figure 6 Probabilistic approach of the financing threshold 
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Source: Devlin, 2004, Figure 2. 
 
Equity is one of these considerations in the NICE’s activity, although the factors it 
covers are less clear. One equity issue for the NHS is the access to care for patients 
independently of their ability to pay (health care services are financed through taxes). 
Another issue is the equal access to care in every geographical location. Beside 
income and location other factors like age, gender, ethnicity, etc. could also be 
important dimensions of equity, however, the NICE has no authority to make 
difference between patients based on these. [NICE 2005] 
Although societal groups cannot be subjects to decision making, patient groups are 
frequently taken into consideration. NICE is likely to treat differently those 
technologies that serve for the treatment of very rare diseases17. Also, the initial 
health status of the patient (bad quality of life, poor prognosis) and the size of the 
relevant patient population can be of utmost importance. [Devlin 2004] 
A further challenge to define a single threshold is that along with clinical efficacy 
and cost-effectiveness of the technology its budget impact is also taken into 
                                                 
17 Orphan drugs are developed for the treatment of rare diseases. Their return is usually less 
favourable. Diseases with a prevalence of 1/ 50 000 or less are considered to be very rare in the UK. 
[NICE 2005] 
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consideration in the NICE’s decisions. As the disposable budget of the NHS has been 
increasing, the context of the use of the threshold has been changing, too. [Devlin 
2004] 
The uncertainty around the evidences is also a difficulty in establishing a threshold. 
Assuming two technologies with the same cost-effectiveness ratio the technology 
carrying less uncertainty is more likely to be accepted by a risk-averse decision 
maker. [O’Brien 2002]  
In summary, a financing threshold is proposed that is able to capture both the societal 
views and the financial considerations. An absolute value does not exist, however, 
because there is no empirical basement of such a threshold and there can always be 
situations when health policy has other priorities than cost-effectiveness. Therefore, 
instead of the rigorous application of a single and artificial financing threshold, the 
case-by-case assessment of health technologies is still suggested. Hence, the assessment 
of health technologies still comprises of two stages. [Rawlins 2004] This also means 
that coverage decisions should not be solely based on cost-effectiveness results but 
being aware of them. [Maynard 2004] 
A study carried out in our research group shows how flexible the NICE applied the 
threshold in its recommendations: the cost-effectiveness of recommended 
technologies ranged on a wide scale. This is probably due to those considerations 
that were placed before the threshold criteria by the decision makers. This study was 
based partly on the results by Towse [Towse 2002] and we reviewed the HTA 
monographs (drugs only) published by the NICE between January 2004 and August 
2005 looking for the ICERs of the recommended technologies. [Brandtmüller et al 
2005] 
Most of the technologies can be characterized by more than one cost-effectiveness 
ratios due to subgroup analyses, different comparator technologies and sensitivity 
analyses (the range of ICERs of a technology is very informative for the decision 
makers).  
The tornado diagram in Appendix 2 is based on the lowest and highest cost-
effectiveness values published in the monographs showing the expansion of these 
values for each technology.18 The cost-effectiveness ratios of recommended 
technologies show a significant diversity: they range from the negative values of 
                                                 
18 Cost per QALY was not available for each technology, in some cases other measures (e.g. cost per 
life year gained) were reported.  
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sensitivity analyses 19 to 220.000£/QALY. This suggests that the threshold of 20 - 
30.000£/QALY is more of a reference point guiding the decision makers than an 
absolute financing threshold. 
 
II.5 Drug coverage decisions in Hungary 
 
My thesis was inspired by the results of one of my previous researches. 
[Brandtmüller et al 2006] In 2005 our research group made a study for the Financing 
Ministry in which we summarized the international experiences on the use of health 
economics analyses in decision making. Later I carried out a small scale study in 
Hungary about the availability of health economics evidences and their use in drug 
reimbursement decisions. (In 2005 pharmaceuticals were the only technologies for 
which coverage policy was regulated and the submission of health economics 
evidences were required.)  
In this case study the submission dossier of 25 new original drugs were reviewed 
(from the 2. half of 2004 and year 2005) to investigate if these dossiers submitted to 
the National Health Insurance Fund Administration (NHIFA) contained relevant 
information in health economics. I was also interested in the aspects the decision 
makers took into consideration and the reasoning behind the approval or the rejection 
of a drug. Those documents available at the NHIFA were reviewed that the decision 
makers themselves used as input for their decisions: 
- the reimbursement application by the pharmaceutical company; 
- the recommendation of the ESKI20 Technology Assessment Bureau, 
- the opinion of colleges of medical professionals; 
- the recommendation of the Technology Assessment Committee21. 
In these documents I was looking for the availability of the following pieces of 
information: 
1) in case of a positive decision, the approved reimbursement category was the same 
as the one the pharmaceutical company asked for; 
2) health economics evidences; 
3) the size of the relevant patient population (2nd year after the coverage decision); 
                                                 
19 The ICER becomes negative e.g. when positive health gain and cost saving are achieved at the same 
time. 
20 Egészségügyi Stratégiai Kutatóintézet (National Institute for Strategic Health Research) 
21 In Hungarian: Technológia Értékelő Bizottság 
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4) annual budget impact expected in the 2nd year of coverage; 
5) motivation for a positive or negative coverage decision in the NHIFA’s degree. 
 
We found that the reimbursement category asked by the company was accepted in 18 
cases. 2 drugs wre not accepted for being part of the „special budget” (means central 
acquisition by the NHIFA and central allocation of the drug among a limited number 
of providers under rigorous administration) for the following reasons: 1) clinical 
evidences were not convincing that time and guidelines had not mentioned the 
potential role of the drug; 2) preliminary health policy decision was considered to be 
needed.  
Further 2 medications got lower reimbursement rate than asked for in the submission 
dossier because 1) the new drug did not belong to the baseline therapy of the given 
disease, 2) the drug was not significantly better than the comparator therapy and the 
daily therapeutic cost of the new drug was also higher. Additional 3 drugs were 
rejected because some point of the submission was against the regulations of the 
coverage policy. 
The reasoning of coverage decisions (in the NHIFA’s degree) focused on clinical 
considerations and the impact of the drug on health. The most frequent types of 
statements were as follows: 
- proved efficacy/better efficacy of the drug; 
- favourable effect on quality of life (e.g. less adverse event, easier 
administration, therapy available at home for the patient); 
- the drug provides therapy for those patients who did not tolerate/react to 
therapies previously available; 
- widening of the range of available therapies; 
- significant improvement in survival is expected; 
- clinical efficacy is proved also in patients with poor prognosis; 
- the disease treated by the drug is of public health importance; 
 
Notions on the favourable / unfavourable cost consequences or about the cost-
effectiveness of the drug were found only a few times. 
Regarding the size of the eligible patient population in Hungary, there were no data 
or estimation available in 4 cases. There were 9 cases when the parties agreed on the 
estimated number of patients. In 12 cases, the ESKI did not accept the estimated 
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patient number provided by the pharmaceutical company because they did not find 
the source of the estimation. The ESKI gave its own estimation only in 2 cases. 
Imperfect information on the size of the patient population entails that is not easy to 
assess the expected budget impact of a treatment. This is reflected by the fact that in 
16 cases there was no budget impact analysis in the documentation. 
In general, we found that there were hardly any health economics data available in 
the dossiers. Both the industrial parties and the ESKI provided data on therapeutic 
costs but – based on the statements of the ESKI – in 23 cases the companies did not 
submit a Hungary-specific cost-effectiveness analysis that properly followed the 
Hungarian guideline on health economics analyses (issued by the Ministry of 
Health). Even if the companies submitted health economic analyses usually those 
presented international results and Hungarian adaptation was not carried out. Hence, 
it was not possible to ascertain the cost-effectiveness of the drugs. Out of the 23 
cases, the ESKI did not require a cost-effectiveness analysis in 2 cases because the 
submissions related to orphan drugs. In 1 case data sources were missing and model 
assumptions were questionable in the Hungarian model. In another case the new drug 
was cheaper than the reimbursed one, so the cost-minimization approach was 
accepted. For those 2 submissions when Hungarian health economics evidences were 
available the findings of these analyses were taken into consideration in the coverage 
decision.  
 
This case study shows that the availability of information on the cost-effectiveness of 
a drug, the size of the relevant patient population and the budget impact of a new 
drug was rather limited in Hungary in 2005. Coverage decisions were made along 
with a shortage of information, although requirements of a reimbursement 
application are legally regulated. Also, applications are aided by the Hungarian 
health economics guideline in which QALYs considered being the accepted and most 
recommended measure of health benefits.  
At the time of this cases study, of course, existed different „techniques” to bridge this 
information gap (e.g. price-volume agreements between the industry and the NHIFA) 
and to ensure that the NHIFA would not overspend its drug budget. However, these 
agreements are and were mainly motivated by financial considerations and - to my 
opinion - are not able to substitute rationing decisions in health care or the methods 
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of priority setting. Also, these arrangements do not enhance the transparency of 
coverage decisions.  
 
The English and the Hungarian examples above show two things. On the one hand, 
the availability of health economics evidences are limited in Hungary, although 
developments in the legislation moved to the direction of improving in this field. (I 
assume that a repeating of our case study would give a better picture by now.) On the 
other hand, it should be noted, that even in those countries where the method and the 
use of health economics analyses are much more advanced and where the scientific 
knowledge and skills are available in abundance, the results of health economics 
analyses are only one input for the decision making. Decision makers always 
consider aspects that are beyond the scope of cost-effectiveness and the favourable or 
unfavourable cost-effectiveness of a technology does not lead to positive or negative 
decision automatically. 
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III. EQUITY CONSIDERATIONS IN HEALTH DISTRIBUTION 
 
This subchapter is built up along two guide-lines. The empirical research in the thesis 
focuses on the identification of social values at play in the distribution of health gain. 
An essential part of the empirical work is therefore to give a survey of considerations 
that have so far been identified in health economic literature and health economic 
analyses as well as of the observations made in the literature about their importance 
and role. On the other hand, however, these considerations are born out of various 
justice theories familiar from philosophy and economics. It is therefore expedient to 
begin discussion of the subject by offering a brief, systematic survey of these 
theories. The theoretical survey is justified by another point. The use of certain terms 
differs in economics and in health economics, which calls for a precise definition of 
the concepts relevant to the thesis.  
 
III.1 Justice theories in economics 
 
Justice theories are summed up here on the basis of Konow’s work22. [Konow 2003] 
Justice theories can in general be divided into two major groups. Distributive justice 
is concerned with the justice of the ultimate distribution of goods, of the outcome 
(e.g. utilitarianism). Procedural justice examines the fairness of the distributive 
process itself, on the assumption that the outcome of a fair process will also be fair 
(e.g. social contract theories). Konow classifies justice theories in three categories, as 
shown in Table 1 below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
22 Konow mentions several empirical studies on justice theories, and describes certain justice theories 
and their criticism in more detail. In this thesis my aim is to give a systemic outline of these theories 
without discussing them in detail. Those interested will find a good number of references to literature 
in Konow’s paper.   
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Table 1 Overview of justice theories 
Category Basic principle Theories23
1 Equality and need Need - Egalitarianism 
- Social contract theories 
(Rawls) 
2 Utilitarianism and 
welfare economics 
Efficiency 
 
- Utilitarianism 
- Pareto Principles 
- Absence of envy 
3 Equity and desert Equity - Desert theory 
- Equity 
 
The theories in the category ‘Equality and need’ emphasize the well-being of the 
underprivileged members of society. The principle of need covers an aspiration to 
satisfy certain basic human needs of all people, even if the individual is unable to do 
so from his/her own resources. The principle of need prevails as long as basic needs 
remain unsatisfied; beyond them, however, other criteria of distribution (e.g. 
efficiency) may come to the fore. The theory of egalitarianism is concerned with the 
outcome and interprets fairness as an equal share of goods by all. Both macro and 
micro-level studies have demonstrated that society in general does not favour equal 
distribution of goods; egalitarianism gains more significance in the broader sense of 
‘treating equals equally’. According to Rawls’ theory, in the original position (in 
which members of the society are ignorant of their social and financial situation as 
well as of their individual capabilities), society is prepared to accept two justice 
principles as guidelines for a basic social arrangement. One principle is the equality 
of rights and opportunities, the other (the difference principle) is known as the 
maximin rule, according to which all social primary goods (rights, opportunity, 
income etc.) are to be distributed equally, unless an unequal distribution is to the 
advantage of the least favoured.  
Utilitarianism and welfare economics are based on consequentialist ethics and 
assume that people value outcomes that appear at the social and not just the 
individual level. According to these theories, the efficiency principle – the 
maximisation of surplus welfare – is not at odds with justice, it is indeed a type of 
justice. Utilitarianism advances choices which yield maximum social utility in all 
cases. Accordingly, resources should be allocated first to the person who derives the 
greatest marginal utility. This implies that individual utility can be cardinally 
                                                 
23 The list of theories in the given categories is incomplete. 
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measurable and interpersonally comparable, and that aggregated individual utilities 
add up to social utility. As to the question what should be used as the measure of fair 
allocation, answers vary from physically allocable units, such as money and other 
goods, to derived values, such as happiness, joy, health and satisfaction. In contrast 
to utilitarianism, the Pareto Principle does not call for a strong cardinality and 
comparability, and endorses all changes that make someone better off without 
rendering others the worse off. The simplest form of fair allocation in welfare 
economics is the lack of envy for anyone else’s position. However, several critics 
have pointed out that the presence or absence of envy cannot necessarily be brought 
into correlation with fairness as commonly perceived by people. This is because the 
examination of outcomes alone is insufficient; in judging fairness, due attention must 
also be paid to the process by which the outcome is attained.24 The next category of 
justice theories concentrate on the process by which outcomes are generated. 
Equity and desert as the common thread of justice theories are based on the idea that 
fair allocation is inseparable from the individual’s activity in which the allocation is 
made. One of the best-known theories based on individual merit is Buchanan’s. 
[Buchanan 1986] In his view, claims for the distribution of goods are determined by 
four factors: luck, individual choice, individual efforts, and birth. Others argue, 
however, that differences stemming from birth, luck or choice are unfair, and only 
those attributable to individual efforts are fair.  Those who make greater efforts 
obtain more desert, which is to be appreciated; other factors, however, such as 
intelligence, physical skills, etc. are irrelevant. ‘Reward’ should be equal for those 
who get equal desert. The question can naturally be taken further. Dworkin 
differentiates between option luck and brute luck. Option luck resembles gambling: 
the individual is aware through his or her decision that the outcome may be good or 
bad and they have to face the consequences. Brute luck, however, is incalculable as 
far as the individual is concerned, who should therefore be relieved of its 
consequences. In light of the above, desert theory professes to the relevance of 
individual efforts and choices under the individual’s personal control (attribution 
theory). In such cases, individual action can be correlated to the outcome, and the 
extent of individual responsibility and contribution is relevant to the outcome. A 
                                                 
24 For instance, two persons may covet the same thing, the one doing his best to get it, the other doing 
nothing. If the first person gets the coveted thing, the other may envy him for it but would probably 
not see the situation as unjust.   
36 
similar stance is taken by equity theory which takes its origin in Aristotle’s principle 
of proportionality. According to the principle of proportionality, the outcome should 
be proportional to the individual’s input. The definition of the concept of individual 
input poses a major problem here. Konow alloys attribution and equity theories to 
formulate an equity principle, according to which, individual allocation is fair only if 
it is proportional to the individual input – and only to it –, over which the individual 
exercises control.  
Rather than supporting one or another justice theory, Konow argues for an integrated 
approach to the theory of justice. In his view, each principle highlights an element 
which is relevant in a positive analysis, thus none should be exclusive. The weight of 
a particular justice theory is determined by the context.25 Konow allies the integrated 
approach to theory with the concept of ‘what is fair’. ‘Fairness’ implies a kind of 
communal morality which in individual cases calls for various solutions. Rather than 
a rigid employment of one particular justice theory, it accepts a ‘fair’ use of various 
justice theories depending on the situation and the context. This concept differs from 
pure justice theories also in that it is often less partial, and the concept of fairness as 
conceived by individuals may also be distorted by interest conditions (e.g. self-
interest). 
 
III.2 Equity in health economics 
 
The concept of equity in health economics may be interpreted in several ways, which 
calls for a more thorough exploration of the concept. It is important to emphasize that 
no single, universal equity theory prevails in health economics: competing theories 
are simultaneously present and their relevance varies from case to case. What is 
conceived of as equitable is a matter of ethics and value system, of which public 
opinion, philosophy, political science and economics etc. may develop differing 
views. [Culyer 2001] Before expounding on the concept of equity, some definitions 
are cited here from health economic literature.   
 
                                                 
25 The importance of context is stressed in several theories (e.g. by Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler or 
Elster). They judge justice as depending on context, rather than formulate a principle of justice.   
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a) According to Whitehead, inequity in health occurs when people’s health 
conditions display differences that are unnecessary and avoidable, and are also 
considered unfair and unjust. [Whitehead 1992]  
 
b) „Health equity is the absence of systematic disparities in health (or its social 
determinants) between more and less advantaged social groups.”…” Health equity, 
an ethical concept based on the principle of distributive justice, is also linked to 
human rights.” [Braveman 2003, p256.] 
 
c) „In essence all equity approaches judge the treatment of individuals inequitable if 
it is capricious or relates to „irrelevant” characteristics. Commonly cited 
characteristics of this sort include race, religion, and gender.” [Culyer 2001, p276.] 
 
It is evident from these definitions that the concept of equity is difficult to formulate; 
almost all the words in them call for further interpretation. Nor can I have a goal 
other than giving a survey of the major dimensions of the concept of equity. 
Equity can be examined in several relations. The following conceptual ranges can be 
distinguished:26 1) equity in health (as a state); 2) equity in the distribution of health 
care (resources); 3) equity in access to health care (e.g. time requirement); 4) equity 
in financial contribution to health care. [Williams 2000, Culyer 2001] 
When discussing equity, the concepts of horizontal and vertical equity invariably 
arise. Horizontal equity means providing similar treatment (e.g. similar allocation) to 
similar individuals (with similar healthcare needs); vertical equity refers to the idea 
that individuals differing from each other in relevant aspects should receive 
adequately different treatment, which should be proportionate to the extent of 
dissimilarity. (Both concept may be interpreted in other relations as well, such as 
horizontal and vertical equity in financial contribution.) It is easy to see that here the 
meaning of the words relevant and adequate present a challenge in the practical use 
of the theory. [Culyer 2001] 
Distinction should be made between micro and macro levels of equity. Micro level 
refers to equity between individuals; and the individual may be either a known 
person or a representative (anonymous) person. The doctor–patient relationship is a 
                                                 
26 Literature is abundant both on these relations and their central concepts, dealing with, among others, 
the definition of health and access to health care, which are outside the scope of this paper. 
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typically micro-level relation. In contrast, macro level refers to equity between 
various groups and it is concerned with health and health policy programmes and the 
resource allocation of programmes.  
 
Williams provides a good survey of equity theories. [Williams 2000] In his work he 
sets up a classification of the various philosophical and economical equity theories in 
health distribution (see Table 2).27 He defines health in terms of quality-adjusted life 
years.28
 
Table 2 Theories of equity in the distribution of health 
Nature of maximand 
Yes 
Nature of 
opportunity set 
Side 
conditions 
on health 
outcomes 
No 
Equal weights Unequal weights 
No 
 - Utilitarian 
- Paretian 
- Equality of health 
   (fair innings) 
- Maximin health 
- Desert 
- Equality of  
   opportunity for 
health 
- Distribution  
   according to current
   ill-health 
Ethically 
unconstrained 
Yes - Decent minimum of health  
- Decent minimum   
          
No 
Various process 
theories (e.g.): 
- libertarianism 
- participatory 
democracy 
- „no envy” 
 - equal access to 
health care 
- rule of rescue 
-Rawlsian maximin -Equality of 
opportunity using 
finance only 
Ethically 
constrained 
Yes  -Extended Rawlsian maximin 
  
Source: Williams, 2000, after Table 1. 
 
Williams uses optimisation in the economical sense as a framework of analysis, in 
which he arranges the equity theories. He examines what the theories have to say 
about optimal distribution of health between two individuals. For that purpose, he 
makes the assumption of the existence of a health production opportunity set, which 
has a frontier. In economic sense, the health production opportunity set is determined 
                                                 
27 It is not the aim of this paper to introduce all theories; only examples are cited to help interpret the 
table. Williams gives a detailed discussion of all cases.  
28 Though Williams’s concern in his analysis was equity in health (QALY) distribution, the theories 
he discussed may also be related to other concepts, like equity in health care distribution.  
39 
by two factors: 1) the technological feasibility of opportunities; 2) their producibility 
from the available resources. Concerned with health, Williams adds a third factor: 
ethical considerations, which may limit the set of health opportunities. He brings up 
two examples: the priority of life-saving is an ethical consideration which is deeply 
rooted in society, and which generally tends to decrease the set of health 
opportunities as it detracts resources from the implementation of other opportunities, 
yet it is widely accepted. And liberalism holds free individual will as an absolute 
basic ethical principle and refuses state intervention even though it may contribute to 
widening the set of health. 
On the other hand, Williams supposes that some theories apply certain criteria of 
maximisation (objective function to define the optimum), while other theories offer 
no orientation as to optimal distribution. Utilitarianism, for instance, aims to 
maximise utility at a social level, and defines the mode of optimal distribution 
through this criterion. In contrast, the theory of participative democracy says that 
individuals have equal rights to participate in democratic public policy dialogues, but 
it does not go further to offer guidance in addressing questions of distribution. 
Two things should be mentioned in connection with the objective function. On one 
hand, some theories introduce side conditions on health outcomes, and the criterion 
of maximisation can only be applied upon the fulfilment of these. For instance, a 
minimal level of health should be initially ensured for all, and the criterion of 
maximisation (utility maximisation) can only subsequently be applied (it may also 
happen that no maximisation criterion is used above the minimum level). On the 
other hand, two persons may not weight equally in the objective function, and it 
matters which of them receives health gain. The desert theory takes its starting-point 
typically in the idea that for various reasons, certain members of the society represent 
greater social value and are thus more deserving of health. The theory of ‘equal 
health opportunity’ proposes compensation for those who are the worse off through 
‘no fault of their own’.29  It can be argued, for instance, that a person with higher 
education degree and working in a high-ranking position has more opportunity to 
lead a healthy life, owing to his/her schooling and financial situation, therefore 
deserves less health care than another person in the same health condition but in poor 
financial situation and without schooling.  
                                                 
29 It is another question of course what is meant by ’own fault’ and what is seen as the free choice of 
the individual. 
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Figure 7 shows a case when the optimal health distribution between A and B is sought 
for in a linear maximisation function and with equal weights. The frontier of health 
opportunity set is marked by the FF curve, with the point X at the optimum solution. 
No side condition is given and the two persons have equal weights.  
 
Figure 7 Health maximization (linear maximand and equal weights) 
45° 
F
FO 
•  X 
E 
Health of „A” 
Health of „B” 
 
Source: Williams, 2000, after Figure 3. 
 
As mentioned earlier, quality adjusted life year (QALY) is currently the most 
accepted concept in health economical analyses for assisting resource allocation 
decisions. QALY comes from a utilitarian approach and has been frequently 
criticised because, as is evident from the practice and as supported by several 
empirical results, utility maximisation is but one of the many considerations in the 
distribution of health resources. Health economic literature has identified several 
other factors at play with greater or lesser weight in medical, financing or health 
policy allocation decisions. In the next subchapter I give a survey of such 
considerations, with a brief description of the results of empirical health economical 
examinations as to their presence and role.  
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 III.3 The role of social values in the distribution of health 
 
Equity considerations actually direct attention to the fact that, more than simply a 
choice among medical technologies, priority setting is also a choice among members 
and groups of society, among individuals. In the practical realisation of equity and daily 
decision-making, decision-makers are inevitably confronted with the issue of the 
criteria under which to provide health benefits to certain persons or groups and deny 
others access to them. Rendering such delicate and assailable decisions as acceptable as 
possible for the society, bringing them ever closer to social value judgment, is a most 
natural expectation.   
Problems of prioritization among persons are demonstrated in Figure 8 (where value 0 
on the vertical axis denotes the state of death and value 1 perfect health). It is assumed 
for simplicity’s sake that decision is to be brought on treating three patient groups 
whose life expectancy is identical and remains unaltered by the treatment, and who 
differ only in their health-related quality of life. It is evident from Table 8 that patient 
group A is in a worse state of health (with a lower health-related life quality) than group 
B or C, while the improvement in health-related quality of life is expected to be greater 
in group C than in the other two groups. In case QALY maximisation is targeted, 
patient group C would be prioritised. [Nord 1999] 
 
Figure 8 Differences in disease severity and treatment effect 
 
 
              1                                     C 
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                    A 
 
 
 
 
                0 
  
Source: Nord, 1999, Figure 2. 
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It is conceivable, however, that society grants priority to treating patients in a very 
bad state of health and favours patient group A accordingly (which would be in 
consonance with Rawls’ criteria), even though other patients would benefit equally 
or more from the treatment. The severity of the health state of the individual patients 
is therefore of importance.  
Another question is whether patient group B can be discriminated against on grounds 
that their treatment promises less health gain, even though their initial life quality is 
identical with that of patient group C. This issue keeps coming up in practical, 
patient-level decision-making all the time. An example is the decision on 
transplantation priority in case of two patients with equal prospects before the 
intervention. No satisfactory reply is found to this question; yet the display of strong 
and clear social preferences for the treatment of patients capable of achieving greater 
health gains, as is suggested unequivocally by the QALY maximisation criterion, 
cannot be taken for granted. Another question of equity is the intention to reduce 
inequity among patients. If patient group C receives treatment, differences in health 
state would significantly increase as compared to the initial state of affairs. Further 
increase in inequity is not necessarily a desired state. [Nord 1999] 
 
QALY is a preference-based measure, which combines the aspects of longevity and 
life quality in health gain quantification. Health economists have proposed QALY 
for the quantification of additional health gain in order to maximise social welfare. In 
actual fact, however, social value judgement views both the attainable health gain 
and the rule of health gain maximisation as insufficient and unsatisfactory. In 
community-level resource allocation decisions, social values, such as justice and 
equity are equally important. Social values may derive from several sources and can 
be classified in two basic categories: 1) factors that relate to the characteristics of the 
patient and 2) factors related to the characteristics of the intervention’s effect on 
patient’s health.30 [Schwappach 2002] 
In the following, I examine the characteristics to which social value judgments 
attribute an important role in health gain distribution, based on categories defined by 
Schwappach [2002]. As we shall see, QALY allows for certain considerations; 
however, social value judgments may not directly overlap the QALY linear, 
                                                 
30 Other factors beyond the two categories mentioned by Schwappach may also play a role, e.g. the 
burden of illness on the patient’s relatives.   
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proportional assumption (i.e. 1 QALY gained by 10 persons each may not 
necessarily be equivalent with 10 QALYs gained by one person).  Moreover, social 
value judgments may have certain aspects that are absent from the concept of QALY 
– and thus do not affect achievable QALY gain – yet may have a bearing on 
allocation decisions (e.g. individual responsibility in the emergence of the disease). 
Schwappach set up the following categories of considerations:  
 
1) Characteristics of patients  
- age of patients  
- social role of patients 
- health-related lifestyle and behaviour of patients 
- prior health-care consumption of patients 
 
2) Characteristics of health effects on patients  
- health level before treatment (start point) 
- health level after treatment (end point) 
- the change in health effect: distance between start and end points 
- time horizon of health improvement (e.g. absolute or relative growth of 
longevity)  
- health improvement versus prevention of health decline (direction of health 
effect). 
 
Relying on the literature, I added to the above characteristics the number of patients 
in need of treatment, the cost of treatment, and the probability of successful 
treatment. 
The concept of QALY takes into account the patient’s age (indirectly, see later), the 
size and duration of health effect, and the probability of successful treatment. While 
no other factors form part of the QALY conception, they may indeed affect treatment 
efficiency and thus the achievable QALY gain. For instance, if life-style is directly 
related to the illness so as it decreases the efficiency of treatment, this factor may be 
taken into account in QALY calculations and sub-group analyses can be made (e.g. 
analysis of the sub-group of smokers in case of coronary diseases). [Schwappach 
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2002] In the following, I shall deal with the most important theoretical questions of 
the above characteristics and give some examples of empirical results. 
 
III.3.1 Age of the patient 
 
Of the above characteristics, issues related to the patients’ age have probably been 
most extensively dealt with in literature. Age is one of the most obvious of patient 
characteristics, and also most definitive in the choice of social values. One comment 
on the relation of age and QALY is called for. Although QALY is generally looked 
upon as discriminatory against older people, i.e. it is ‘ageist’ (see later), QALY 
calculations are based on the patients’ life expectancy, rather than their age. QALY 
favours ceteris paribus younger age groups merely because of their longer life 
expectancy, and in certain circumstances it may be discriminatory against both the 
old and the young. [Schwappach 2002] 
Here is an example of the problem posed by the introduction of age as criterion in 
resource allocation decisions in the QALY model. It is assumed that medical 
intervention is to be applied on patients aged 20, 60 and 70 years in similar state of 
health. With identical effect on health and an annual 3 per cent discount rate, the 
QALY model yields the following assessment of the three interventions: the 
treatment of the 20-year-old is 1.8 times more valuable than that of the 60-year-old 
and 3.1 times more valuable than of the 70-year-old patient. From another angle, the 
treatment of 33 twenty-year-old patients equals that of 60 sixty-year-olds and 100 
seventy-year-olds. Age-based discrimination of such extent is likely to conflict with 
social value judgment. Other factors may also play a role in the higher social 
appreciation of the treatment of young generations as compared to the older.  
People may deem, for instance, that everyone is due some similar life expectancy, or 
they may assign greater importance to certain stages of life (see later). Thus, despite 
a probably erroneous assumption, the QALY conception may indeed yield the right 
overall result when prioritising younger generations. [Nord 1999] 
Ageism is easier to understand if its types are briefly surveyed: 1) preference for the 
young on account of their greater life expectancy; 2) preference for young adults 
over children and the elderly on account of their greater productiveness; 3) 
preference for the young over the old as the latter have had more life years. 
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[Tsuchiya 1999] Although some empirical data attest to the refusal by respondents of 
age-based prioritisation, in most examinations ageism is apparent. An examination of 
decision-making in medical practice also proved age-based rationing both with 
regard to the patients’ expected benefits from treatment and to patent age. [Dolan et 
al 2005] 
Age-based weighting of health gain (QALY) is justified on two counts. [Tsuchiya 
1999] One is efficiency-based age weighting, which is conjoined by two approaches 
to age-related value judgment: 
a) the productivity consideration: social role filled at various ages defines the 
social value of the health of a person of a particular age; 
b) the utility consideration: preference for the younger as they have greater life 
expectancy and can probably achieve more health gain.31  
The other is equity-based age weighting, based on an egalitarian approach, which 
favours the young as they have had less life years and deserve as much as older 
people do. 32  
The concept of ‘fair innings’, introduced by Williams [Williams 1997], puts different 
weights to persons of different ages on an equitable basis. Equity weights are 
determined by a) the generally accepted QALY value in the given society due to a 
person during a lifetime; b) personal prospects of realizing that QALY value.  
This argument implies that people are entitled to a ‘normal’ life span (e.g. 70–75 
years in West European societies). Those failing to achieve this are deprived of a 
certain number of life years that society deems are due to them. In contrast, those 
who live longer than that, receive each consecutive year as a ‘bonus’ and suffer no 
harm in equity. ‘Fair innings’ implies that everybody should be given equal chance 
to live out their fair share of life, and until they reach that age, all must be done to 
prevent them dying earlier. [Rivlin 2000] In light of this, Williams proposes to assign 
more weight to obtainable life years where recipients are under the particular age. 
‘Fair innings’ has been criticised from several quarters. On one hand, the concept of 
a ‘fair’ life-span is practically indefinable. On the other hand, the concept in this 
                                                 
31 Though I do not wish to deal here with the concept of DALY (Disability Adjusted Life Year), it 
should be noted that DALY is based on the individual’s social value and aims to capture the different 
social roles individuals play in different age groups. The greatest weights are assigned to the middle-
aged, while the youngest and the oldest are assigned smaller weights. [Murray 1996] 
32 It should be noted that age-based health gain weighting cannot be handled together with weighting 
based on the patient’s sex, education or income. Most people have the chance to experience the 
various ages, so it can be regarded less discriminatory. [Tsuchiya 1999] 
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form is related to the rationing of health care by age, and its sole relevance in 
defining equity is questionable. Later Williams also argued that the concept of ‘fair 
innings’ should be complemented by life quality. [Nord 2005] 
In view of this, efficiency-based weighting is clearly focussed on the particular age 
of the patient and, in contrast to equity-based weighting, disregards the past, present 
and future extent of the person’s life quality, nor is it concerned with life expectancy. 
In other words, people of the same age will be assigned identical weights. But in 
equity-based weighting, persons of the same age may be assigned differing weights 
(e.g. in case QALYs to be expected in the rest of their life is differing). The two 
types of weighting display a similar – decreasing – pattern in adulthood, but are 
widely different in childhood: the weight assigned to the newborn in DALY is zero, 
while in the other approach, the newborn are given the greatest weight. [Tsuchiya 
1999] 
 
Several papers have dealt with the analysis of the role of age, but as yet literature 
offers no reliable proof for the value of these weights. Results display differences, 
among others, according to the particular age group examined in the paper. 
Moreover, the intensity of preferences for younger age groups nurtured in a given 
society varies from country to country. [Nord 1999] 
Johannesson, for instance, examined the role patient age plays in prioritisation 
decisions. [Johannesson 1996] The examination was occasioned by a health policy 
recommendation then current in Sweden, according to which no distinction should be 
made between the young and the old with regard to life-saving intervention. The 
survey also sought to establish the equivalent of the number of saving 30 year-olds 
with 100 fifty and 70-year-old persons. The result obtained with respect to the 
median value of replies was that saving the life of one 30-year-old person is 
equivalent to saving the life of 4.9 fifty-year-old and 34.5 seventy-year-old people. 
With the progress of age, the number of patients eligible for compensation grew 
exponentially. In other words, the Swedish population assigned increasingly smaller 
weights to increasingly aged patients. 
Nord conducted a survey among an average sample of the Australian population of 
their attitudes to health gain maximisation or propensity towards egalitarianism. 
[Nord et al 1995a] The survey was aimed to explore neutrality in QALY distribution. 
The question to be answered was: which person should be prioritised if available 
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resources are insufficient to treat all. The role of age was examined in three contexts: 
choice according to age amongst persons in critical condition; choice according to 
age group amongst persons who are to achieve equal life quality through treatment; 
and choice between young children and infants (e.g. in case of organ transplantation). 
Assuming a propensity toward maximisation, younger age groups as well as infants 
should be prioritised in the above examples, since more QALY gain is to be expected 
in their cases. The results in Nord’s surveys, however, showed a propensity to 
egalitarianism: in the case of life-threatening conditions, 42 per cent of respondents, 
in case of equal life quality 76 per cent, and in the choice between young children 
and infants 55 percent of respondents accorded equal priority to all patients. In the 
latter case, a further 44 per cent would have prioritised young children on the 
assumption that 1) intervention had better chances – which can be interpreted as a 
maximising attitude; 2) children were viewed more like suffering, feeling ‘persons’, 
the loss of whom, moreover, would have involved greater pain for their parents. 
In Finland, Ryynänen examined attitudes to health care prioritisation criteria among 
doctors and nurses in relation to old patients and children. [Ryynänen et al 2000] He 
found that the probability of decision for the treatment of child patients was 
significantly greater both among doctors and nurses (the odds ratio was 4.7 in the 
case of doctors, 6.8 of nurses).  
Studies on social preferences for age show contradictory results. Public opinion 
surveys have found only limited support for age as an explicit and general criterion 
of prioritisation. In ranking age-specific medical treatments and prioritising 
hypothetical patients, however, respondents showed moderate or strong preference to 
younger patients. [Bowling 1996, Rodríguez 2000] The wording and perspective of 
the questions are also important: while the public in general tends to show a positive 
discrimination in favour of the young, there is much less support for negative 
discrimination against the elderly. To sum it up, public opinion in general prioritises 
younger people against the elderly, but the presence and strength of these preferences 
varies from country to country and they are also conditional on the structure of the 
survey and the context of the questions. The extent and orientation of age-related 
preferences are therefore still insufficiently documented. [Schwappach 2002] 
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III.3.2 Social role of the patient 
 
I have already broached the attitudes to the social role of patients in discussing age-
related value judgments. Surveying the literature on the subject, Dolan and 
Schwappach concluded that examinations conducted among the general public show 
a reluctance or direct refusal of prioritisation criteria based on the patients’ working 
status, retirement, wealth or poverty. [Dolan et al 2005, Schwappach 2002] On the 
other hand, most respondents tend to prioritise in favour of patients with dependants, 
especially small children, or other social responsibilities. As a counter example, Nord 
finds that, in case all patients have the same illness, only 33.4 per cent of Australian 
respondents prioritised patients with dependent children. 66.6 percent of the 
respondents gave equal priority to patients with or without children, which means 
that the findings of the paper showed distributive neutrality. [Nord et al 1995a] In 
Finland, Ryynänen found that doctors and nurses gave greater priority to poor 
patients than wealthy ones. [Ryynänen et al 2000] Attitudes to the patients’ social 
role are also likely to display great differences in various countries and cultures.  
 
III.3.3 Health related lifestyle of the patient 
 
The social value of health gain may be affected by the cause why a treatment is 
necessary. One point of consideration may be the patient’s control over the 
emergence of the illness and the extent to which the illness is related to the patient’s 
lifestyle. [Dolan et al 2005] 
Le Grand argues that if the illness is caused by factors beyond the patient’s control 
the situation is unfair, while in the opposite case it is to be regarded as fair. [Le 
Grand 1987] Dolan also takes the view that individual responsibility should be taken 
into account. [Dolan-Olsen 2001] 
Current examination results on the health-related lifestyle of patients as a 
prioritisation criterion are, however, far from unequivocal. Although respondents 
show a tendency to extend priority to those ill through no fault of their own, public 
opinion is in general strongly divided. Preferences for people conducting a healthy 
lifestyle might be based either on the prospect of better health outcomes in their case, 
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i.e. on the efficiency consideration, or on a purely moralistic approach. [Schwappach 
2002] 
Nord examined willingness to give identical priority to smokers and non-smokers in 
case of heart disease and lung cancer. Close to 60 per cent of respondents said some 
priority should be given in favour of non-smokers, and 40 per cent refrained from 
prioritising on such grounds. Nord avers this reflects a moralising attitude: non-
smokers are given priority because they are not to blame for a self-inflicted 
condition. [Nord et al 1995a] 
Ryynänen found that in Finland nurses and doctors showed neutrality in relation to 
patients’ negligence of their health, but gave smaller priority to those who were to 
blame for their condition. [Ryynänen et al 2000] 
In the US, Wittenberg examined the issue of personal responsibility in relation to the 
treatment of liver disease and asthma: in case rationing is necessary, who are to 
receive liver transplant and asthma treatment. [Wittenberg et al 2003] Results 
showed that respondents were 10 to 17 times more likely to allocate treatments to 
patients deemed not responsible for their conditions. In both cases, personal 
responsibility significantly influenced respondents’ allocation decisions.  
 
III.3.4 Prior health care consumption 
 
Prior health care consumption of patients might be an important consideration in 
social judgment. It may follow from the hypothesis that everybody is entitled to have 
a life-saving intervention if necessary, regardless of its cost or benefit, and those in 
need of the intervention for the first time should be prioritised over those who have 
previously undergone one. [Schwappach 2002] As I mentioned earlier, Williams 
introduced the concept of ‘fair innings’ which regards the amount of QALYs gained 
previously as also important. [Williams 1997] 
In Dolan’view, preferences in the distribution of QALYs depend on differences in 
four approaches to health streams33 [Dolan-Olsen 2001]:  
1) expected QALYs from health care; 
2) health state without health care (no-treatment profiles); 
3) amount of previous QALYs gained without health care; 
                                                 
33 It should be noted that in reality the four streams are very difficult to distinguish.  
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4) amount of previous QALYs gained from health care.  
 
Table 3 Taxonomy of health streams 
 
 Retrospective health Prospective health 
Gained health 
 i.e. from health care 
Previous QALYs gained from 
health care (4) 
Expected QALY benefit from 
health care (1) 
"Free" health 
 i.e. not from health 
care 
Previous QALYs yielded without 
health care (3) 
Expected QALY profile without 
health care (2) 
 
Source: Dolan, 2001, Figure 1. 
 
Dolan draws a parallel in the difference between factors 3 and 4 with Rawls’ 
approach, who distinguishes between goods distributed in a natural way and as 
determined by society. [Rawls 1972] However, he points out two differences. Rawls 
viewed health and its personal distribution as determined solely by nature, which 
Dolan disapproves. On the other hand, Rawls focussed on social resolutions for 
ensuring the individual’s right to primary goods. Dolan, in contrast, is concerned 
with the outcome (health state) in health distribution, rather than distributive 
processes or rights. 
In health economics analyses, as they gradually gain ground, the amount of QALYs 
expected from health care (stream 1) have came to the fore, and the need for health 
care interventions is most frequently defined as the individual’s capacity to benefit 
from them. [Culyer 1997]. If the aim is health gain maximisation, this is indeed the 
only relevant approach.  
Stream 2 calls for a definition of health need as the expected ill health state over the 
remaining lifetime. The consequences of no treatment are to be dealt with for two 
reasons: a) people may feel the need to care for those with poor health prospects; b) 
it may figure as a consideration in equitable health distribution. If inequities in 
prospective health are to be reduced, QALY gains should be primarily allocated to 
those with the worst prospects without treatment. [Dolan-Olsen 2001] Taking into 
consideration previously gained QALYs (streams 3 and 4) leads in actual fact to 
issues related to the age and the age group of patients. (The importance attributed to 
health varies in different ages and phases of life.) [Dolan-Olsen 2001]  
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The question that arises here is whether taking into consideration previous health 
gained from health care is of relevance morally when making distributive decisions. 
Dolan offers the following answers to the question. [Dolan-Olsen 2001] The answer 
is ‘yes’ if one takes the view that everybody is entitled to a given amount of QALYs 
during their lifetime. The answer is ‘no’ if previous treatments obtained are looked 
upon as sunken costs, and discrimination on this ground against those previously in 
need of such treatments is refused. The third answer is ‘it depends’. In this case too, 
the need for previous treatments can be taken into consideration to a varying degree. 
The core of the argument is whether the patient can be deemed responsible for 
his/her condition. An extremist view is that the patient’s responsibility for a previous 
illness should have a bearing on the current distributive decision, regardless of his 
responsibility for the emergence of his current illness. Somewhat more permissive is 
the view that previous treatment should only be taken into consideration if the patient 
can be deemed responsible for both his previous and current condition, even though 
the two illnesses may have nothing to do with one another. And lastly, ‘recidivist’ 
patients, i.e. those who fell ill both previously and currently for the same 
irresponsible and self-destructive behaviour, may be punished. The counter-argument 
is that people’s different psychological and intellectual capabilities make for a 
varying degree of ability to modify their behaviour, and the correlation between 
lifestyle and illness cannot always be substantiated with certainty.  
 
III.3.5 Initial level of health state 
 
Empirical examination results reveal that the public tends to give priority to the worst 
off, and that the initial severity of illness, irrespective of the prospective effects of 
treatment, is in itself a value-generating factor. [Dolan 1998, Ubel et al 1996, Ubel 
1999] Evidence shows that people are willing to sacrifice a certain amount of life 
quality gain for the treatment of the severely ill. Because of the limited number of 
donors, the most obvious example of prioritisation is organ transplantation. Ubel 
found that in case of life-saving intervention, respondents made no distinction 
between patients previously in good health and those worse off. [Ubel et al 1999] 
Interestingly enough, less priority was granted to a patient with paraplegia to develop 
after the life-saving intervention.  
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Such decisions may probably be explained by equity considerations, as the 
prioritisation of patients in already better health would increase inequity among 
them. A special example is the care of the dying, which may be regarded as an 
extension of the ‘rule of rescue’: society in general feels it is their duty to alleviate 
the suffering of the dying and to provide them palliative care. In contrast, initial 
health state is of secondary importance in the concept of QALY, which counts in so 
far as those in poorer health have – theoretically – a greater chance to gain QALYs 
than those in a better state, thus the improvement in their health state is expected to 
be less. If, however, only a small extent of improvement is to be gained in poorer 
health states, QALY underestimates the social value of the treatment of patients in 
poorer health. [Schwappach 2002] 
 
III.3.6 After- treatment level of health state 
 
Though indicative of the benefit of treatment, the level of health to be achieved after 
intervention is also closely connected with the characteristics of the patients. The 
QALY approach is based on the concept of ‘perfect health’ which is defined as a 
universal theoretical optimum, rather operating with the individual maximum 
potential available to patients.  Accordingly, patients whose perfect health can be 
restored are prioritised over those whose illness is curable, yet some other chronic 
condition or disability prevents achievement of a perfect health. This is why QALY 
has been described as discriminatory against the disabled and the chronically ill. 
[Schwappach 2002] 
As against this, survey results show that in case of life-saving interventions, people 
do not discriminate between patients on grounds of their previous health states. 
[Abellan-Perpinan 1999, Nord 1993] In another examination, Nord found that, of 
patients with poor life quality, 53 per cent of the respondents prioritised those with a 
higher life quality after intervention, and 47 per cent refused prioritisation on such 
grounds. [Nord et al 1995a] In his examination related to liver transplantation, Ubel 
sought answer as to whom people would give the organs. [Ubel-Loewenstein 1996a, 
1996b] He found that only a small proportion of respondents was prepared to give all 
organs to the patient group with the best prognosis. However, the greater the 
differences were in prognosis, the less equal chances people gave to all patients. 
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Seeing the empirical results, the question arises if the concept of perfect health 
should be replaced with ‘actual health’ in order to establish the achievable maximum. 
The results show that in prioritisation, given the limited possibilities, people 
generally concentrate on the greatest possible benefit to the patients, rather than a 
theoretical optimum. [Schwappach 2002] 
 
III.3.7 Change in health state – extent of health gain 
 
The appropriateness of health care resource allocation according to the extent of 
health gain is much debated in the literature. Health economists usually argue for the 
greatest possible aggregate health gain in resource allocation. Others, however, 
question such a principle in allocation on grounds that it is discriminatory against the 
elderly and against underprivileged groups less able to benefit from health services. 
[Dolan-Cookson 2000] 
The extent of health change, or of health gain, is an important consideration in public 
opinion. (See e.g. [Abellan-Perpinan 1999, Bowling 1996, Cookson-Dolan 1999, 
Olsen et al 1998]) However, health gain is often interpreted as the end point, rather 
than a relative improvement, and no priority is accorded to treatments leaving the 
patient in a relatively poor state of health. [Dolan-Cookson 2000] Comparing this 
finding to the fact that in general people do not discriminate on the basis of the initial 
state of health, people seem to distinguish between the health state achievable owing 
to the treatment and the patient’s limited capability of benefiting from the treatment. 
[Schwappach 2002] 
In his qualitative examination, Dolan found that giving priority to patients capable of 
gaining more health from the treatment was ambiguous. [Dolan-Cookson 2000] Out 
of humane and moral considerations, a sizeable proportion of respondents tend to 
give equal chance for all to have treatment. Dolan observed what is called the 
threshold value, which appears in more than one form. In case of absolute threshold 
value, respondents said, regardless of the other patient group, that if a patient’s life 
quality or life expectancy remains very poor after intervention, the other patient 
should be prioritised. In case of a relative threshold value, respondents compared the 
health gains in the two patient groups and if the difference was ‘great enough’, they 
prioritised those with greater benefits from the treatment. Beyond these two 
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approaches, there was a third shown by some respondents who opted for an equal 
treatment of the two patient groups if the difference between achievable health states 
through the intervention is too small either in a relative or absolute sense. 
 
III.3.8 Time horizon of achieved health effect 
 
According to the basic QALY approach, the social value of health improvement is 
proportionate to the number of years in which the patient enjoys the positive effect of 
treatment; in other words, a principle of strict proportionality prevails. For instance, 
the value of the treatment of a 60-year-old with a life expectancy of 20 years is 
double the value of a patient of similar age with a life expectancy of 10 years. This 
assumption is made in the QALY conception with no empirical evidence whatsoever; 
it is simply implied intuitively in the construction. Whether some can be 
discriminated against and barred from health care on such grounds is, however, 
questionable on ethical grounds too. [Nord 1999] 
Olsen, for instance, found that respondents judged the two cases of 100 persons 
gaining another 10 years as a benefit of treatment and of 80 people another 20 years, 
as similar. [Olsen 1994] In other words, in this context 1 000 life years were seen as 
equivalent to 1 600 years. Doubling the life expectancy decreased the number of 
patients to be treated by only 20 percent, instead of 50 percent. This assumption of 
the QALY concept is therefore strongly questionable. It has to be noted, though, that 
the duration of the effect results from the combined effects of several factors, such as 
life expectancy, aged-based preferences, time preference etc., the individual effects 
of which are hard to separate. [Schwappach 2002] 
 
III.3.9 Improvement in health versus prevention of its further deterioration 
 
The direction of health effect, i.e. health improvement versus prevention of health 
deterioration, does not figure in utility assessments, so it does not affect utility. 
Current examination results in this area are also contradictory. Further researches are 
to be conducted on the value of prevention. [Schwappach 2002] 
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III.3.10 Number of eligible patients 
 
According to the QALY approach, the social value of a health programme is 
proportionate to the number of people enjoying its health benefits. However, empirical 
examinations prove that people are also concerned with the distribution of health gain. 
They prefer those programmes that provide benefits to as many as possible; on the other 
hand, if the health gain to be achieved by the individual is too small, they prefer to 
concentrate it. There is also evidence that people show a strong tendency to distribute a 
certain amount of health gain to all, if possible. [Olsen 2000] 
 
III.3.11 Cost of treatment 
 
In QALY-based health gain maximisation, patients should be ranked inversely 
proportionally to treatment costs. In other words, if treating one patient costs double the 
treatment of another, the patient in need of the more expensive treatment should only be 
prioritised if the outcome is at least the double of the less expensive treatment cost of 
the other patient. [Nord 1999] Cost considerations are far less frequently taken into 
account than health economists would find it appropriate. In certain special areas of 
health provision society accepts cost considerations only with great difficulty or not at 
all. Such are life-saving interventions in line of the principle of ‘the rule of rescue’. Yet 
apart from such obvious cases, evidence is scant about societal opinion in such 
questions and about the appropriateness of the QALY notion. People’s willingness to 
discriminate against patients in need of high-cost treatments is therefore questionable. 
[Nord 1999] 
In actual fact, available evidence (see e.g. [Nord et al 1995b]) attests to people’s strong 
‘resistance’ to the maximisation argument and the importance of the severity of illness 
as prioritising criterion over costs. From an economical aspect, the attitude of 
decreasing treatment chances for all ought to be actually viewed as irrational. Why this 
preference can still be regarded as rational from the aspect of utility is supported by 
Nord by three arguments. On one hand, the individual’s awareness that in case he or she 
has an illness with high treatment cost they will receive the necessary intervention and 
will not be discriminated against on the basis of cost, is a source of benefit. Another 
source of benefit is avoidance of the emotional burden attached to refusal. The third 
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factor that may appear in the individual’s benefit function is similar to the ‘the rule of 
rescue’: the majority of people have a sense of duty to help those in need.  
 
III.3.12 Probability of successful treatment 
 
The success of medical interventions always carries a degree of uncertainty. The health 
gain expressed in terms of QALY is an expected value appearing as a statistical mean. 
In the QALY approach, the social value of an intervention is proportionate to the 
probability of successful intervention. (For instance, if the utility of a successful 
intervention is 20 QALYs and the probability of the successful intervention is 70 per 
cent, the expected benefit is 14 QALYs.) Few analyses have been made in this area, so 
the incorporation of this consideration in resource allocation decisions is questionable. 
Nor is sufficient evidence available on whether the traditional QALY conception could 
handle this question appropriately and would not ‘mislead’ the decision-maker. 
Intuitively, from observing people’s reluctance to discriminate on grounds of the 
patient’s capacity to benefit from the treatment (or only disproportionately), and on the 
basis of the number of patients, one can conclude that proportionality between the 
success of the intervention and its social value judgment is also questionable. Further 
empirical examinations are called for to answer these questions. [Nord 1999] 
The above-mentioned empirical examinations lead to three major conclusions. 1) A 
significant proportion of respondents frequently refuses rationing on any ground and 
flatly reject it. 2) People usually reject extremist resource allocation. Even if they 
prioritise a patient group, they do not allocate all resources for the treatment of this 
group only and tend to allocate some resources also to the less preferred group. 3) The 
proportionality attributes of the QALY concept are untenable. People are unwilling to 
show a health maximising attitude if their attention is called to the fact that they have 
renounced a certain amount of health gain. The decision-making criteria represented by 
QALY, such as multi-dimensional proportionality and health gain maximisation, do not 
enjoy full support by the public or individuals. [Schwappach 2002] 
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III.3.13 Social reference point 
 
Going through the above considerations, it is worth while addressing another issue: 
which are those illnesses or health conditions which elicit the society’s sense of 
responsibility; in other words, which treatments and health improvements society is 
willing to allocate resources for.   
There is a sort of value judgment in society of a normal life, a normal health state in 
various phases of life. Beyond the fact that QALY gain by those with a higher life 
quality is deemed less necessary than by patients with lower life quality, there might 
exist a social reference point on the QALY scale, below which the improvement of 
health state is viewed as necessary, and above which intervention is considered 
unnecessary, since a decreased life quality is seen, for instance, as a natural 
consequence of ageing and therefore acceptable. In this sense, the demarcation 
between individual and social responsibility may depend on the extent achievable 
health gain is seen as ‘luxury’. Plastic surgery is classified in this category and is 
thus excluded from interventions financed from public funds. Social responsibility is 
more likely to manifest itself for health states in which, to put it in a very general 
way, treatment is aimed at the avoidance and reduction of pain. The development of 
new technologies and the changes in social expectations and value judgment, 
however, are bound to give rise to more and more similar dilemmas. [Stolk et al 
2002] The difference between the two kinds of responsibility can be shown as a 
threshold value on the QALY scale (Figure 9). 
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 Figure 9 Social Reference Point on the QALY scale – hypothetical decision 
 
Egészség maximum
Egészség minimum
Társadalmi Referencia Pont 
(TRP)
mozgás a TRP felé = magasabb 
költség / QALY értékek elfogadása 
rosszabb feltételek esetén
- fájdalom elkerülése
- súlyosságtól függő szükséglet
mozgás a TRP felett = nincs finanszírozás
- életmód-gyógyszerek
- kezelés nem szükséges
Above SRP: no reimbursement
. life-style drugs 
. no need for treatment 
Health maximum
Health minimum
Social Reference Point (SRP) 
Below SRP: acceptance of higher 
cost/QALY 
. to avoid pain 
. need depends on disease 
severity 
 
 
Source: Stolk, 2002, Figure 3.1. 
 
On this basis, a patient’s entitlement to treatment can be expressed as the difference 
of life quality between the social reference point and his/her actual health state. The 
difference between ‘luxury treatment’ and pain reduction is defined by their position 
with respect to the social reference point, rather than the existence or absence of the 
illness burden.  Social reference points might differ according to patient groups and 
individual age, and might change in time. Society is likely to expect an increasingly 
higher life quality at all ages. [Stolk et al 2002] 
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 IV. HYPOTHESES AND OPERATIONALIZATION OF CONCEPTS 
 
 
IV.1 Research hypotheses 
 
Research question 
 
In opinion of Hungarian medical doctors, which societal and equity considerations 
should affect the distribution of health among individuals (patients)? 
 
The paper aims to answer this question with two empirical studies using different 
methodological approaches: preference elicitation and investigation of attitudes. As 
the literature review of the dissertation shows, there are no straightforward answers 
in the international literature either, only tendencies can be seen. As I investigated 
preferences and attitudes, the results can be interpreted only in the circle of 
respondents in these studies; I do not consider adequate to transfer preferences and 
attitudes to other respondent groups. That is why the wording of my hypotheses 
mentions the relevant respondent group. 
 
Preference elicitation among general practitioners 
 
The subjects of the preference elicitation were Hungarian general practitioners (GPs). 
At the end of the day, it is medical doctors to decide which patient to treat and how, 
hence they play a key role in resource allocation. Furthermore, through the referral 
system, GPs have an impact on which treatment options will be available for the 
patient at higher levels of the health care system. Another reason for choosing GPs as 
subjects was that retrospective analyses of medical decisions (e.g. medical chart 
reviews) are available in abundance, however there are few examples for preference 
elicitation among medical doctors. I composed two hypotheses for the preference 
measurement. 
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Hypothesis 1:  
General practitioners have well defined preferences about the prioritization of 
patients: they are expected to consider the age of the patient and disease severity the 
most important factors. 
 
Hypothesis 2: 
Preferences for patient prioritization are not homogeneous: based on the 
characteristics of the respondents (e.g. age of the GP) differences in the preferences 
can be shown. 
 
Study of attitudes among medical doctors 
 
Related to the second methodological approach – study of attitudes with Q-method – 
I do not propound a hypothesis for the results. The reason behind is that the Q-
method - as the study of subjectivity – is not suitable for testing hypotheses. The Q-
method had been widely used in the field of psychology and political sciences; 
however its use related to health sciences has not been widespread. Therefore, the 
hypothesis composed for this second study is related to the applicability of this 
method in the field of health care. 
 
Hypothesis 3: 
It is possible to distinguish different opinion families among medical doctors with 
respect to which factors are considered to be important in allocating health among 
patients and which patient or disease characteristics are rejected as a basement for 
patient prioritization. 
 
I find the test of these hypotheses important for two reasons: 
 
a) it is possible to show the diversity of preferences and attitudes and how they are 
affected by the characteristics of responders; 
b) although the generalizability of the results is not possible, we might assume that 
other groups hold different and diverse preferences, too; therefore, a deeper 
understanding of social values would be important in health policy decision making. 
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IV.2 Operationalization of key concepts 
 
The main concepts of this paper are defined in line with the literature, however, as 
these concepts may cover many aspects it is worth presenting here the meaning as 
the paper interpret them. 
 
Health gain 
 
In general, health gain means the improvement of the health state [Evetovits-Gaál 
2005], and can be described with different measures (e.g. number of avoided deaths, 
decrease of blood pressure). In a less disease-specific context, it has two basic 
dimensions: health gain expressed as longer life time (more life years) and as an 
improvement in health related quality of life. These two dimension provide the 
basement of the QALY concept (quality adjusted life year). Although, my research 
studies are not based on the QALY concept itself, they are related to those aspects 
that might affect those decisions which determine the distribution of health gains 
among individuals. 
 
Preference 
 
According to neoclassical microeconomics, the consumer’s decisions are based on 
the assumption that the consumer is able to compare two goods and chooses the one 
that maximizes her utility function. The theoretical basement of the preference 
elicitation study in this paper is also in line with Lancaster’s theory. [Lancaster 1966] 
This economic value theory assumes that each good is a set of different 
characteristics that are present to a different degree in the good. It is these 
characteristics that provide utility for the consumer; hence these characteristics will 
determine the consumer’s preferences and the demand for goods is derived from 
these characteristics. In my research, GPs are to choose among patients who are 
described with patient and disease characteristics. Furthermore, the preference 
elicitation in this paper deals with revealed preferences, i.e. respondents are asked 
about their preferences and not observed during their decisions. 
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Attitude 
 
The concept of attitude comes from the field of societal psychology and shows a sort 
of psychological tendency on how much an individual likes or not likes something or 
finds something important or not. In the frame of attitude surveys, it is common to 
ask the respondent to rank or rate different aspects of the investigated issue. In the 
informal language, the term of preference and attitude are many times mixed, 
however it is only the concept of preference that is rooted in economics. [Phillips et 
al 2002a] The research presented in this paper investigates the attitudes toward the 
distribution of health gains, i.e. which are those societal or equity aspects that are 
acceptable or rejected by the respondents as the basement of patient level 
prioritization. 
 
For an easier overview of the two empirical works presented in this paper, two 
separate chapters describe the methods and the findings of the studies on preference 
elicitation and attitudes (Chapter V.1. and V.2., respectively). 
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V. EMPIRICAL STUDIES 
 
 
V.1 Preference elicitation from Hungarian general practitioners 
 
V.1.1 Preference measurement – a brief overview 
 
The measurement of preferences is based on the concepts of revealed preferences 
and stated preferences. In case of revealed preferences the behaviour of the subjects 
is observed and preferences are investigated through their real life decisions and 
choices. As for stated preferences, subjects are asked about their preferences. 
Examples for the study of revealed preferences are relatively rare in health 
economics due to the following reasons. [Kjaer 2005] 
 
1) Consumers’ (e.g. patients) behaviour is usually difficult to observe because 
the market of health care services does not exist or works imperfectly. 
2) Unlike revealed preferences, the approach of stated preferences is able to 
capture the whole economic value of a good, including its non-use value, 
which derives e.g. from altruism or the mere existence of the good. Non-use 
value is of importance in the field health care. 
 
Also, stated preferences give the freedom to the researcher to focus on those aspects 
and factors of the decision making she is interested in or to study preferences for 
hypothetic products; i.e. the study is less limited by the information actually 
available at the market. Of course, the measurement of stated preferences has its 
disadvantages, too. [Kjaer 2005]: 
 
1) stated preferences may not reflect real life preferences (it might not be easy to 
express preferences for a hypothetic good), 
2) respondents may not be motivated sufficiently to give an answer as accurate 
as possible, 
3) asking for preferences may actuate the respondents to follow some strategic 
behaviour. 
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 The systematic literature review by Ryan summarized the methods of preference 
elicitation in health care. [Ryan et al 2001] Based on these quantitative techniques 
and on the work by Kjaer [2005] did I create Table 4 for making easier the overview 
of the methods. 
 
Table 4 Elicitation methods for stated preferences 
Response techniques Simple good Complex good 
(conjoint analysis34) 
Ranking A D 
Rating B E 
Choice C F 
 
„A”: The respondent is asked to rank (ordinal scale) the presented products or 
options (e.g. he has to rank different health care services according to how important 
he thinks they are). 
„B”: In case of rating the respondent is asked to express her preference on a 
numerical or semantic scale. In health care for example, it is common to use the 
visual analogue scale for the measurement of quality adjusted life year. Rating is also 
frequently applied in studies about patient satisfaction. 
„C”: In its simplest form, respondents are instructed to choose from two options 
according to one characteristic (e.g. preference for the treatment of a current smoker 
or a non smoker). Standard gamble, time trade-off and person trade-off also belong 
to the choice techniques and are frequently used in health economics. 
Cases „D”, „E” and „F” refer to a situation when respondents have to decide on 
products that are described with several characteristics; hence the decision task is 
more complex.  
The ranking exercise results in the complete preference ordering of the presented 
goods. Compared to ranking, the rating exercise puts more cognitive burden onto the 
respondents as they are asked to attach a value to each product, so they have to 
express the strength of their preferences as well. Choice tasks are considered to be 
relatively less burdensome for the responders: e.g. in case of a discrete choice 
                                                 
34 „Conjoint analysis” comes from the composition of two terms: „consider” and „jointly”. [Kjaer, 
2005] Products are characterized by several features and respondents are asked to choose a product 
after considering these features simultaneously. 
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experiment („F”) they only have to state which product they would choose (weak 
preference ordering). [Louviere et al 2000]  
 
In my empirical work I decided to use the method of the discrete choice experiment 
to elicit the preferences of general practitioners. This decision was motivated by two 
things: 1) the aim of the study was in line with the properties of this method, 2) 
discrete choice experiment has an adequate theoretic background in economics (see 
Appendix 3). Therefore, I will elaborate only the method of discrete choice 
experiment (or with other words, discrete choice modelling) in the next chapters. 
 
V.1.2 The discrete choice experiment (DCE) 
 
Choice based techniques were started to be used in the 1960’s in the field of 
psychology. Later they became common in the marketing research and made a 
significant contribution to the better understanding of consumers’ behaviour. [Kjaer, 
2005] In health economics it is Ryan who gives a general description on the steps of 
the discrete choice experiment (DCE) [Ryan 1999a, 1999b] that are as follows: 
1. determination of attributes 
2. determination of attribute levels 
3. experimental design 
4. data collection 
5. data analysis. 
 
1/ The first step is to determine those factors and aspects that are likely to be 
considered by the respondents when choosing a product (or an option). Those factors 
that play a role in the decision are called attributes. Regarding health care services 
for example, attributes can be the distance from the place of the health care provider 
or the waiting time until the treatment. Hence, attributes are characteristic features of 
the options, they describe the options and they are considered together by the 
decision maker. Relevant attributes are determined by the research question; 
however, there are some principles to follow [Keeney 1976]: 
 
a) attributes should cover the most important aspects of the choice; 
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b) attributes should be easily interpretable for respondents; 
c) attributes should not be redundant; 
d) the number of attributes should be limited to avoid very complex and 
burdensome decision tasks;35  
e) attributes should be able to take different values (levels). 
 
Attributes can be retrieved from several sources: from the review of the literature, 
from focus-group interviews with interested parties (decision makers, experts), etc. 
 
2/ The second step is to determine the levels of each attribute. Back to our previous 
example, the distance attribute may take the levels of 5 km, 20 km or 50 km; and 
waiting time could be 10, 30 or 60 minutes. Levels of attributes should follow the 
following recommendations: they should be plausible and easily interpretable for the 
respondents, and levels should motivate the trade-off between different products or 
options (i.e. none of the attribute levels should be so good that respondents always 
choose the option with this level irrespective of other characteristics).  
 
3/ Making the experimental design, the researcher combines the levels of the 
attributes in different ways to create a number of product concepts or options. These 
concepts or options are going to be presented in the choice tasks to choose from. The 
number of concepts in a choice task and the number of choice tasks in a 
questionnaire are also determined in the experimental design. Figure 10 gives an 
example: in this DCE design there are 3 concepts to choose from in a choice task, 
and each concept is described with 3 attributes.36 Respondents are asked to make a 
decision in 6 choice tasks. 
 
                                                 
35 Regarding the number of attributes there is no general rule, though it is usually not recommended to 
use more than eight of them. [Kjaer 2005] 
36 The number of concepts and attributes can be different of course, and it is also typical to use 
different number of levels for different attributes. 
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Figure 10 Example for the DCE design 
  
 
Concept 1                     Concept 2                    Concept 3 
 
Att1 Level1i                 Att1 Level1j                  Att1 Level1k 
Att2 Level2i                 Att2 Level2j                  Att2 Level2k 
Att3 Level3i                 Att3 Level3j                  Att3 Level3k 
 
Choice 
 
    Ο                           ⊗                       Ο 
Choice task 
DCE 
design 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The number of attributes and levels determine how many concepts can be possibly 
created from their combinations. Giving an example, if there are 3 attributes in the 
design and each attribute has 4 levels, the number of possible concepts is 43 = 64 
(called factorial design after the method of the calculation). Furthermore, the design 
called a full-profile design if all the determined attributes are used to describe the 
concepts. One talks about a partial profile if only a subgroup of the attributes are 
used to describe the concepts in a choice task (one subgroup may be used in the first 
choice task and another subgroup in the second choice task, etc.). [Chrzan 2000] 
The number of potential concepts increases exponentially as the number of attributes 
and levels increases. One talks about a full factorial design when all possible 
concepts are presented for the respondents in the choice tasks. A full factorial design, 
however, is only feasible with a relatively small number of attributes and levels. 
Usually, the number of concepts presented in the choice task has to be limited; in this 
case the design is called fractional factorial design. Different methods (manual and 
computerized) are available for the selection of those concepts that are going to be 
presented. These methods are to ensure the efficiency of the design, although, some 
information is always lost with fractional factorial designs. [Chrzan 2000] General 
efficiency criteria of DCE designs are shortly described in Appendix 4. 
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4/ Data collection is the following step in a DCE. Depending on the aim of the 
research the following tasks may belong to it [Kjaer 2005]:  
 
- inclusion of validity tests into the design; 
- determination of respondents’ characteristics to collect; 
- making respondents understand the aim of the research and the 
decision situation itself; 
- presentation of the choice tasks to the respondents; 
- getting feed-back from the respondents on the questionnaire; 
- qualitative research (interviews with respondents) for a better 
understanding of the results. 
 
It is recommended to carry out a pilot study before the main research to ensure that 
attributes and levels are adequately determined, the questionnaire and the choice 
tasks are properly understood by the respondent, and it is not too burdensome for the 
subjects to fill out the questionnaire, etc. [Kjaer 2005] 
Data collection usually applies one of the following means or a combination of them 
[Bennett 2001]: face-to-face interviews, telephone interview, survey via post mail or 
e-mail, placement of the questionnaires at central and busy places. The way of data 
collection is determined by the respondent group (the respondent’s ability to fill out 
the questionnaire by herself, the easiest way to access the respondent, etc.) and by the 
disposable research fund.  
 
5/ Data analysis is the final step. Basically, choice tasks carry two types of 
information in a DCE: the attribute levels attached to the concepts in a choice task 
and the decision itself: which concept was preferred and chosen by the respondent in 
the choice task. Nowadays, several econometric models are available for the analysis 
of DCE studies.37  
 
Giving a general overview on DCEs, two other issues are worth mentioning. First, in 
DCEs it is common to offer an „opt-out” option for the respondents, i.e. subjects are 
allowed to decide not to choose any of the concepts presented in a choice task. 
                                                 
37 Interested readers are referred to [Louviere 2000, Train 2003] 
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Depending on the study question should the researcher consider the inclusion of this 
option. [Kjaer 2005] 
The second issue is the size of the cognitive burden respondents are likely to cope 
with. As it was mentioned before, this is mainly determined by the complexity of the 
questionnaire: the number of attributes and levels, the number of options in a choice 
task and the number of the choice tasks. Complexity is also affected by how much 
the respondents are familiar with the choice situation. Also, respondents with 
different socio-demographic characteristics may experience more or less difficulties 
with filling out the questionnaire. The transparent layout of the questionnaire and 
proper phrasing are crucial, too, to help respondents complete the questionnaire. 
However, even the most careful design of the questionnaire is not able to avert the 
occurrence of some unfavourable phenomena: some of the respondents may get tired 
earlier than others, some use heuristics or try to behave strategically, etc.. These 
problems emerge in many studies, however, and they are not typical of only the 
DCEs. [Kjaer 2005] 
 
Reviewing the literature, we see that the application of DCEs has been increasing in 
health sciences for a couple of decades. Its use may be partly motivated by 
recognizing that other inputs of decision making, e.g. health technology assessment, 
needs assessment, may not provide sufficient information to make decisions in health 
care and health policy. Getting know the opinions and preferences of interested 
parties (patients and their family members, health care professionals, etc) can make a 
contribution to make decisions that serve the public better. In Appendix 5 I give 
some examples for studies in the international literature that used the method of DCE 
in health care and health policy. They show very well the diversity of the scope of 
these studies. 
 
The motivation for choosing DCE for eliciting the preferences of Hungarian GPs was 
threefold. First, our aim was to create a decision making situation that medical 
doctors were likely to be familiar with (i.e. discrete choice in the treatment of 
patients). Second, we wanted our respondents to consider the attributes we were 
interested in together. Also, DCE was preferred because it is well rooted in economic 
theory. In the next chapter, I will proceed to present our empirical work on the GPs’ 
preferences. 
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 V.1.3 Subjects of the DCE 
 
Hungarian GPs with adult enrolees were randomly sampled from a market research 
database (Progress Research Ltd) with stratification by gender and the location of the 
practice (Budapest, county town, town, village). The number of subjects was set to 
200. First, potential subjects were contacted via telephone to ask for their consent to 
take part in the study. GPs got financial incentive to fill out the questionnaire. Due to 
personal contact and financial incentives, GPs did not tend to refuse to participate, so 
it is not likely that selection bias would bias our results.38 Based on different 
considerations, this study chose to interview general practitioners for the following 
reasons:  
 
- Patient level decisions are usually made by medical doctors, therefore medical 
professionals are likely to be the most familiar with this decision making situation.  
- GPs have a gatekeeper function in the Hungarian health care system and are in a 
position to affect the availability of treatments. 
- GPs have relatively big autonomy in their decisions.  
- The research question did not focus on any specific illness, patient group, or 
therapy. This approach is mostly in line with the practice of GPs who are likely to 
have a more general view on patients than specialists. 
 
Selected characteristics of respondents were collected to investigate if there were 
differences in preferences due to personal features. These were as follows: 
- gender of the GP; 
- year of graduation from the medical university (as a proxy variable for the age of 
the GP); 
- number of years spent as a GP; 
- number of enrolees in the practice (patient cards). 
 
 
                                                 
38 Interviews were done by Progress Research Ltd. and MSD Hungary provided the financial means. 
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V.1.4 Attributes and levels 
 
Several factors were identified in the literature that reflect social value judgements in 
allocating health care resources. Due to a long list of factors and allowing for the 
cognitive capacity of the respondents the complexity of the choice tasks was 
decreased as follows. 
- We focused on factors that are likely to play role in the decision of medical 
professionals, i.e. such attributes were chosen that related to patient and disease 
characteristics.  
- It was decided not to investigate the effect of socio-economic and lifestyle factors 
(e.g. income, self-induced disease). 39
- Attempts were made to keep the phrasing simple and not to use concepts (e.g. 
QALY) that GPs were supposed to be unfamiliar with.  
- We rejected to use numerical expressions as there was no interest in measuring 
preferences for a given value of an attribute level and it was assumed that GPs would 
simplify the choice task and categorize numerical expressions as high or low, 
anyway. 
                                                 
39 Ryynänen [2000] made a study with a similar research question to ours with doctors and nurses. 
Beside other factors, they investigated whether the income of the patient, her responsibility for the 
disease, and negligent behaviour for health affected the respondents preferences for which patient to 
treat. 
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 Table 5 Attributes and levels 
Attributes Levels Effect coding Variable 
Characteristics of patients and the 
disease   
  
18-35  -1 -1  
36-60  1 0 Age2 
Age group of the couple (years) 
60+  0 1 Age3 
Frequent  -1  Prevalence 
Rare  1  Preval 
Deterioration is significant -1  Impact on quality of life 
Deterioration is not significant 1  Qeffect 
Low -1 -1  
Medium 1 0 Mortal2 
Mortality  
High 0 1 Mortal3 
Other serious chronic disease -1  Co-morbidities 
No other serious chronic disease 1  Comorb 
Effect of medication     
1-1 additional life-year for couple 
members  
-1  Distribution of life-years gained 
2-0 additional life-years for couple 
members  
1  LYGdistrib
partly (by 50%) -1  Restoration of previous quality of 
life completely 1  Restor 
short time horizon -1  Averted complications 
long time horizon 1  Complic 
 
Eight attributes were selected in our study (Table 5). The age of the patients is one of 
the central concepts that is exhaustively discussed in the literature. [Johannesson 
1996, Nord 1999, Rodríguez 2000, Tsuchiya 1999] The prevalence of the disease 
also seems to be an issue in resource allocation: decision makers might give a special 
consideration to the treatment of rare diseases. [Devlin 2004] 
Evidences suggest that the public and medical professionals tend to give priority to 
patients in bad condition before the treatment. [Ryynänen 1999, Ubel 1999, Dolan 
1998] In our study the severity of the disease was captured by mortality and the 
impact of the disease on the quality of life. The available health status after the 
treatment is also addressed in previous studies [Nord 1993, Abellan-Perpinan 1999], 
although the evidences so far are not conclusive. Also, strong empirical evidences 
show that the size of the health gain matters in the allocation of resources. [Bowling 
1996, Dolan-Cookson 2000] In our study the existence of co-morbidity is to present 
a difference in the available end status and the potential for restoring previous quality 
of life is a measure of how much the patient can benefit from the treatment. In the 
literature, egalitarian tendencies are observed and people do not prefer to give all the 
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health gains to one patient group. [Olsen 2000, Nord 1995] We investigated whether 
the respondents prefer equal distributions of life years gained or not. This issue was 
addressed in a way that the respondents had to choose among patient couples. This 
was it was possible to see if GPs prefer to give life years equally or not to the 
patients (i.e. 1-1 year to both members of the couple or 0 and 2 years). Regarding all 
other aspects, the members of the couple were identical and this was explicitly told to 
the interviewees. 
Time preference is generally handled in cost-effectiveness analysis. In our study the 
timing of health gains is captured by complications of the disease avoidable on a 
short or a long time horizon. 
 
V.1.5 Choice tasks in the DCE study - the design  
 
The attributes and levels presented in Table 5Error! Reference source not found. 
result in 576 possible scenarios (26 * 32), therefore a fractional factorial design was 
used to reduce the number of presented scenarios. For this Paper&Pencil survey the 
Sawtooth® software was used to generate the questionnaires, i.e. to create and select 
those patient concepts with the combination of attribute levels that would appear in 
the choice tasks. The Sawtooth® software offers four methods for the design of the 
choice tasks40: 
 
1) complete enumeration method; 
2) shortcut method; 
3) random method; 
4) balanced overlap method. 
 
These methods fulfil the criteria of an efficient design to a different degree 
(Appendix 4). Some method (e.g. the complete enumeration method) is more suitable 
for the investigation of main effects (utilities of each attribute level), while the other 
one (e.g. the random method) is a more proper choice when interactions between 
attributes and their effect on the decision are of interest. As the number of 
                                                 
40 For the detailed description of the methods, including advantages and disadvantages, see [Sawtooth 
Software 2001]. 
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observations in our study was not big enough to investigate interactions, only main 
effects were investigated. As a larger scale study has been also planned and the use 
of the same design method was preferred, the balanced overlap method was chosen 
for this study because this method is properly able to investigate main effects only.41
One of the requirements of a DCE design is to compare as many product concepts as 
possible to ensure the reliability of the results (i.e. to simulate as many different 
decision situations as possible). As the number of respondents could not be increased 
in our study and the paper & pencil survey also puts a limit on how many patient 
couples can be presented in the choice tasks, we increased the number of presented 
concepts in two ways. 
 
a) Each choice task included 3 concepts, i.e. GPs were asked to choose among 3 
patient couples in each task. We did not include a „none” option (the GP does not 
choose any of the 3 couples presented in the choice task) as unqualified denial of the 
treatment was considered to be implausible. Appendix 6 shows an example for a 
choice task among 3 couples. 
b) We generated 4 versions of the questionnaire with the Sawtooth® software42. All 
these versions consisted of 15 different choice tasks, therefore, we had altogether 60 
choice tasks (i.e. different choice situations). Each version of the questionnaire was 
filled out by 50-50 respondents. The allocation of the questionnaires to the GPs was 
random; still I tested if the respondent groups by the 4 questionnaire versions were 
similar: independent sample t-tests were carried out to compare each group to the 
others by GPs’ age, the number of patient cards and by the number of years in 
practice. 
 
                                                 
41 The balanced overlap method is somewhere inbetween the method of complete enumeration (that 
pursue minimal overlap of the levels) and the random method (that freely allows the overlap of the 
levels and so is more appropriate for the investigation of interactions). The balanced overlap method 
allows some degree of overlap of the levels but not as many as the random method that is based on a 
sampling with replacement. Instead of this, the balanced overlap method keeps track of the co-
occurrence of all pairs of attribute levels in the course of the sampling. The balanced overlap is 
somewhat less efficient than fixed orthogonal designs (e.g. complete enumeration) in estimating main 
effects (efficiency loss is 5-10%), but it is still considered to be a proper method for the investigation 
of main effects, and it performs better in estimating interaction terms. [Sawtooth Software 2001] 
 
42 The aggregate analysis of more questionnaire versions in a DCE is feasible. For theoretic 
background see: [McFadden 1974]. 
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V.1.6 The pilot of the DCE questionnaire and data collection 
 
The first version of the questionnaire, i.e. the introductory text, the attributes and 
levels, were tested with three medical doctors. Then the questionnaire was amended 
according to their suggestions. The final version of the introductory text is presented 
in Figure 11. 
 
Figure 11 The introductory text of the DCE questionnaire 
Introduction 
In our study we use the method of conjoint analysis which works with the help of response 
cards. This questionnaire – unlike to other questionnaires – circuit only one question. The 
aim of this research is the investigation of preferences so no good or bad answers exist! 
 
The question: 
 
Imagine that you treat married couples. Both members of the couples suffer from the 
same disease. The couples do not have children. 
 
Let us assume that there is a medication with beneficial treatment effects but without 
significant side effects. 
 
The available quantity of the medication is sufficient for the treatment of only one 
couple. This medication is the only treatment option for the couples. You are the only 
one who can provide the medication. 
 
We will show you different card-sets in the questionnaire each describing 3-3 different 
couples. Except for the characteristics shown on the cards the couples are not different on 
any other aspect.  
 
On every page of the questionnaire we ask you to choose that couple from the 3 possibilities 
you prefer to give this medication. Please, choose only 1 couple per page! 
 
You are kindly asked to read all the cards carefully! Indicate your answer with an X put in 
the box below the proper card! 
 
Thank you for your collaboration! 
 
The most important suggestions contributing to the finalization of the questionnaire 
were as follows. (The first version of the introductory text to the questionnaire is 
shown in Appendix 7.) 
 
- The introductory text should call the GPs’ attention to the fact that the 
questionnaire is about preferences, hence no good or bad answer exists. 
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- The introductory text should be general and it is not recommended to mention 
any of the attributes. 
- The pilot subjects implicitly assumed that there were no alternative 
medication for the couples, but were not sure about it. As this assumption was 
in line with our intention, this feature of the treatment was expressed in the 
final text. 
- It was recommended to emphasize that the lack of resources forced the choice 
between the couples 
- Also, the final version made it clear that the couples were identical on every 
aspect but the attributes. 
- The pilot subjects shared that opinion that the attributes were easy to 
understand and most of them were relevant for a GP. 
- The interviews reported to get fatigue as they proceeded with the choice tasks 
(around choice tasks 11-13) and tented to develop some sort of decision 
algorithm. In general, however, they did not feel burdensome to fulfil the 
questionnaire and completed it in about 30 minutes. 
- Two attributes were said not to affect the decisions (frequency of the disease, 
distribution of life years gained). In spite of this, we kept both attributes in 
the questionnaire. According to the literature, the frequency of the disease 
may play a role in decision making. The distribution of life years gained was 
included because of our own research interest. 
- Pilot subjects felt important that the layout of the choice tasks, i.e. the order 
of the attributes and their look, be the same along the questionnaire to help 
the subjects go through the tasks. 
- Pilot subjects did not report difficulties to choose between couples instead of 
individuals. 
 
Interviewers carried out face-to-face interviews in April and May 2006.  
 
V.1.7 Data analysis 
 
The logit model is widely used in the data analysis of discreet choices, but the logit 
model has some restrictive assumptions. One drawback is the assumption that the 
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regression coefficients of variables are identical for all respondents. This means that 
respondents with identical observed qualities are assumed to have the same 
preferences, the same ‘taste’ in relation to the particular attributes. Such an 
assumption is, intuitively, unlikely to be accurate. It is natural that people of the same 
sex, age etc. opt for different things. [Rouwendal 2001] Another assumption of the 
logit model is the independence from one another of several decisions made by a 
person. It is to be expected though that some unobserved factors systematically affect 
the individual’s choices, thus, each decision he/she makes.  
The random parameter logit (RPL) model (mixed logit) is an extension of the logit 
model and resolves these restrictive assumptions. (For a brief description of the RPL 
model, see Appendix 8.) The RPL model can capture the random differences in 
preferences (in taste) and the correlation of non-observable variables in a way that, 
instead of fixed coefficients it allows for the random change of the regression 
coefficient of observed variables among the respondents. [Train 2003] The 
theoretical basis is offered by utility maximisation decision theory. Assuming 
random parameters, the utility of n decision-makers for alternative j can be described 
as follows: Unj=β’nXnj+εnj, where Xnj are the observed explanatory variables 
characteristic of the decision alternative or the decision-maker; βn is the vector of 
regression coefficients which can be characterised by their mean and standard 
deviation; and εnj is the random term. The RPL model is relatively flexible as random 
parameters may show any dispersion, normal, triangle or lognormal. [Train 2003] 
The utility function observed in the preference analysis among general practitioners, 
the subject of the dissertation, may be described in the following additive form 
(A_First és A_Second are alternative specific constants): 
 
Vij = A_First +A_Second + β1 x Age2 + β2 x Age3 + β3 x Preval + β4 x Qeffect + β5 
x Mortal2 + β6 x Mortal3 + β7 x Comorb + β8 x LYGdistrib + β9 x Restor + β10 x 
Complic + βk x Interactionk (k number of interactions among attributes and observed 
characteristics of GPs) 
 
In the RPL model, choice probabilities can be described as an integral over 
dispersion. The form of the integral, however, is in general not closed and thus it has 
only an approximative solution. Simulation calls for repeated random sampling from 
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the dispersion. It may happen though, that random sampling leaves ‘holes’, i.e. no 
samples are taken from certain parts of the density function. In order to avoid this, 
the use of the so-called intelligent sampling sequences is recommended. One of them 
is the Halton sequence, which breaks up the density function into parts of equal size 
and draws samples from the individual parts. Thus no uncovered parts remain in the 
course of sampling, and compared to random sampling, less draws yield stable 
parameter estimates. [Hensher et al 2005] Several empirical examinations found that 
in RPL models the simulation variance of parameter estimates was lower over 100 
Halton draws than 1000 random draws. [Train 2003] 
A parameter is random if the parameter estimate of the standard deviation is 
statistically significant; in this case there are differences in taste. If, however, 
parameters correlate, the dispersions are interdependent and differences may result 
from two things: on one hand, from the actually existing variance in random 
parameter estimate, and on the other, from the correlation to the other random 
parameter estimates. If so, the Cholesky decomposition matrix is usually examined 
for the identification of random parameters, which separates attribute-specific 
standard deviation from deviation arising from attribute interaction and thus help 
avoid the mixing of the effect of correlations in dispersion parameter estimates. 
[Hensher et al 2005] Accordingly, if the correlation among parameters justified so, 
we also examined the Cholesky decomposition matrix. In the matrix, attribute-
specific dispersions appear along the diagonal, and estimated dispersion following 
from the interaction of attributes are below it.  
In our model, categorical variables are shown (Table 5) which were coded by effects 
coding – this is generally recommended for discreet choice experiments. [Bech 2005] 
In this case, regression coefficients are estimated so as the sum of the effects of the 
particular categories is zero. As a result, the estimates regression coefficients of the 
categories are compared to the value estimated on the basis of all the other predictors 
in the model, rather than to a fixed reference category. The software used for data 
analysis was NLOGIT 4.0. 
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V.1.8 Validation 
 
Regarding the DCE, several issues may emerge for validation43, in my study I dealt 
with two of them. 
 
- Rationality of responses: whether the results are in line with a priori 
expectations of the researcher. As we investigate preferences, they may be 
contradictory to these expectations and tastes are not disputable, of course. 
Still, assuming some sort of behaviour, (e.g. utility maximization) or on the 
base of empirical findings in the literature, it is possible to make up some 
expectations about the most preferred levels of the attributes. 
Assuming that the GPs would follow a utility maximizing behaviour, the 
following expectations were made for the attributes. The respondents would 
prefer 1) the patients in the younger age groups, 2) the treatment of that 
disease that deteriorates the quality of life significantly, and 3) has higher 
mortality, 4) those patients who do not suffer from other co-morbidities, and 
5) who are able to regain their previous health status, and 6) those cases 
where complications can be averted at a short time scale. Regarding the 
frequency of the disease and the distribution of life years gained, we did not 
have a priori expectations. 
 
- Dominant preferences (lexicographic preference ordering): whether the 
respondents are willing to trade-off between the attribute levels. Dominant 
preference exists when the respondent always chooses the alternative with the 
most preferred level of a certain attribute irrespective of the levels the 
alternative takes on other attributes on. The literature does not give a clear 
guidance on how to treat the respondents with this sort of preference. In this 
study, I will analyse these respondents – if any – together with the others. If 
dominant preferences are found in many cases, it may be worth making 
subgroup analyses, as well. [Scott 2002] 
I investigated the existence of dominant preferences in case of 4 attributes 
separately. I was looking for those GPs who always chose that patient couple 
1) who belonged to the youngest age group, or 2) whose quality of life was 
                                                 
43 See e.g. Kjaer [2005] 
80 
deteriorated significantly, or 3) who were suffering from a disease with high 
mortality, or 4) who had the potential to restore their previous health status 
completely. 
 
V.1.9 Results of the preference elicitation 
 
Table 6 below shows the average characteristics of the GPs in the total sample. Pair-
wise comparison of the respondents’ subgroups by the 4 questionnaire versions 
showed that these groups were similar with respect to the age of the GPs, the years 
spent as a GP, and the number of enrolees in the praxis (see Appendix 9). As one 
may expect it, a high Pearson correlation (r=0,78; p<0,01) was found between the 
age of the GP and the number of years in praxis. 
 
Table 6 Characteristics of GPs in the total sample 
Characteristics N=200 
Male GPs 58% 
Average age (years) 48,7 
st.d. 9,6 
Average time in praxis (year) 18,2 
st.d. 10,5 
Average number of enrolees 1804 
st.d. 520 
 
Due to face-to-face interviews, all the 200 questionnaires were completed (altogether 
3 choice tasks were not answered and some demographic data were missing for two 
respondents). It took approximately 30-35 minutes for the respondents to complete 
the questionnaire. 
No evidence was found for the existence of dominant preferences in the sample. 
None of the GPs preferred to choose always that patient concept that had the most 
preferred level of a certain attribute (youngest age group, high mortality, significant 
deterioration of quality of life, or complete restoration of previous health status).  
A number of models (not presented here) were investigated to identify random 
parameters and to explore taste variations among our respondents. After testing 
various possible distributions, the normal distribution of random parameters was 
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chosen. Halton sequences were used in simulations with 500 replications. Since we 
found relatively high correlation between our random parameters (i.e., 0.71; 0.71 and 
0.50 for Qeffect:Mortal2, Qeffect:Mortal3 and Mortal2:Mortal3, respectively), we 
investigated the Cholesky decomposition matrix to identify those parameters that 
behave randomly. Below I present the results of the RPL model we chose finally. 
These estimation of the RPL model always begins with the estimation of a standard 
multinomial model (MNL) (see Table 7) that provides initial values for the RPL 
model. 
 
Table 7 Parameter estimations in the MNL model 
Variable Coefficient St. error P[|Z|>z] 
    
Qeffect -0,3006 0,021 0,000
Mortal2 -0,0407 0,032 0,197
Mortal3 0,3439 0,029 0,000
Age2 0,1307 0,030 0,000
Age3 -0,4743 0,033 0,000
Preval 0,0338 0,021 0,112
Comorb 0,1288 0,022 0,000
Restor 0,2162 0,021 0,000
Complic 0,0124 0,021 0,560
LYGdistrib -0,2265 0,021 0,000
A_First 0,0265 0,049 0,585
A_Second 0,0573 0,048 0,236
    
LL* -3275,482   
LL(MNL) -2866,972   
Chi2(10) = 817,020 (p = 0,000)  
R2=0,125    
Number of observations = 3000  
Remarks:  
1) LL*: model estimated with constants only. 
2) Chi2 (df) = 2 x [LL(MNL) – LL*] 
3) R2 = 1 – LL(MNL)/LL* 
4) Total number of observations: 3000 (200 GPs and 15 choice tasks per GP); 18 bad observations. 
 
The results of the final RPL model is shown in Table 8. The model was statistically 
significant with a Chi2(18)=848,6 (p=0.000). Compared to the standard multinomial 
logit model (MNL) with 12 parameters, the likelihood ratio test produced a 
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Chi2(6)=30,42 (p=0.005).44 This measure of improvement indicated that the 
goodness-of-fit of the RPL model was significantly better, and suggested that 
heterogeneity in GPs’ preferences was an important phenomenon.  
                                                 
44 A standard logit model is estimated first to derive the initial values for the RPL. The MNL model, 
however, does not include the heterogeneity in means estimates and the standard deviations of 
parameter distributions. 
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 Table 8 Results of the RPL model 
Variable Coefficient St. error P[|Z|>z] 
Random parameters   
Qeffect -0.3962 0.118 0.001
Mortal2 0.1597 0.089 0.071
Mortal3 0.4328 0.095 0.000
Nonrandom parameters   
Age2 0.1469 0.032 0.000
Age3 -0.5056 0.035 0.000
Preval 0.0249 0.023 0.277
Comorb 0.1253 0.021 0.000
Restor 0.2110 0.019 0.000
Complic 0.0220 0.019 0.256
LYGdistrib -0.2280 0.022 0.000
A_First  0.0296 0.054 0.585
A_Second  0.0542 0.050 0.275
Heterogeneity in mean   
Qeffect:Gpage 0.0033 0.002 0.163
Mortal2:Gpage -0.0024 0.002 0.164
Mortal3:Gpage -0.0024 0.002 0.164
Diagonal values in Cholesky matrix  
NsQeffect 0.0004 0.000 0.000
NsMortal2 0.0719 0.038 0.057
NsMortal3 0.0719 0.038 0.057
Below diagonal values in Cholesky matrix  
Mortal2:Qeffect 0.0724 0.038 0.055
Mortal3:Qeffect 0.0724 0.038 0.055
Mortal3:Mortal2 -0.0008 0.000 0.000
Standard deviation of parameter distributions 
sdQeffect 0.0004 0.000 0.000
sdMortal2 0.1021 0.000 0.000
sdMortal3 0.1021 0.000 0.000
N=3000 (200 groups)  
LL* -3276,062   
LL(RPL) -2851,760   
LL Chi2(18) = 848,604 (p = 0,000)   
R2=0,129   
Number of Halton sequences: 500     
 
Remarks: 
1) LL*: model without estimated parameters. It is like a model giving equal probability of choice to 
all couples. 
2) Chi2 (df) = 2 x [LL(RPL) – LL*] 
2) R2 = 1 – LL(RPL)/LL* 
3) Number of observations was 3000 with 200 groups (by GPs) in the RPL model; 18 bad 
observations. 
 
The results show that many of the coefficients were statistically significant at a 5% 
level and had the expected signs. Ceteris paribus and given the levels of the attributes 
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used, GPs preferred to treat the youngest patients and those diseases that affect 
patients’ quality of life most. Treatment was increasingly preferred when the 
mortality related to the disease increased. GPs were more likely to prefer treatment 
of patients without co-morbidities and those who had the potential to fully restore 
their previous health status. They also showed a preference for distributing life-years 
gained equally between the members of the couple. The prevalence of the disease nor 
the time horizon of available complications played a significant role in the decisions. 
The insignificance of the (alternative specific) constants (i.e. A_First and A_Second) 
indicates that GPs, as would be expected, did not prefer one couple over the other 
when the differences in attribute (level)s were accounted for. Nevertheless, constant 
terms were included in the model as a test for specification error.45 [Scott 2001] 
After thorough investigation, we found that two attributes, i.e. effect on quality of 
life and mortality, could not be sufficiently described by single parameter estimates. 
The mean random parameters of quality of life effect and high mortality were 
statistically different to zero at a 5% level of significance. The attribute-specific 
standard deviations (diagonal values in Cholesky matrix) were significant at a 5.7% 
level, indicating that GPs’ preferences for quality of life effect and for diseases with 
high mortality were, indeed, heterogeneous. To determine the potential sources of 
taste variations among the respondents (e.g. older GPs show less strong preferences 
for the treatment of diseases with high mortality than younger GPs), it is common to 
introduce interactions of the random parameter and other variables. All possible 
interactions with the observed characteristics of the GPs were investigated. (The 
results with GPs’ age as explanatory variable – interactions with GPage - are shown 
in Table 8. Unfortunately, none of these interactions were significant, indicating that 
the characteristics of the GPs collected in the study were not able to explain the taste 
variations.  
Another RPL model is presented in Appendix 10 (the initial MNL model of which is 
the very same as the one in Table 7). In this version of the model the following four 
attributes were considered to be random parameters: old age (Age3), high mortality 
                                                 
45 If the alternative-specific constants were statistically significant, this would mean in this study that 
responders systematically preferred e.g. the 2nd couple that is located in the middle of the 
questionnaire. The location of the couple, however (i.e. right, middle or left position on the paper) 
does not carry any meaning, couples are different only in the levels of the attributes. However, it is 
possible to design a DCE of such where different alternatives are described with the very same 
attributes. For example travelling by train or plain can be characterized with the same attributes, still 
there can be an explicit preference e.g. for travelling by train if the responder is afraid of flying. In this 
case the alternative-specific constant – meaning train or plain – can be statistically significant. 
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(Mortal3), effect on the quality of life of the patient (Qeffect), and the potential for 
restoring the previous health state of the patient (Restor). Investigating the Cholesky 
decomposition matrix, the parameter of Mortal3 seemed to behave randomly, 
meaning that based on this RPL2 model, the preferences of the GPs for high 
mortality are heterogeneous. This heterogeneity could be explained by the age of the 
GPs: the interaction between Mortal3 and the age of the GPs proved to be 
statistically significant at a level of 1.5%, which suggests that the older the 
respondent is the weaker her preference is for the treatment of diseases with high 
mortality. As in the majority of the tested models the observed characteristics of the 
respondents were not able to explain taste differences, I would refrain to draw 
conclusions about the potential relationship between the preferences for attributes 
and observed characteristics of the GPs. The fact, however, that we identified some 
models where the age of the GPs explained heterogeneity in tastes in a statistically 
significant way shows that this issue is a potentially interesting area for further 
research. 
 
As a summary of the results, we can say that the magnitude of the coefficients (either 
fixed or random) did not change significantly in the tested models, and the sign of 
the coefficients never changed, meaning that the direction of the preferences for a 
given attribute did not change in the models. This suggests stability in our results. 
 
V.1.10 Discussion of the results of the DCE study 
 
We investigated the preferences of Hungarian GPs for a set of criteria that might 
affect patient level prioritization with a DCE. The direction and the strength of 
preferences for different attributes (given the specified levels) seem to be plausible 
and findings showed that GPs were willing to trade-off these attributes, which is an 
important feature of a DCE study. The importance of these criteria is widely 
discussed in the literature, although the preferences of health care professionals have 
been elicited only in few studies.  
Ryynänen [2000] investigated the prioritization attitudes of doctors and nurses in 
Finland, using a number of attributes comparable to those in our study. Treatment of 
children was found to be preferred in that study. Old age in itself was not a reason for 
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lower priority, but treatment of demented and institutionalized patients was less 
preferred due to co-morbidities in old age. In our study only adult patients were 
included46 in the scenarios and we find a preference for treating younger patients. 
Relative discrimination against the old is controversial, also in the literature. These 
preferences may depend on the characteristics of respondents and cultural issues. 
[Nord 1999] In line with international studies [Johannesson 1997, Busschbach 1993] 
we found no relationship between age of the respondents and preferences for 
treatment on the basis of age of the patients.  
Our finding that respondents preferred treatment of patients with diseases associated 
with high mortality and those with a negative impact on quality of life, is also in line 
with the study by Ryynänen [2000]. Moreover, he found that both patients with a 
poor prognosis and those with a good prognosis did not receive priority in treatment. 
(While this result may be considered counterintuitive, this need not be the case if 
respondents understood good prognosis as a situation in which patients will recover 
without treatment as well, while patients with poor prognosis were considered to be 
‘beyond help’ or for whom the health state after treatment would still be poor.) In our 
study, the improvement in health was explicitly related to medical treatment. 
Unsurprisingly, GPs preferred to treat people with a higher capacity to benefit from 
the treatment. The importance of the magnitude of the health gain in our study is in 
line with previous studies (in the general public). [Bowling 1996, Abellan-Perpinan 
1999, Cookson-Dolan 1999] 
 
Earlier studies [Nord 1993, Abellan-Perpinan 1999] suggest that after-treatment 
health status has a limited relevance in allocating resources, although it was stressed 
that eliciting these preferences may be highly sensitive to framing effects. Ubel and 
colleagues also found that the general public gave equal priority to patients with and 
without pre-existing health conditions which influence the possible after-treatment 
health status. [Ubel 1999] Our respondents appear to hold other preferences. One of 
the potential explanations is that we did not ask respondents to choose between 
patients in life-threatening conditions. The ‘rule of rescue’ might mitigate the 
importance of factors like after-treatment health. Moreover, subjects from the general 
                                                 
46 We decided to exclude the age group of children from the study for we wanted to avoid the situation 
that the preference for treating a child would prevail the decisions, i.e. the responders will not be 
willing to trafe-off between attributes. 
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public might feel more uncomfortable with making such discriminatory choices than 
medical professionals. [Sen 1997] The study by Ryynänen [1999] provides some 
support for this hypothesis, as treatment of patients with co-morbidities were less 
preferred by nurses and doctors in that study as well. 
The time horizon of avoidable complications was not significant. GPs are likely to 
consider other attributes more important and did not focus on events that might occur 
in the future. Also, the interpretation of complications (e.g. severe or not) was left to 
the respondents, which may be considered a limitation of this study.  
Life-years gained were preferred to be distributed equally between the members of 
the couple, even if the magnitude of the difference was not so remarkable. This sort 
of egalitarian tendency is also observed elsewhere [Nord et al 1995b] and we assume 
it to be more prevalent if differences in gains were more significant.  
 
A number of limitations of our study deserve mentioning. First, more attributes than 
here considered may be relevant in the investigation of social value judgments in the 
allocation of health care resources. We narrowed the scope of the study in order to 
avoid overburdening our respondents, in such a way as to focus on general concepts 
that were considered to be able to characterize the patient, the disease and treatment 
effect in a broad sense. Further research is encouraged to study the role of socio-
economic factors, the lifestyle of the patients, etc. in prioritization decisions. Also, 
collecting more background information of respondents (e.g. health state) may 
contribute to explaining taste variations.  
Second, we sought to determine attributes and levels in a way that all the possible 
combinations correspond to a disease in real life, nevertheless some of the scenarios 
were more realistic than others. (For example, a disease with high mortality and low 
impact on quality of life might seem unrealistic at first sight, but myocardial 
infarction can be thought of in this case.)  
Third, in this study we investigated only the main effects, but the possibility of 
interaction effects cannot be excluded. Also, the generalizability of our results is 
limited by the fact that survey of other medical professionals, the general public or of 
health policy decision makers might lead to different results, and preferences can be 
determined by country-specific and cultural factors.  
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Interestingly, our findings suggest that GPs’ choices were reasonably in line with 
QALY maximization. However, our study was not designed to separate maximizing 
behaviour from other considerations, so we cannot be conclusive in this respect. Still, 
often, respondents preferred those levels of the attributes that can be considered as 
the ones that generate more health gain. For example, GPs preferred treating the 
youngest age group. In general, young people have a larger capacity to benefit 
because of longer life expectancy. Obviously, it is possible that respondents were 
considering other age-related aspects as well (e.g. the productivity of the patient or, 
indeed, a simple distributional preference to treat the young). An exception in this 
respect is the distribution of life-years gained. Maximizing health gains, one would 
not make a distinction between how the gains were distributed. Still, GPs clearly 
preferred to give equal gain for both members of the couple, showing that equality 
carried additional value for them.  
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 V.2 Attitudes of Hungarian medical doctors – the Q-study 
 
V.2.1 Overview of the Q-method 
 
The Q-method was introduced by William Stephenson, an English psychologist. The 
appellation suggests that Q-method should be distinguished from traditional 
statistical methods, called R-methods, based on correlation (R stands for the Pearson 
correlation). [Baker 2006] Beyond psychology, the Q-method is widely used in the 
field of communication and political sciences, and has been increasingly used in 
health sciences. [Brown 1993] 
The aim of the method is the study of subjectivity and not that of objective facts. It 
belongs to qualitative methods in so much that the Q-method is to get know 
individual opinions, believes, faiths, tastes, judgements and motivations related to the 
investigated issue. Also, small sample of respondents is sufficient to explore the 
diversity of opinions [Baker 2006], which is the final goal of the method. [Donner 
2001] 
On the other hand, the technique of the data collection and the analysis is 
quantitative. It operates with correlations and factor analysis; however, in distinction 
to R-methods, it can be regarded as the „inverse” of the factor analysis. Instead of 
making correlations between the test results of a great number of respondents, it 
collects a great number of observations from a small number of individuals and it 
calculates the correlation between the respondents. These correlations suggest 
different views, opinion families or opinion groups in the sample. [Van Exel 2005] 
The main elements and steps of the Q-method are the following: the Q-set 
(concourse of opinions), the P-set (group of respondents), the Q-sort and the factor 
analysis by individuals. These elements are discussed briefly below.47
 
The starting point of the Q-method is the collection of all the possible opinions, 
believes and views that may relate to the issue under investigation, i.e. to get know 
what people say or think about the topic. The concourse of opinions may be retrieved 
                                                 
47 Readers interested in the Q-methodology are referred to the following website: 
http://www.qmethod.org and to the literature of the dissertation. 
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from the media, focus-group discussions, interviews, and the literature or from policy 
documents. The aim is to cover the opinions as broad as possible and that these 
opinions are representative to the whole concourse of opinions. Afterward, retrieved 
opinions are formulated as statements by the researcher. These statements together 
are called the Q-set that can be unstructured (all emerging opinions are included in 
the Q-set) or structured (the researcher is interested in only some aspects of the issue 
and only related opinions are formulated). The number of statements in a Q-set is 
usually between 20 and 100. Each statement is written onto a card and showed to the 
respondents. [Baker 2006] 
 
The sampling of respondents is not random in the Q-method. Subjects are usually 
selected by personal characteristics that are expected to cause differences in opinions 
and views (e.g. social status or job of the individual). The literature suggests that 30-
60 respondents are sufficient in a Q-study. [Brown 1980] It is important to note, that 
the selection of the individuals is to explore the pattern of opinions (the similarities 
and the differences in views) and the Q-method does not intent to estimate the 
proportion of people who share the same opinion in the population. [Baker 2006] 
 
Having the Q-set, the following step of the Q-method is the sorting of the statements 
by the respondents. Respondents are asked to express how much they agree or 
disagree with each statement. Statements have to be placed on a score sheet (see an 
example in Appendix 11) along a scale (from -4 to +4 in the example) that shows the 
degree of agreement with the statement. For example, the respondent is supposed to 
place those cards she does not agree with at all on the left-hand side of the grid 
(column -4). Statements she feels neutral about should be placed under score zero, 
and statements she agree with the most are to be placed under score 4 on the right-
hand side. The rows in the grid carry no additional information, i.e. the statements 
placed in the same column are agreed with to the same degree. The Q-sort is usually 
carried out in two steps. First, the respondent groups the statements into 3 piles 
(„agree”, „neutral” and „disagree”), then she places each statement on the score sheet 
as she likes. Having the Q-sort completed, the respondent is allowed to review her Q-
sort again and to change cards if she wishes. The Q-sort can be made via interview or 
the respondent can do it by herself. [Baker 2006] 
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The grid usually takes the form of the quasi-normal distribution to give some hint to 
the respondent, although other layouts are also possible. A random number is 
attached to each statement to facilitate data entering. Q-sort is recommended to be 
followed by an interview to let the individual explain why she agreed or disagreed 
with the statements. Additional information help the researcher identify the opinion 
families and contribute to a deeper understanding of the results. [Baker 2006] 
 
The Q-method operates with correlations and factor analysis. The correlation matrix 
represents the similarity of the individuals’ Q-sorts. Also, the factor analysis is based 
on the individuals and its result allows for the distinction of the different opinion 
groups and makes it possible to create that specific Q-sort for each opinion group 
that describes the group’s view on the topic on average. (More details on the 
statistics are available in Appendix 11.) Having the „average” Q-sort for each 
opinion group we can investigate the Q-statements one-by one looking for a) 
consensus statements and b) contention elements. Consensus statements are the ones 
that are similarly valued by the members of most groups (e.g. most of the individuals 
agree with the statement). On the contrary, contention statements distinguish one 
opinion group from the others. [Donner 2001] 
Compared to sheer qualitative methods, the advantage of the Q-method is that the 
classification is not completely the result of the researcher’s intellectual activity. 
Although, it is the researcher that formulates the statements, so they are not 
independent from the researcher, the respondents themselves make the classification 
and this way such opinion patterns may emerge that the researcher would not think 
of intuitively. Another advantage might be, that the method of data collection and 
data analysis in a Q-study makes it possible to investigate subjectivity in a structured 
way. [Baker 2006] 
Compared to quantitative methods, the weakness of the Q-method is that the results 
are not able to tell us the proportion of people who belong to each opinion group in 
the population. The Q-method does not fulfil the criteria of independency either: the 
placement of one statement on the grid is not independent of the placement of other 
statements. The importance of this methodological shortage, however, is still 
debated. [Baker 2006] 
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V.2.2 Subjects and data collection in the doctors’ Q-study 
 
Those dimensions that are likely to play a role in these allocation decisions were 
retrieved from the literature in the EuroVaQ project. [Dolan et al 2005, Tsuchiya 
2005, Smith 2005, Schwappach 2002] These dimensions are expected to cover all the 
relevant issues that might play a role in the societal distribution of health gains: 
 
• characteristics of the patient (e.g. age, socio-economic status, relatives, 
employment status); 
• characteristics of the disease (e.g. severity, pain, reason of the development of the 
disease, frequency of the disease); 
• effect on the health of the patient (e.g. degree of deterioration in health, survival, 
health related quality of life, prevention); 
• characteristics of the treatment (e.g. effective, costs, cost-effectiveness, waiting 
time); 
• non-health aspects related to the disease (e.g. wellbeing of family members, burden 
on the family members). 
 
The statements of the Q-study (the Q-set) were then formulated along these 
dimensions. (Original statements in English and statements in Hungarian are listed in 
Appendix 12.) The first version of the Q-set consisted of 37 statements. These 
statements were critically reviewed by the members of the EuroVaQ team. Based on 
these opinions, the final version of the Q-set formulated altogether 34 statements. 
The Q-questionnaire was piloted in three countries (Croatia, The Netherlands, and 
United Kingdom) in the general public.  
The translation of questionnaires needs validation to ensure that the content and the 
meaning of the statements are the same in different languages. The EuroVaQ project 
required a back-and-forth translation for this purpose. Therefore, I translated the 
original English statements in Hungarian first. Then, a professional interpreter 
translated them back to English. Comparing the original and back-translated 
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statements in English I was able to change and finalize the statements in 
Hungarian.48  
The Q-study was a web-survey in the EuroVaQ project. As the on-line version of the 
Hungarian Q-questionnaire was available, it was plausible to survey the doctors 
through the internet, too. To collect data separately from the EuroVaQ project, a new 
web-address was created for the doctors. 49 The on-line questionnaire was several 
times tested and amended with the helpof my Hungarian colleagues. 
Medical doctors were contacted by my colleagues and acquaintances and were asked 
to participate in the survey via e-mail. The only inclusion criterion was that the 
responder was actively working as a doctor at the time of the surveying. Other 
criteria, like age, location, professional area were not used. The e-mail contained 
information about the aims of the research and the availability of the website. The 
decision making situation itself and the step-by-step guidance on the completion of 
the questionnaire was part of the on-line questionnaire. To get a deeper insight into 
the opinion of the responders, after the Q-sorting exercise the responders were shown 
those two-two statements they agreed with the most or the least, and were asked to 
give an explanation for those decisions. The survey was nameless, but information 
was collected on the age, the sex and the profession of the responder. Data collection 
took place in October and November 2008. 
 
V.2.3 Results of the Q-study 
 
In a total, 80 e-mails were sent to out. Alltogether, 34 responders rank-ordered the 34 
statements; as 1 of the responders said himself to be a student, 33 Q-sorts were 
suitable for analysis. The medical doctors (10 males) ranged between 25 and 69 
years of age and came from different parts of the country.  
Data were analyzed with the PQMethod 2.11 software50. The software uses the 
statistical method of factor analysis and rotates the factors with the so called 
VARIMAX process. Results were investigated by different solutions with 2, 3 and 4 
                                                 
48 I would like to acknowledge Dr. Márta Péntek for her valuable contribution to the Hungarian 
version of the Q-questionnaire. 
49 The online Q-questionnare for medical doctors is available at: 
http://www.yourviewonhealth.com/hungary/md/index.html
50 The software and its manual are available at: www.rz.unibw-munchen.de/∼p41bsmk/qmethod/  
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factors. Finally, I chose the 3-factor solution and the results of this solution are only 
presented in the dissertation.51
 
Table 9 shows the factor loadings for all 33 reponders in the case of the 3-factor 
solution. Six responders did not load on any of the factors significantly. (These 
responders were excluded from further analyses by the software.) For the other 
responders the number in bold and X indicate that factor load that was statistically 
significantly loading on a given factor52 (i.e. X shows the opinion group the 
responder belongs to). The three factors had 11, 8 and 8 defining variables, i.e. 
responders belonging to each, respectively, and together explained the 50% of the 
total variance in the Q-sorts.  
 
                                                 
51 Regarding the 2-factor solution I felt the results a bit rough, although the factors were easy to 
distinguish. In the case of the 4-factor solution there were 11 responders that did not belong to any 
factor, that is why I did not find this solution a proper one either (see Appendix 13) (Originally there 
were 5 factors with an eigen value > 1.) 
52 Based on a Q-sort of 34 statements and p<0.01, the factor loading of a Q-sort must be equal to or 
higher than 2,58/sqroot(34) = 0.44 to be statistically significant. The composite sort of a factor is 
determined as the weighted average of the the Q-sorts belonging to the factor, with factor loadings as 
weights.  
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 Table 9 Factor loadings with 3-factor solution 
 
Responders Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 
1 hu_md_01 0,4172 -0,4914 0,2913
2 hu_md_02 0,3338 0,0676 0,5914X
3 hu_md_03 0,7092X 0,3307 0,3213
4 hu_md_04 0,4173 0,1524 0,6654X
5 hu_md_05 0,5168 0,5022 0,3014
6 hu_md_06 0,6161X 0,1796 0,1945
7 hu_md_07 0,3228 0,3587 0,476
8 hu_md_08 0,6445X 0,1728 0,057
9 hu_md_09 0,3466X -0,0117 0,3324
10 hu_md_10 0,6073 0,3253 0,5933
11 hu_md_11 0,1632 0,1839 0,6822X
12 hu_md_12 0,6881X 0,2376 0,2856
13 hu_md_14 0,0634 0,4965X 0,2116
14 hu_md_15 0,2146 0,4132X 0,297
15 hu_md_16 0,2242 0,2872 0,6543X
16 hu_md_17 0,4053 0,5058X 0,1989
17 hu_md_18 0,1949 0,168 0,5454X
18 hu_md_19 0,5525X -0,0014 0,3578
19 hu_md_20 0,5512X 0,192 0,1286
20 hu_md_21 -0,0771 0,3794X 0,3138
21 hu_md_22 0,6475X 0,2345 0,2475
22 hu_md_23 0,3841 0,5623X 0,2311
23 hu_md_24 0,058 0,2904 0,4923X
24 hu_md_25 0,3847 0,5708X -0,0016
25 hu_md_26 0,5730X 0,317 0,4721
26 hu_md_27 0,1903 0,5959X 0,0478
27 hu_md_28 0,2363 0,533 0,4878
28 hu_md_29 0,6059X 0,1196 0,5062
29 hu_md_30 0,2398 0,1446 0,7534X
30 hu_md_31 0,5696 0,1437 0,5719
31 hu_md_32 0,2268 0,4586X 0,2828
32 hu_md_33 0,3746 0,2699 0,7488X
33 hu_md_34 0,4543X 0,2995 0,2742
% Var. 19% 12% 19% 
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The Q-method provides different outputs. 
 
a) Within each factor (opinion group) the software calculates the so called 
normalized factor scores (Z-score) for each statement; these scores show the degree 
with which the valuation of the given opinion group is different from the main 
average. On a given factor, the Z-scores of the highest values indicate those 
statements that are agreed the most by the responders in the group. Statements with 
the lowest Z-scores are disagreed with the least in the group. These scores help the 
analyser to overview which statements were agreed or disagreed with or were neutral 
in a given group. The statements having a Z-score > ⎜1⎥ are called characteristic 
statements. (Z-scores of each factor are given in Appendix 14.) 
 
b) Distinguishing statements are those that distinct a factor from the other factors (i.e. 
opinion groups) because the group agrees or disagrees more with the statement or – 
unlike other groups – finds a statement neutral. (Distinguishing statements for each 
factor together with the ranks and the Z-scores are presented in Tables 1-3 of 
Appendix 15.)  
 
c) Consensus statements are those in the case of which the opinion groups share a 
similar attitude and opinion about the issue. Groups tend to agree or disagree with the 
statement in a similar way or all groups find the issue neutral (see Table for in 
Appendix 15). 
 
d) Based on the Z-scores, it is possible to generate for all the 3 factors the Q-sort that 
is characteristic of the given factor on average. The scoring sheet can be filled out in 
a way that is characteristic of the given factor: the two statements with the highest Z-
scores are placed in column (+4), the two statements with the lowest Z-scores are 
placed in column (-4), etc. Typical Q-sorts of the 3 factors are given in Table 10.)  
 
In the following, I describe the factors, using the characteristic and distinguishing 
statements of each and the written comments of those respondents who belong to the 
factor. Quotes are presented in Italics between quotation marks.  
 
 
97 
Opinion group 1 
 
Medical doctors in this factor believe that rescuing someone from death has a priority 
over other interventions [8# +4 (short for statement 8 ranked at +4); 17# -2; see 
Table 2]: “Life saving is the most important thing”; “The most important task of 
medical care is to avert life threatening condition”. On the other hand, they feel 
highly important to prevent diseases (27# +4): “This is the theoretical principle of 
medical science”; “It costs less and provides better quality of life”. They are against 
the idea that circumstances other than health status of the patient should play a role in 
allocating health services. They most disagree with the prioritization of people who 
contributed more to the health care system (3# -4) or with the discrimination of 
people who do not work (5# -4): “It would cause absolute inequality in the society”; 
“Contribution to public expenditures is about this. If the statement were true, we 
would not talk about social insurance anymore”; “We cannot ground the availability 
of health care on the patients' ability to pay again (see middle ages, the beginning of 
modern history)”. Also, they are of the opinion that differences in income should not 
affect the treatment of the patients (16# -3): “These two things have nothing to do 
with each other, it is a completely insensate assumption”; “According to the  
Hungarian constitution, all people are entitled to medical care of the highest 
quality”. According to the group, it is need that should drive the access to health care 
not geographical circumstances or socio-economic status (29# +3; 4# +2): this is 
required “to ensure equality and justice”. This group of respondents slightly 
disagree with taking into consideration the effect of the disease on the family 
members of the patient (9# -1; 13# -1). Although, they are not willing to discriminate 
patients according to their financial situation, they tend to concern the costs and 
benefits of medical interventions. They agree that treatments generating more health 
should have priority (15# +3; 19# +3; 32# +2): “This needs no explanation, it is 
clear in economics”; „It is the most advantageous for the patient, the health care 
provider and for the financier”. They are willing to consider situations where high 
costs are associated with very low benefits (6# +1): „18 million Forint [HUF] is too 
much for a patient living for 1 month”. Also, they do not pursue to cure those people 
who are in a worse condition but can hardly benefit from treatment (11# -3; 22# +2; 
33# -2). Unhealthy lifestyle of the patient and her responsibility for her own illness 
matter for this group of doctors (21# -3; 25# +1): „The patient is indeed responsible 
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for his health”; “Yes indeed, everybody should care for themselves to live a healthier 
life”; “At the moment, it is only the health care system that is accountable for the 
success of the prevention and the treatment. Patients do not have any responsibility 
for it. This way we are beating the air”. 
 
Opinion group 2 
 
This group of doctors think that prevention would be highly important (27# +4): 
“This is the basement of everything”; “Prevention is more important than 
anything”; “Prevention is important, fewer people would be ill”. Life saving is of 
priority, too (8# +3): “Life is the most important thing”. As a distinctive 
characteristic of this group, they most agree with the statement that patients should 
be prioritized based on medical expertise (12# +4): “That is why we continued 
studies. To become able to decide this”; “Medical treatment should be judged on a 
professional basement”. They would not give priority to patients with dependent 
children (31# -4): „It is the disease that should matter, not the family circumstances 
of the patient”. They do not choose the patient with lower quality of life if the 
treatment is of little help (11# -4): “It is not quality of life that matters but the 
disease”; “No, because everybody is the same, one cannot make a distinction”; but 
they would treat the patient in worsening condition with priority (18# +3). On the 
other hand, compared to the other factors, they are less willing to consider the health 
benefits of the treatment (19# +1; 32# -1): “It is not possible to tell in advance how 
the patient will react to the treatment”, and they do not appear to consider the costs 
in patient level decision making (6# -1; 15# +1): “We do not consider this”. This 
opinion group think that young patients should not be preferred to older people (23# 
-3; 26# -3): [because of] “Equal judgment”, and they are the only ones who agree 
with the idea that elective interventions should be provided on a first come first 
served basis (28# +2): “I am a democrat”; If it is not about emergency care, I do not 
find any reason to  treat somebody out of his turn”. They do not seem to care about if 
the patient’s behaviour or lifestyle played a role in the development of the disease 
(21# 0; 25# 0). Similarly to other factors, they feel that it is need that should drive the 
access to health care not geographical circumstances or socio-economic status (29# 
+3; 4# +2). Regarding the role of paid work in priority setting, they take a middle 
position between the other two factors (5# -2). 
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Opinion group 3 
 
Similarly to the other factors, these respondents think that prevention of diseases 
(27# +3) is important: “Prevention of the diseases (based on developed protocols) is 
a more efficient way of curing than to treat diseases already manifested. Of course, 
this is not true for all the diseases, that is why proper regulation is needed. 
Furthermore, it puts bigger burden on the society because the person who does not 
die of AMI at the age of 45-60 is likely to die of cancer about 20 years later. The 
treatment of the latter one is much more costly and the pension should be paid, too. 
However, if we took into consideration this argument, we could not speak about 
cure, health care and humaneness”; “At a long run it is much cheaper to prevent 
severe diseases than to treat and see after them”. 
Rescuing people from a certain death (8# +3) is of high importance, too: „In case of 
life saving, we usually do not know how much health gain we can reach. That is why 
life saving is to be done first”; [it is important] “Because it saves life. I do not 
understand what should be explained about it”. However, they do not pursue the 
‘rule of rescue’ by any means (17# +1): “It is needless to prolong the suffering”. 
Also, they agree that access to health care should be based on needs (29# +4); age or 
gender should not play a role in prioritization decisions (4# +2): “All people should 
have access to the most important health care services, even if not to all services. 
This should be independent of the habitation or the income of the patients, because 
this is the only way to ensure their right to work”; “It is fair in this way”; “This 
would be the proper way in an ideal society, because all people are the same”. They 
think that differences in income are not a reason for positive or negative 
discrimination (16# -4): “Why should we prioritize like this? Because the other one 
might be able to buy the treatment for himself? Or the one who is better off has paid 
the social insurance contribution in all his life and the other one did not?”. These 
respondents are of the opinion that people are responsible for their own health and 
should bear the consequences, as well (21# -4; 25# +2): “People are responsible for 
their health. It is valuable as anything else. If somebody does not care about it, 
although he could, than he behaves irresponsibly, as the problem could have been 
prevented. The statement is not acceptable even in an idealistic health insurance 
system based on complete solidarity. The other insurees who spent time, energy, 
money and showed self-discipline to conserve their health would be put at a 
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disadvantage if people who did not do these things would get the same treatment. 
Also, in general, it may result in irresponsible behaviour and decreases the 
motivation for health-conscious behaviour”; “Why should the society help that 
person who caused harm for himself? It is not fair!”. 
They feel it important to provide treatments with more health benefits (15# +4; 19# 
+3): “Bigger health gain for the same price is beneficial both for the society and the 
individual”; “The running of the health care system is very expensive. Many times it 
is wasteful. To constraint expenditures, the health gain of different treatments should 
be determined and based on this, the treatments should be ranked for 
reimbursement”, these respondents are willing to consider the costs of the treatment 
if the expected benefit is very low (6# +2). They disagree the most to consider if the 
patient has a partner or not (7# -3): “Why should we give [the transplant organ] to 
the person with partner? How would we define partnership, anyway?”. Unlike other 
factors, they are of the opinion that patients should be allowed to by priority 
treatments if others are not affected negatively (24# -3). They appear to be the least 
interested in how much the patient contributed to the health care system or she has 
paid work or not (5# 0; 3# +1), or putting it in a different way, they do not feel such a 
revulsion at these statements as e.g. Factor 1 does. They would not give priority for 
the patient in the worst condition (1# -2; 11# -2). 
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Table 10 Statements and factor arrays (average Q-sorts by factors) 
No. Statement Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 
1 If two groups of patients can benefit from a treatment equally and 
group A’s health is fairly good and group B’s health is poor, group B 
deserves priority. 
1 0 -2* 
2 If one treatment results in one life year gained for certain and another 
in a 50% chance of gaining two life years, priority should be given to 
the first type of treatment.  
0 -1 -1 
3 People who have contributed more (e.g. through premiums or taxes) to 
the health care system should be treated with priority over people who 
have contributed less. 
-4* 0 1 
4 Patient characteristics like age, gender or income should play no role 
in prioritizing between people. 
2* 2* 2* 
5 People who are in paid work and so contribute financially to society 
should be prioritized over people who do not work. 
-4* -2* 0* 
6 If a treatment adds one month to the life of a patient and costs 7.500 
Euros, one should consider whether the money could have been better 
spent on other health care.  
1* -1* 2* 
7 If two patients are waiting for a transplant organ, one with partner and 
the other single but otherwise identical, the first organ to become 
available should go the patient with partner. 
-1 -2 -3 
8 Rescuing people from a certain death should take priority over all 
other kinds of health care. 
4 3 3 
9 Treatment of illnesses that put the highest burden on patients’ families 
should receive higher priority. 
-1* 2 0 
10 A treatment which benefits patients in the short-term should have 
priority over a treatment with similar benefits for patients in the future.
0 -1 0 
11 Priority should be given to people whose quality of life is low over 
those whose quality of life is moderate, even if treatment can only 
improve their quality of life by a small amount. 
-3* -4* -2* 
12 Doctors should be the ones to judge which patients get priority on the 
basis of their medical expertise. 
2 4* 1 
13 People who depend heavily on members of their family or neighbours 
for care should be treated with priority. 
-1 0 -1 
14 Adding one year to the end of life for someone who will otherwise die 
at age 30 is more important than adding one year to the life of 
someone who otherwise would die at age 80. 
1 1 0 
15 When having to choose between two treatments that both cost the 
same, funding should be given to the treatment that results in the 
biggest health gain. 
3 1* 4 
16 In general, if people from different income groups are suffering from 
the same condition, people from low income groups should be given 
priority. 
-3 -2 -4 
17 There is no sense in saving lives if the quality of those lives will be 
really bad. 
-2 0 1* 
18 If two people have the same current condition but the health of one of 
the two is worsening while that of the other is stable, the former should 
be treated with priority. 
0* 3* 1* 
19 Priority should be given to those treatments that generate the most 
health. 
3 1* 3 
20 It is more important to extend one person’s life by one year than to 
extend 12 people’s lives by one month. 
0 -2 -1 
21 Whether an illness is the result of an unhealthy lifestyle should not be 
relevant, everyone is just as worthy of treatment as everyone else.  
-3* 0* -4* 
22 Priority should be given to treatments that restore health to an 
acceptable level, there’s no use in improving health when the final 
result is still a very poor state of health. 
2* 2* 2* 
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23 Younger people should be given priority over older people, because 
they haven’t had their fair share of health yet. 
0 -3 -1 
24 People should not be allowed to buy themselves priority treatment, 
even if it doesn’t affect others negatively. 
0 1 -3* 
25 People who are in some way responsible for their own illness should 
receive lower priority than people who have the same illness simply 
due to chance. 
1 0 2 
26 Priority should be given to younger people, because they may benefit 
from treatment for longer. 
-1 -3* 0 
27 It is more important to prevent ill health than it is to cure ill health 
once it occurs. 
4 4 3 
28 For non-emergency treatments where there are waiting lists, patients in 
need of care should be treated on a first come first served basis and not 
be prioritised in other ways (e.g. the severity of the illness).   
-2 2* -2 
29 Access to health care should be based on need, not on geographical, 
social or economic circumstances. 
3 3 4 
30 Priority should be given to people with rare diseases, even when these 
diseases do not necessarily cause more health damage than more 
common ones. 
-2 -3 -3 
31 Parents with dependent children should be given priority over similar 
people without dependents. 
-1 -4* -1 
32 People who benefit more from a treatment, because it is more effective 
for them, should receive priority over people who benefit less from 
this treatment. 
2 -1* 0 
33 It is more important to provide treatments that prolong life than 
treatments that improve quality of life. 
-2 -1 -2 
34 The amount of health care people have had in the past should not 
influence access to treatments in the future. 
1* 1* 1* 
Remarks: Ranks of the those statements got a colourful (pink, blue or yellow) background that are 
distinguishing statements for the given factor (p < 0,05). *indicates where the distincion is 
statistically significant at a level of p<0.01. 
Ranks in green colour show the consensus statements, i.e. those statements that do not distinguish the 
groups at a level of p<0,01. *indicates where the statement does not distinct the groups at a level of 
p<0.05 either. 
 
V.2.4 Discussion of the results of the Q-study 
 
Our Q-study revealed three opinion groups of medical doctors on the aspects of 
allocating health services in the population. These aspects cover issues such as the 
age, the socio-economic status or the life-style of the patient, burden on the family 
members, contribution to societal expenditures by the patient, access to treatment, 
need for care, the patient’s potential for benefit from the treatment, the importance of 
life saving versus quality of life, costs and cost-effectiveness of the treatment. 
Beyond the statistical analysis of the Q-sorts, word for word quotations from the 
respondents were used to highlight the similarities and differences between the 
factors.  
It seems that medical doctors share similar opinion about what are the most 
important aspects of allocating health care services. There are three statements that 
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are highly ranked (+4 or +3) by all the three factors: rescuing people’s life should 
take priority over other interventions (8#); prevention of the disease would be more 
important than curing it (#27); and it is need that should drive the access to health 
care (#29).  
Life saving is usually considered to be the most important and primary task of a 
doctor. Prevention of diseases is generally deemed to be an optimal solution both for 
the individual and the society, as higher quality of life and less costs are expected. 
The need principle is justified by the belief that people are equal. The latter finding is 
further supported by a consensus statement (#4 +2), as each factor believe that the 
age, gender and income of the patients should not play a role in patient level 
prioritization.  
The Q-analysis revealed three more consensus statements. None of the factors 
prioritized the patients with low quality of life over those with moderate quality of 
life, if expected health gain was marginal for the previous one (#11). The importance 
of quality of life emerged from #22, too: factors tended to prefer those treatments 
that restore health to an acceptable level. Finally, all the factors seem to be neutral 
for the past utilization of health care (#34): „The solidarity principle should prevail 
in the allocation of health care”. 
Not surprisingly, the similarities we found between the factors seem to reflect the 
basic principles of medicine. These principles provide a common basement for 
medical doctors, and differences between opinion groups come from other aspects of 
patient level prioritization. Table 11 overviews the most important characteristics of 
the opinion groups. The table does not contain the consensus statements. 
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 Table 11 Comparison of opinion families 
Factor Factor characteristics 
F1 • Prioritization of treatments resulting in more health gain (#15; #19) 
• Neutral for small health gain costing a lot (#6) 
• Denial of taking family burden into consideration (#9) 
• Individual responsibility is important (#21) 
• Denial of taking paid work and contribution to health care system into 
consideration (#3; #5) 
F2 • Physicians are to make decisions (#12) 
• Treatment of worsening health condition is preferred to that of the stable one 
(#18) 
• Neutral for small health gain costing a lot (#6) 
• Waiting list on a first come first served basis (#28) 
• Neutral for treatments resulting in more health gain (#15; #19; #32) 
• Neutral for/slight denial of taking paid work and contribution to the health care 
system into account (#3; #5) 
• Neutral for individual responsibility (#21) 
• Denial of prioritization of the younger and parents with children (#26; 
   #31) 
F3 • Preference for treatments resulting in more health gain (#15; #19) 
• Tendency for considering small health gains if they cost a lot (#6) 
• No need for rescuing life by any means (#17) 
• Neutral for taking paid work into consideration (#5) 
• Individual responsibility is more important than for the other 2 factors (#21; 
#25) 
• Denial of the treatment of the patient in the worst condition (#1) 
• Buying of priority treatment should not be forbidden (#24) 
 
There are some limitations of the Q-study described above that should be mentioned.  
Out of 80 e-mails there were 33 questionnaires suitable for analysis (rate of 41%). 
However, it has to be emphasized again that this sample size is sufficient for the Q-
method and the Q-method does not aim to have a sample representative of the 
potential responders. It is important to note that these results cannot be transferred to 
other responder groups such as the general public, groups of other professions, etc. 
Also, the Q-method is suitable for the distinction of opinion groups but is not able to 
tell the distribution or the weight of these groups in the study population. One of the 
potential disadvantages of the web-based surveys is that it might be difficult to fill 
out an on-line questionnaire for those who do not use the internet frequently. In my 
opinion, this is not likely to cause significant problems in this research: medical 
doctors can be assumed to be familiar with internet use. Furthermore, the structuring 
of the questionnaire and the layout of the website tried to exploit all the possibilities 
to be user friendly and to provide help for the responders. Finally, it can be a 
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limitation of this study that responders were asked to give a reason for their decision 
only in the case of those 4 statements that were ranked as +4 or -4 by them (the 
statements they agreed or disagreed with the most). During face-to-face interviews 
there had been more opportunities to reveal the attitudes and opinions of the 
responders.  
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VI. SUMMARY 
 
 
In my dissertation I dealt with the societal aspects of the distribution of health gains. 
Because of scarce resources, the prioritization among patients is inevitable. 
Prioritization has always been an issue in medical care: always has to be decided 
which patient is in bigger need for health care, and which patient should have access 
to different health care services (e.g. medication, operational procedures, and 
screening programmes). Prioritization criteria have been different in different 
societies and ages (access to health care might have been determined by the financial 
situation of the patient, etc.). Nowadays, however, in modern societies citizens and 
ensurees expect to access to the broad circle of services and expect that health policy 
decisions be made on a professional (medical, economic, etc.) basement. Enhance of 
expectations and constraint resources are difficult to harmonize and put pressure on 
any health care system, irrespective of whether we are talking about a national health 
care system, private or social insurance. 
Prioritization in health care has different levels. At the level of health policy it has to 
be decided who, under which conditions, and to which health care services are 
entitled to. For example, health policy is to decide which services are covered in the 
social insurance (benefit package) and to determine those services which are going to 
available only at the private markets (e.g. aesthetic surgery is a typical example for 
the latter). Similarly, it is possible that some patient group is excluded from the 
covered population. Another circle of policy decisions is when a given health care 
service is covered for the patient group by the insurer but only if the treatment 
follows medical protocols and uses predefined and covered health technologies.  
Health care providers (institutes and individuals) play a role in prioritization, too. 
Treatment decisions are made by medical professionals at the individual patient 
level. Basically and primarily, these medical decisions are guided by professional 
rules and consider the interest of the individual patient at the first place. However, 
each and single treatment decision is a decision about allocating resources, too. All 
the resources given to a patient is opportunity cost at the same time. In this broader 
context, the costs of treating a patient become a considerable issue in medical 
decisions as well. This factor however has to do with ethics, philosophy and different 
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aspects of social policy, which are closely related to value judgements, equity views 
and expectations typical of a given society.  
 
The objective of this dissertation was to review the international literature and 
identify those social values and equity considerations (e.g. age of the patient, severity 
of the disease, social role of the patient) that might be of importance in the allocation 
of health gains among individuals. The second part of the dissertation presented the 
results of two empirical studies conducted with Hungarian medical professionals as 
subjects. Both studies – with different methodologies – sought an answer to the 
following basic question: „In the opinion of Hungarian medical doctors, which 
societal considerations should affect the distribution of health gains among 
individuals (patients)?”. 
The subjects of the first empirical study were general practitioners and the study 
aimed to elicit their preferences for selected characteristics (as prioritization criteria) 
of the patient and of the disease. This study was a discrete choice analysis that is a 
method for getting know stated preferences and considered to be a choice-based 
method that is deeply rooted in economic theory. The second study related to an 
international research project (EuroVaQ project) that investigated the views of health 
policy makers and of the general public on the factors (e.g. age, family background 
and income of the patient) that are considered to be important in allocating health 
among patients. The study in the dissertation chose another responder group and 
made a survey with Hungarian medical doctors. This survey used the Q-method that 
serves for the study of personal attitudes, opinions, and value judgements, etc. 
 
The researches described above on preferences and attitudes in health gain 
distribution have served a number of lessons. Similar researches ought to be 
conducted also in a wider range. The main thoughts are summarized below. 
 
• With respect to resource allocation in health policy, insufficient transparency of 
decisions is a frequent problem. One reason for this is that, according also to the 
literature, social expectations and values connected with resource allocation are not 
sufficiently clarified. As tools for facilitating decision-making, similar researches 
could enhance transparency of decision-making in public policy. Acceptability of 
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decisions could be increased by clarifying the role equity considerations play in 
decision-making. 
 
• Several examples for the explicit use of equity considerations are found abroad. 
Guidelines on the most important basic principles have been developed in Sweden 
and the United Kingdom. The motivation behind the guidelines is the safeguarding of 
human rights and reduction of discrimination. Since the subject is still insufficiently 
researched and poses a multitude of ethical issues, basic principles primarily point to 
those characteristics on the basis of which no prioritisation of patients is to be made 
(e.g. race and sex), allowing for the consideration of such characteristics only if a 
given group’s different response to medicinal treatment is scientifically established. 
The guidelines of the NICE declares for example that the age of the patient should 
not be a factor of prioritization in itself, however, if the age of the patient is a risk 
factor during the treatment or is related to higher risk of complications, it should be 
considered. This might mean that certain treatments will not be available for a given 
age group. [NICE 2008] 
Albeit that several open questions still exist, it should be stressed, that such 
recommendation now form part of decision-making. In the United Kingdom, 
guidelines on social value judgments formulated by NICE should be followed by the 
relevant advisory and decision-making bodies.53  
 
• The guideline of the NICE states that recommendations are necessary: alongside 
considerations of medical and efficiency evidence, social considerations also play a 
role in health-care decision-making. On the other hand, there is no consensus 
whether, from an ethical viewpoint, fairness of distribution is served better by the 
utilitarian approach (health maximisation at a societal level from available resources) 
or by the egalitarian approach (all should have a ‘fair’ measure of access to available 
resources). While the former approach may easily work against minority interests, 
the latter is hard to maintain given the limited resources. According to the position 
taken by NICE, the problem can be resolved by supporting procedural fairness, i.e. 
decision-making along transparent principles established in advance. In line with this 
position, the guidelines of the NICE are freely available for the ample circle of 
                                                 
53 One of the tasks of the National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE) is to develop 
recommendations and guidelines in all areas of health and health-care for the National Health Service.  
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stakeholders, i.e. for professional bodies, patients and their associations, for the 
health industry and the general public. For the sake of transparency, this publicity is 
considered to be essential by NICE.  
 
• In making decisions on resource allocation, health economists in general follow 
two main lines of thinking with respect to equity and social considerations. One calls 
for a numerical expression by preference elicitation tools of the weight a person 
described by specific characteristics (e.g. age, marital status) is given in social 
distribution, that is, individuals should be accorded different importance. The other 
trend holds that there is no need for a system of numerical weights, it is sufficient to 
acquaint decision-makers with social preferences and it is up to them to which extent 
they take them into consideration. In practice, health policy decisions are closer to 
the latter approach, partly because no sufficient body of scientific work is available 
on the basis of which an equity system of weights can be developed, and partly 
because, in my opinion, decision-makers prefer a degree of flexibility in the 
decision-making process. As mentioned in the previous point, agents in both science 
and health policy abroad take a keen interest in equity and social considerations in 
health distribution. It would be a great step forward if more researches were 
conducted in Hungary too, guidelines would be developed, and decision-makers 
could recognise that well-elaborated guidelines facilitate decision-making and 
increase acceptance of the decisions. 
 
• The subjects of the studies presented in this dissertation consisted of medical 
doctors. A very important issue of health care prioritization, however, who is to 
make these decisions, i.e. the health policy decision makers, medical doctors, or 
scientists dealing with ethics, philosophy or social policy, the general public or some 
subgroup of it? This question is not to be answered here, but shows that for a wider 
knowledge of social expectations, examinations should be conducted in a variety of 
respondent groups. Therefore, exploration of opinions held by various groups of 
health workers, the general public, and health policy decision-makers may mark out 
further directions for research.  
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• Owing to methodological limitations, the preference elicitation described above 
examined only a narrow range of social considerations. The exploration of the role 
other factors, such as patients’ social and economic characteristics, life-style, health 
consciousness, etc., play in prioritisation decisions is called for. 
 
• Both the preference elicitation and the attitude study yielded useful results: one of 
them being the proof that the methods employed could be successfully used in areas 
of health-care. 
 
• The successful use of discrete choice experiment and Q-method offers several, so 
far unexplored possibilities. In recent decades, several health reform ideas have been 
developed in Hungary without knowledge of the opinions and preferences either of 
the medical profession or the general public. Beyond issues concerning the entire 
health care system, these methods can be utilised also in more concrete cases. There 
are a fair number of studies in Western Europe, in which various methodologies were 
applied, including the discrete choice experiment I used, for the examination of 
considerations in organising specific health services deemed important by the 
inhabitants and patients who use them. Examples are the examination of preferences 
for screenings of colorectal cancer and mammal cancer [Gyrd-Hansen 2001], and 
preferences of the elderly in organising social services [Ryan 2006], or the 
preferences for out-of-hours care by general practitioners. [Scott 2003] Similar 
researches should be conducted also in Hungary, the results of which would 
contribute towards the development of a health-care scheme better adapted to patient 
needs. 
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Appendix 1 List of abbreviations 
 
 
English term Abbreviation 
Discrete choice experiment DCE 
Quality adjusted life years QALY 
Mixed logit [model] ML 
National Institute for Clinical Excellence NICE 
Cost-effectiveness analysis CEA 
Cost-utility analysis CUA 
Cost-benefit analysis CBA 
Cost-minimization analysis CMA 
National Health Services [UK] NHS 
Incremental cost-effectiveness ratio ICER 
National Health Insurance Fund 
Administration
 [Hungary] NHIFA 
Random parameter logit [model] RPL 
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Appendix 2 Cost-effectiveness of technologies recommended by NICE 
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Source: technologies no. 3-41: Towse, 2002. Table 4; technologies no. 75-93: NICE 
HTA monographs (www.nice.org.uk), data collection 
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Appendix 3 Economic theory of DCE 
 
 
Among choice based techniques, the method of discrete choice experiment is 
considered to have the strongest basis in economic theory. One of the pros is that the 
decision making situation is well known by most of the people from daily life: 
respondents have to choose one good out of two or more. Compared to this exercise, 
people are usually less familiar with ranking and rating. [Ryan 1999a].  
DCE, on one hand, roots in the probabilistic choice theory, within that it belongs to 
the random utility theory, and on the other hand, it is consistent with the economic 
theory of Lancaster and the neo-classical economic theory. [Lancaster 1966, Manski 
1977] 
The basic idea behind the probabilistic choice theory is that individual choices 
always carry some degree of uncertainty. Instead of determining that option the 
individual chooses, these models estimate the probabilities with which different 
options are chosen by the individual. These models may have two distinct 
approaches. 
1) The model of random decision rule [Tversky 1972] assumes that the utility of an 
alternative is deterministic, while the decision rule is probabilistic, i.e. the behaviour 
of the individual is probabilistic by nature: individual behaviour changes due to 
exogenous and endogenous factors. Consequently, the probability of choice can be 
estimated for each alternative, however, individuals do not necessarily choose the 
alternative with the highest utility. This sort of uncertainties and anomalies can be 
observed in decisions, indeed. Also, people may not choose the very same alternative 
under the same circumstances either.  
 
2) According to the random utility theory, it is the decision rule that is deterministic 
and the utility of the alternative is probabilistic. [REF] Its probabilistic nature derives 
from the assumption that the researcher is not able to give an exhaustive description 
of individual behaviour. This approach is consistent with neo-classical economic 
theory as it regards the individual as a rational one who maximizes utility: the 
individual is able to determine which is the best alternative for him and makes the 
same decision under the same circumstances. The link with the probabilistic choice 
behaviour comes from the imperfect information the researcher has on the utility 
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function of the individual. First, the researcher is not able to get know all those 
features (attributes) of the alternatives that may affect the decision. Second, he will 
not perfectly know the individuals themselves (e.g. taste variations). [Ben-Akiva 
1985]  
Let us assume that the individual is to choose between alternative i and j. The utility 
function of the individual for alternative i can be formulated as follows:  
 
Ui = Vi + εi;
 
where Ui is the real but unobservable utility, Vi is the observable component of the 
utility, and εi represents those factors that are not observable by the researcher so he 
treats them as random. [Hanemann 1984] Choosing between two alternatives, the 
probability that the individual will choose alternative i against alternative j is as 
follows: 
 
Pi = Prob (Ui > Uj) = Prob (Vi + εi > Vj + εj) = Prob (Vi – Vj > εi – εj), ahol   ∀ i ≠ j 
 
Apparently, the higher the choice probability of an alternative is, the bigger the 
difference in the observable utilities of the alternatives is. The probability of choice 
can be interpreted as the strength of the preferences for an alternative.  
The economic theory by Lancaster [1966] provides another theoretic basement of 
DCE. This theory regards the good as the combination of several features and 
characteristics that are present to a different degree. The consumer values these 
characteristics of the good and those will determine the consumer’s preference for 
the good. In this sense, the demand for the good is derived from its characteristics. 
DCE applies this very approach when alternatives are described with their attributes 
and respondents are asked to choose one alternative after considering these attributes.  
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Appendix 4 Efficiency criteria of the DCE design 
 
 
Huber established the 4 principles of an efficient DCE design, calling them as „D-
efficiency”. [Huber 1996] Improving one of the principles, ceteris paribus, the design 
improves. In general, however, it is not possible to create a design that fulfils all the 
4 criteria in full, some trade-off always exist. The criteria are as follows: 
 
1. Level balance: each attribute level appears approximately with an equal 
number of times in the design. 
2.  Orthogonality: attribute levels are chosen independently of other attribute 
levels, so that the effect of an attribute level can be measured independently 
of other levels’ effects. 
3. Minimal overlap: each attribute level shows up as few times possible in a 
given choice task. If an attribute took the same level in all the concepts in a 
single choice task than the decision would not carry information about that 
attribute. 
4. Utility balance: the utility of the concepts in a single choice task is 
approximately equal. This is a relatively new criterion the application of 
which is not without difficulties as it requires precursory information on 
respondents’ preferences. 
 
Appendix 5 Preferences in health – studies in the literature 
 
Reference Country Scope of the study Attributes Subjects (number) Method 
Ryan 1997 
 United Kingdom 
Management of 
miscarriage 
Strength of pain, time in hospital, time to 
recovery, costs of care for the patient, after-
care complications 
Women from the general 
population (n=196) 
Discrete Choice 
Experiment 
Ryan 1999b 
 United Kingdom 
In Vitro Fertilization 
(IVF) 
 
Attitude of the personnel, same personnel 
during the process of care, time on waiting list, 
cost of IVF for the patient, chance of a 
successful intervention, patient follow-up  
Visitors of a reproduction 
clinic (n=331)  
Discrete Choice 
Experiment 
Farrar 2000 
 United Kingdom 
Development of clinical 
services 
Strength of evidence on clinical efficacy, 
magnitude of health gain, contribution to 
professional development, contribution to 
teaching and research, strategic importance 
Hospital experts (n=130) Discrete Choice Experiment 
Ryynänen 2000 
 Finland 
Priority setting criteria in 
health care 
Age of the patient, disease severity, prognosis, 
patient’s responsibility for the disease, 
financial situation of the patient, demented 
patient, institutionalized patient, cost of care 
Nurses (n=151) 
Doctors (n=241) 
Discrete Choice 
Experiment 
Gyrd-Hansen 2001 
 Denmark 
Screening for colon 
cancer and breast cancer  
Screening cost for the patient, number of 
screenings, risk of false positive result, 
decrease in the risk of cancer due to the 
screening 
Men and women about 
colon screening (n=422) 
women about breast 
screening (n=207) from 
the general population 
Ranking 
Phillips 2002 
 USA 
HIV test  
 
Location and price oft he HIV test, method of 
sample collection, accuracy of the test, waiting 
time for the result, secrecy, way of counselling
Participants in HIV 
testing (n=365) 
Discrete Choice 
Experiment 
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Appendix 5 (Cont.) 
Reference Country Scope of the study Attributes Subjects (number) Method 
Scott 2003 
 United Kingdom 
Out of hours care in 
general practice 
Location of care, who provides care, time to 
access of care, doctor-patient relationship Parents (n=3326) 
Discrete Choice 
Experiment 
Ratcliffe 2004  United Kingdom Treatment of osteoarthritis (OA)  
Intensity and frequency of joint pain, motility, 
risk of minor/moderate side effects, risk of 
severe side effects 
OA patients (n=412) Discrete Choice Experiment 
Albus 2005 
 Germany 
Medical and psychosocial 
support in HIV 
Way of information giving, type of 
counselling, access to counselling HIV patients (n=163) Rating 
Dolan-Tsuchiya 2005 
 United Kingdom 
Prioritization of patients 
based on their past health 
experiences and future 
health prospects 
 
Age and past health experiences of the patient, 
life expectancy, future health prospect of the 
patient without treatment 
 
General population 
(n=128) Ranking 
Akkazieva 2006 Hungary Health care system reforms 
Efficiency, market elements, additional 
services, freedom to choose doctor, use of 
clinical evidences, patient rights 
Rheumatic patients 
(n=86) 
Discrete Choice 
Experiment 
Ryan 2006 
 United Kingdom 
Social care for older 
people 
Eating, personal needs, safety, social contact, 
autonomy of life  
Institutionalized patients 
aged 60+ years (n=326) 
Discrete Choice 
Experiment 
Robinson 2007 
 United Kingdom 
„Worth” of death 
depending on the 
characteristics of the 
departed 
Age, individual responsibility for the cause of 
dying, degree and time of anguish before 
dying 
General population 
(n=313) 
Discrete Choice 
Experiment 
 
Appendix 6 Example for a choice task in the DCE 
 
 
 
Which couple would you treat? (Please tick the appropriate box below!) 
 
 
Couple 1 Couple 2 Couple 3  
 
 
Age of the couple: 18-35 years 
 
The couple suffers from a 
frequent disease 
 
The disease deteriorates the 
QoL significantly 
 
The disease has medium 
mortality 
 
The couple suffers from other 
serious chronic disease 
 
The therapy prolongs the life 
with 1 additional year for both 
members of the couple 
 
Medication restores QoL 
by 50% 
 
 
Medication averts 
complications emerging at a 
long time 
 
Age of the couple: 36-60 
years 
 
The couple suffers from a rare 
disease 
 
The disease does not deteriorate 
the QoL significantly 
 
The disease has high mortality 
 
The couple does not suffer from 
other serious chronic disease 
 
The therapy prolongs the 
life with 2 additional years 
for one of the members of 
the couple 
 
Medication restores QoL 
completely 
 
Medication averts 
complications emerging at 
a long time 
 
Age of the couple: 60+ 
years 
 
The couple suffers from a 
frequent disease 
 
The disease does not deteriorate 
the QoL significantly 
 
The disease has low mortality 
 
The couple does not suffer from 
other serious chronic disease 
 
The therapy prolongs the 
life with 2 additional years 
for one of the members of 
the couple 
 
Medication restores QoL 
by 50% 
 
 
Medication averts 
complications emerging at 
a short time 
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Appendix 7 Introductory text of the DCE questionnaire – first version 
 
 
Introduction 
In our study we use the method of conjoint analysis which works with the help of response 
cards. This questionnaire – unlike to other questionnaires – investigate and circuit only one 
question. 
 
Imagine that you treat married couples. Both members of the couples suffer from the 
same disease. The couples do not have children. 
 
Let us assume that you dispose of a medication one dose of which is able to prolong the life 
of the couple with 2 years. You have only one dose of medication. You are the only one 
disposing of it. 
 
I will show you different card-sets each describing different couples. I ask you to choose 
that couple from each card-set you prefer to give this medication. 
 
Thank you for your collaboration! 
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Appendix 8 The Random Parameter Logit Model 
 
 
In case of discrete choice experiments, one of the widely used models is the 
multinomial model (MNL); e.g. the conditional logit model that was developed by 
McFadden and can be considered one of the first types of models. [McFadden 1974, 
2001] In the field of health economics another type of model that is preferred is the 
multinomial probit model. Also, the so called mixed logit (ML) model is expected to 
gain bigger scope in the future.54 The multinomial model is considered to be a robust 
model and its estimation is relatively easy, however, it has some limitations [Train 
1998], that is why it was not chosen for our analysis. The multinomial model  
 
1) assumes that the preferences of the respondents are homogeneous, so all the 
respondents with the same observed characteristics would evaluate the 
attributes in the very same way; 
2) assumes the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA), which means that if 
one of the attributes changes for an alternative then the choice probability for 
the other alternatives will change proportionally; 
3) is not able to take into consideration that the respondent might make several 
choices one after the other (i.e. multiple observations from the same 
individual), and in this case there might be factors that are not observable still 
are typical of the choices of the same individual, hence these decisions are 
not independent of each other; 
4) makes the interpretation of statistically insignificant parameters ambiguous. 
On one hand, the parameter might not be significant because the attribute is 
not important for the respondent, so it does not affect the decision. On the 
other hand, it might occur that the parameter is not significant because of the 
heterogeneity of preferences: the attribute does affect the decision, but 
counteractive preferences of the respondents for the attribute extinct the 
effect of each other. 
 
                                                 
54 Interested readers are advised to turn to the following literature, e.g.: Train 2003, Hensher 2005 
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Limitations above can be avoided by the mixed logit model (furthermore ML)55 that 
is an extension of the logit model and allows the parameters of the observed 
variables to vary randomly among the respondents. The ML estimates the moments 
of the respondent-specific parameters and makes it possible to investigate the 
heterogeneity existing in the preferences and tastes of the respondents. The variance 
in the non-observed and respondent-specific parameters results in correlation among 
the alternatives in the stochastic part of the utility function. So, the ML releases the 
IIA assumption and is suitable for making estimations in case of multiple 
observations from the same respondent. The term of „mixed” logit refers to the fact 
that the choice probability is the mixture of logit expressions and some distribution 
(mixing distribution); i.e. the ML is the integral of logits over some distribution.56 
Instead of ML model, other terms like „random coefficient logit”, „random 
parameter logit”, and error-components logit model57 are used. The dissertation will 
use the term of random parameter logit (RPL) that is described shortly hereafter. 
 
Let’s assume that the number of respondents in a DCE is N, the number of choice 
situations is T, and the number of alternatives is J. The utility of individual n in 
choice situation t for alternative j can be formalized in the following way: 
 
             n = 1, …, N 
where,  j = 1, …, J 
             t = 1, …, T 
 
and xnjt is the vector of observed variables describing individual n and/or alternative 
j; βn is the vector of individual-specific coefficients and is not observable; εnjt is a 
random term that is assumed to be distributed IID extreme value and it is 
independent of βn and Xnjt. It should be noted that βn vector of coefficients is 
characteristic of individual n expressing her taste. In general, βn = b + ηn where b is 
the mean of the coefficients and ηn is the stochastic deviation from it expressing the 
individual’s taste. This model specification makes it possible to investigate different 
tastes of different individuals but assumes that the taste of a given individual does 
not change over the sequence of decisions.  
                                                 
55 The outline of the mixed logit model is based ont he following publications: [Revelt-Train 1998, 
Train 2003, Hole 2007]. 
56 The mixing distribution can take any form, e.g. normal, triangular, lognormal, etc. 
57 Different terms suggest different approaches of the ML model, for more details see e.g. Train K, 
2003. 
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 In the model, the density function of β is f(β|θ), where θ  stands for the parameters 
of the distribution. Conditional on knowing βn, the probability that respondent n will 
choose alternative i in choice situation t is the following:  
 
 
 
which is the standard logit formula. Still on condition that βn is known, the 
probability of the observed sequence of choices with the individual is:  
 
 
 
where i(n,t) refers to the alternative chosen by individual n on choice occasion t. The 
unconditional probability of the observed sequence of choices can be given as the 
integral of the conditional probabilities over the distribution of β: 
 
 
Therefore, the unconditional probability is a weighted average of a product of logit 
formulas evaluated at different values of β, where the weights are given by the 
density f. The log likelihood in the RPL model can be written in the same way as in 
the standard logit model: 
 
 
 
However, in the mixed logit (RPL) case the expression above cannot be solved 
analytically (like in the case of the standard logit), therefore simulation methods are 
to be used for an approximated solution. The simulated log likelihood is given by: 
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where R is the number of replications (draws from f(β|θ) for the simulation) and βr 
is the rth draw. The estimated parameters maximize the simulated log likelihood 
function (SLL).  
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Appendix 9 Characteristics of GPs’ subgroups by the questionnaire versions 
 
 
In the preference elicitation study there were 4 questionnaire versions. Each of them 
was completed by 50-50 GPs. The allocation of the questionnaires was random; still 
I investigated if these respondent groups were similar according to the characteristics 
we collected. Table 1 shows the average characteristics of the respondent groups. 
 
Table 1 Average characteristics of the GPs by questionnaire versions 
  Version 1 Version 2 Version 3 Version 4
Male GPs 56% 58% 56% 60% 
Average age (year) 47,3 48,3 50,9 48,5 
st.d. 8,29 8,90 11,02 9,67 
Average time in praxis (year) 16,9 17,8 19,9 18,2 
st.d. 10,43 9,42 11,52 10,55 
Average number of enrolees 1730 1805 1827 1850 
st.d. 517,08 514,88 497,47 557,37 
 
Independent samples t-test was used to compare these groups by the age of the GPs, 
the number of years spent as a GP and by the number of patient cards in the praxis. 
All the possible comparisons showed that at a significance level of 5% there was no 
reason to reject the hypothesis that these groups were similar (see Table 2). 
 
 
Table 2 T-tests for the comparison of respondents’ subgroups by questionnaire versions (V, V2, V3, V4) 
 
V1 vs V2 Levene test T-test 
  F Sign. t df Sign. Difference of means SE 95% Conf. Interv. 
          (two-tailed)     lower upper 
GP’s age (year) 0,250 0,618 -0,599 97 0,551 -1,0 1,728 -4,5 2,4 
Time in praxis (year) 2,489 0,118 -0,472 97 0,638 -0,9 1,996 -4,9 3,0 
Patient cards 0,205 0,652 -0,719 96 0,474 -74,9 104,261 -281,9 132,0 
 
 
V1 vs V3 Levene test T-test 
 F Sign. t df Sign. Difference of means SE 95% Conf. Interv. 
          (two-tailed)     lower upper 
GP’s age (year) 1,110 0,295 -1,842 97 0,069 -3,6 1,963 -7,5 0,3 
Time in praxis (year) 0,167 0,684 -1,377 97 0,172 -3,0 2,209 -7,4 1,3 
Patient cards 0,198 0,658 -0,951 96 0,344 -97,4 102,484 -300,9 106,0 
 
 
V1 vs V4 Levene test T-test 
 F Sign. t df Sign. Difference of means SE 95% Conf. Interv. 
          (two-tailed)     lower upper 
GP’s age (year) 0,275 0,601 -0,671 97 0,504 -1,2 1,811 -4,8 2,4 
Time in praxis (year) 0,230 0,633 -0,637 97 0,526 -1,3 2,108 -5,5 2,8 
Patient cards 0,340 0,561 -1,111 96 0,269 -120,8 108,719 -336,6 95,0 
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V2 vs V3 Levene test T-test 
 F Sign. t df Sign. Difference of means SE 95% Conf. Interv. 
          (two-tailed)     lower upper 
GP’s age (year) 1,768 0,187 -1,288 98 0,201 -2,6 2,003 -6,6 1,4 
Time in praxis (year) 3,219 0,076 -0,998 98 0,321 -2,1 2,104 -6,3 2,1 
Patient cards 0,870 0,353 -0,222 98 0,824 -22,5 101,250 -223,4 178,4 
 
V2 vs V4 Levene test T-test 
 F Sign. t df Sign. Difference of means SE 95% Conf. Interv. 
          (two-tailed)     lower upper 
GP’s age (year) 0,785 0,378 -0,097 98 0,923 -0,2 1,858 -3,9 3,5 
Time in praxis (year) 0,976 0,326 -0,200 98 0,842 -0,4 2,000 -4,4 3,6 
Patient cards 0,035 0,853 -0,428 98 0,670 -45,9 107,309 -258,9 167,0 
 
 
V3 vs V4 Levene test T-test 
 F Sign. t df Sign. Difference of means SE 95% Conf. Interv. 
          (two-tailed)     lower upper 
GP’s age (year) 0,291 0,591 1,157 98 0,250 2,4 2,074 -1,7 6,5 
Time in praxis (year) 0,651 0,422 0,770 98 0,443 1,7 2,209 -2,7 6,1 
Patient cards 1,048 0,309 -0,221 98 0,825 -23,4 105,654 -233,1 186,3 
 
 
Appendix 10 Random Parameter Logit Model 2 
 
 
Table 1 RPL Model 2: random parameter estimations 
 
Variable Coeff. St. error P[|Z|>z] 
Random parameters   
Age3 -0,8431 0,1498 0,000
Mortal3 0,6857 0,1404 0,000
Qeffect -0,4398 0,1202 0,000
Restor 0,1704 0,1130 0,132
Non-random parameters   
Age2 0,1372 0,0325 0,000
Mortal2 -0,0246 0,0308 0,424
Preval 0,0315 0,0238 0,186
Comorb 0,1172 0,0218 0,000
Complic 0,0050 0,0209 0,812
LYGdistrib -0,2260 0,0238 0,000
A_First 0,0360 0,0544 0,509
A_Second 0,0580 0,0515 0,260
Heterogenitás az átlagban   
Age3:GPage 0,0073 0,0029 0,012
Mortal3:GPage -0,0066 0,0027 0,015
Qeffect:GPage 0,0035 0,0024 0,151
Restor:GPage -0,0010 0,0024 0,660
Diagonal values in Cholesky matrix  
NsAge3 0,0000 0,0001 0,723
NsMortal3 0,0068 0,0027 0,013
NsQeffect 0,0712 0,0404 0,078
NsRestor 0,0169 0,3253 0,959
Below diagonal values in Cholesky matrix  
Mortal3:Age3 -0,0066 0,0027 0,015
Qeffect:Age3 0,0035 0,0024 0,151
Qeffect:Mortal3 -0,0745 0,0405 0,066
Restor:Age3 -0,0010 0,0024 0,660
Restor:Mortal3 -0,0310 0,2078 0,882
Restor:Qeffect 0,0484 0,1367 0,723
Standard deviation of parameter distributions 
sdAge3 0,0000 0,0001 0,723
sdMortal3 0,0095 0,0001 0,000
sdQeffect 0,1031 0,0021 0,000
sdRestor 0,0599 0,1136 0,598
    
LL* -3276,062   
LL(RPL) -2834,738   
Chi2(20) = 882,6471 (p=0,000)   
R2=0,135    
Number of observations = 3000 (200 groups)  
Number of repetitions for simulation = 500 (Halton draws) 
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Table 2. Correlations between random parameters 
 
  Age3 Mortal3 Qeffect Restor 
Age3 1,000    
Mortal3 -0,697 1,000   
Qeffect 0,034 -0,542 1,000  
Restor -0,017 -0,359 0,931 1,000 
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 Appendix 11 Q-method: Statistical background 
 
 
Statistics behind the Q-method are briefly summarised here based on the publication 
by Brown. [Brown 1993] The starting point of the Q-method is a grid (see an 
example on Figure 1): respondents are to place each Q statement on it according to 
how much they agree or disagree with the statement. The result of the Q-sort for each 
respondent is that a number between -4 and +4 belongs to each statement. Note, the 
size and the layout of the grid depend on the number of statements the researcher 
composed. In our study there are places for 34 statements. Having less of them, the 
endpoints could also be different (e.g. -3 and +3).  
 
Figure 1 Score sheet for the Q-sorting 
MOST DISAGREE MOST AGREE
-4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4
 
 
Let us have two respondents having done the Q-sorting (V1 and V2). The difference 
between their Q-sorts can be expressed numerically (Table 1). 
 
Table 1 Difference of Q-sorts in case of two respondents 
Statement 
number 
V1 V2 (Diff V1-V2)2
1. 1 -1 4 
2. 0 3 9 
3. 2 -2 16 
4. 1 -1 4 
5. -2 2 16 
… … … … 
34. 1 0 1 
Total 0 0 Σ Diff2
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 Column V1 and V2 show the placement of each statement (card) on the grid for 
respondent 1 and 2, respectively. The last column contains the squared difference of the 
scores of each statement. The sum of column V1 and V2 always equal to zero because 
of the symmetric structure of the grid. The maximum of the sum of the squared 
differences depends on the size of the grid. In our example: max Diff2 = 4x82 + 6x62 + 
8x42 + 10*22 = 640. If the two Q-sorts are identical then Σ Diff2 =0, if they are 
complete adversary of each other then Σ Diff2 takes its maximum. Another figure 
typical of the grid is the sum of the squared scores: F2. In our example: F2 = 4x42 + 6x32 
+ 8*22 + 10x12 = 160, that is ¼ of max Diff2. Based on these figures we can calculate 
the correlation (r) between the 2 Q-sorts to show how different or similar they are: 
 
r = 1 – (Σ Diff2 / 2xF2)  
 
Having identical Q-sorts r = 1, in case of completely different ones r = -1. Q-method 
usually collects data from more than 2 respondents. Similarly, a correlation matrix of n 
x n can be calculated for n respondents, which is the initial step to carry out a factor 
analysis. 
In case of the Q-method, the respondents themselves „sit” on each factor. Respondents 
with big factor weights on a given factor are those who have similar Q-sorts, that is they 
share similar views on the issue and they belong to the same „opinion of family”. So, 
respondents with big weights on different factors belong to different opinion groups. 
Factor analysis, however, is not the final step of the Q-method. The goal is to reproduce 
those Q-sorts (placement of the statements on the score sheet) that are generally 
characteristic of the opinion groups. Let us assume that the factor analysis resulted in 3 
different opinion groups. In this case we need to generate 3 Q-sorts each characterizing 
the general view of one of the 3 groups. This is done by generating new weighting 
numbers (w) from the factor weights (f) for those respondents who „sit” on the same 
factor: w = f / (1 – f2). These weights are to show in a single opinion group how 
strongly each respondent belong to the group. Let us assume that respondent V1 and V2 
sit on the same factor (e.g. Factor I) with factor weight 0.82 and 0,72, respectively. 
Then their new weights would be 2.50 and 1.50 (see Table 2). 
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Table 2 Weighting of respondents – strength of belonging to the opinion group 
Respondents on Factor I Factor weights (f) Weights (w)
V1 0,82 2,50 
V2 0,72 1,50 
The Q-methodology uses these weights to create the Q-sort generally typical of a given 
opinion group. It is possible to calculate for each statement the sum of the weighted 
scores of those respondents who belong to the same opinion group. In case of 
respondents V1 and V2 the sum of these weighted scores are as follows for e.g. 
statements 1 and 3 (see also Table 1 and Table 2):  
 Statement #1: 2,50 x 1 + 1,50 x (-1) = 1 
 Statement #3: 2,50 x 2 + 1,50 x (-2) = 2 
 
Following this, the weighted average score of each statement is normalized (normalized 
Z-score with a mean of zero and a standard deviation of 1), and the Z-scores of each 
statement can be compared among the factors. In general, those statements are 
characteristic for a factor the Z-score of which is bigger than 1 in absolute value. [Van 
Exel 2005] Having the Z-scores, the statements can be placed on the score sheet in the 
following way: the two statements with the highest scores should be placed in column 
(+4), from the remaining ones the next 3 statements with the highest scores are to be 
placed in column (+3), etc. Applying this method to all the statements by opinion 
groups, the typical Q-sort of each group can be reproduced, showing the hypothetical 
Q-sort of a hypothetical respondent belonging to the given factor by 100%. 
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Appendix 12 Q-method: Statements in the Q-set in English and Hungarian 
 
 
Card 
number 
Original statement in English Statement in Hungarian 
1 If two groups of patients can benefit from a 
treatment equally and group A’s health is 
fairly good and group B’s health is poor, 
group B deserves priority. 
Ha két betegcsoport („A” és „B”) egyformán 
javulhat egy gyógykezeléstől, és az „A” 
csoport betegei viszonylag jó egészségi 
állapotban vannak, míg a „B” csoportban 
levő betegek egészségi állapota rossz, a B 
csoport kezelését kellene előnyben 
részesíteni. 
2 If one treatment results in one life year 
gained for certain and another in a 50% 
chance of gaining two life years, priority 
should be given to the first type of treatment. 
Ha egy terápia biztosan meghosszabbítja 1 
évvel az életet, egy másik pedig 50%-os 
eséllyel 2 évvel hosszabbítja meg az életet, 
akkor az előbbit kell előnyben részesíteni. 
3 People who have contributed more (e.g. 
through premiums or taxes) to the health 
care system should be treated with priority 
over people who have contributed less. 
Azoknak az embereknek, akik többel 
járultak hozzá az egészségügyi 
ellátórendszerhez (pl. több adót vagy 
társadalombiztosítási járulékot fizettek), az 
egészségügyi ellátás során előnyt kellene 
élvezniük azokhoz képest, akik kevesebbel 
járultak hozzá. 
4 Patient characteristics like age, gender or 
income should play no role in prioritizing 
between people. 
A beteg személyes jellemzőinek - mint pl. 
életkora, neme, jövedelme - nem szabadna 
szerepet játszaniuk abban, hogy ki kap 
elsőbbséget az egészségügyi ellátás során. 
5 People who are in paid work and so 
contribute financially to society should be 
prioritized over people who do not work. 
Azoknak, akik fizetett állásban vannak, és 
ezáltal anyagilag hozzájárulnak a társadalmi 
kiadásokhoz, előnyt kellene élvezniük az 
egészségügyi ellátásban azokkal szemben, 
akik nem dolgoznak. 
6 If a treatment adds one month to the life of a 
patient and costs 7.500 Euros, one should 
consider whether the money could have been 
better spent on other health care.  
Ha egy gyógykezelés 1 hónappal 
hosszabbítja meg egy beteg életét és ez 18 
millió Forintba kerül, akkor meg kéne 
fontolni, hogy ez az összeg nem költhető-e el 
jobban más egészségügyi ellátásokra. 
7 If two patients are waiting for a transplant 
organ, one with partner and the other single 
but otherwise identical, the first organ to 
become available should go the patient with 
partner. 
Ha két beteg vár szervátültetésre, és az egyik 
párkapcsolatban él, a másik egyedülálló (de 
minden más tekintetben egyformák), akkor 
az első beültethető szervet a párkapcsolatban 
élő betegnek kellene adni. 
8 Rescuing people from a certain death should 
take priority over all other kinds of health 
care. 
Az életmentő beavatkozásoknak elsőbbséget 
kellene kapniuk minden más egészségügyi 
ellátással szemben. 
9 Treatment of illnesses that put the highest 
burden on patients’ families should receive 
higher priority. 
Elsőbbséget kellene adni azon betegségek 
kezelésének, amelyek a legnagyobb terhet 
róják a beteg családtagjaira. 
10 A treatment which benefits patients in the 
short-term should have priority over a 
treatment with similar benefits for patients in 
the future. 
Két, hasonlóan eredményes gyógykezelés 
közül annak kéne elsőbbséget kapnia, 
amelyik rövidtávon segít a betegeken azzal 
szemben, amelyiknek az eredménye a 
jövőben várható. 
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 Card Original statement in English Statement in Hungarian 
number 
11 Priority should be given to people whose 
quality of life is low over those whose 
quality of life is moderate, even if treatment 
can only improve their quality of life by a 
small amount. 
A rossz életminőségben élő embereknek 
előnyt kellene kapniuk a közepes 
életminőségben élőkkel szemben még akkor 
is, ha a gyógykezelés csak kis mértékben 
képes javítani az életminőségüket. 
12 Doctors should be the ones to judge which 
patients get priority on the basis of their 
medical expertise. 
Az orvosoknak kellene megítélniük az orvosi 
tapasztalataik alapján, hogy melyik beteg 
kezelése kapjon elsőbbséget. 
13 People who depend heavily on members of 
their family or neighbours for care should be 
treated with priority. 
Azoknak az embereknek a kezelését kéne 
előnyben részesíteni, akik erőteljesen 
rászorulnak családtagjaik vagy a 
szomszédjaik gondoskodására. 
14 Adding one year to the end of life for 
someone who will otherwise die at age 30 is 
more important than adding one year to the 
life of someone who otherwise would die at 
age 80. 
Fontosabb annak az embernek 
meghosszabbítani az életét 1 évvel, aki 
egyébként 30 évesen meghalna, mint annak 
meghosszabbítani 1 évvel az életét, aki 
egyébként 80 évesen halna meg. 
15 When having to choose between two 
treatments that both cost the same, funding 
should be given to the treatment that results 
in the biggest health gain. 
Ha két gyógykezelés ugyanannyiba kerül, 
akkor azt a kezelést kellene finanszírozni, 
amelyik több egészségnyereséget okoz. 
16 In general, if people from different income 
groups are suffering from the same 
condition, people from low income groups 
should be given priority. 
Általánosságban, ha különböző jövedelmi 
helyzetű emberek szenvednek ugyanabban a 
betegségben, akkor az alacsony 
jövedelemmel rendelkezőket kéne előnyben 
részesíteni. 
17 There is no sense in saving lives if the 
quality of those lives will be really bad. 
Nincs értelme valakinek megmenteni az 
életét, ha az életminősége a továbbiakban 
nagyon rossz lesz. 
18 If two people have the same current 
condition but the health of one of the two is 
worsening while that of the other is stable, 
the former should be treated with priority. 
Ha két embernek a jelenlegi egészségi 
állapota azonos, de az egyik állapota romlik, 
míg a másiké stabil, akkor az előbbi ember 
kezelését kell előnyben részesíteni. 
19 Priority should be given to those treatments 
that generate the most health. 
Azokat az egészségügyi ellátásokat kellene 
előnyben részesíteni, amelyek a legtöbb 
egészség-nyereséget eredményezik. 
20 It is more important to extend one person’s 
life by one year than to extend 12 people’s 
lives by one month. 
Fontosabb egy ember életét 1 évvel 
meghosszabbítani, mint 12 ember életét 1-1 
hónappal meghosszabbítani. 
21 Whether an illness is the result of an 
unhealthy lifestyle should not be relevant, 
everyone is just as worthy of treatment as 
everyone else.  
Az, hogy valaki az egészségtelen életmódja 
miatt betegedett meg, nem kellene, hogy 
számítson. Mindenkinek egyformán jár a 
gyógykezelés. 
22 Priority should be given to treatments that 
restore health to an acceptable level, there’s 
no use in improving health when the final 
result is still a very poor state of health. 
Előnyben kellene részesíteni azokat a 
gyógykezeléseket, amelyek az egészségi 
állapotot elfogadható szintre javítják fel. 
Nincs értelme azoknak a kezeléseknek, 
amelyek eredményeként az egészségi állapot 
továbbra is nagyon rossz marad. 
23 Younger people should be given priority 
over older people, because they haven’t had 
their fair share of health yet. 
A fiatalabbak kezelését előnyben kellene 
részesíteni az idősebbekkel szemben, mivel 
ők még kevesebbet élhettek egészségben. 
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number 
24 People should not be allowed to buy 
themselves priority treatment, even if it 
doesn’t affect others negatively. 
Még akkor sem lenne szabad megengedni, 
hogy az emberek elsőbbségi ellátást 
vásárolhassanak maguknak, ha az másokat 
nem érint hátrányosan. 
25 People who are in some way responsible for 
their own illness should receive lower 
priority than people who have the same 
illness simply due to chance. 
Azoknak, akik valamilyen módon felelősek a 
betegségükért, kevésbé kellene elsőbbséget 
kapniuk azokhoz képest, akik véletlenül 
betegedtek meg. 
26 Priority should be given to younger people, 
because they may benefit from treatment for 
longer. 
A fiatalabbak kezelését előnyben kellene 
részesíteni, mert ők hosszabb ideig 
élvezhetik a kezelés hasznát. 
27 It is more important to prevent ill health than 
it is to cure ill health once it occurs. 
Fontosabb a betegségek megelőzése, mint a 
már bekövetkezett betegségek gyógyítása. 
28 For non-emergency treatments where there 
are waiting lists, patients in need of care 
should be treated on a first come first served 
basis and not be prioritised in other ways 
(e.g. the severity of the illness).   
Nem-sürgősségi ellátások esetében, ahol 
várólista van, a kezelésre szoruló betegeket 
érkezési sorrendben kellene ellátni, és egyéb 
szempontoknak (pl. a betegség súlyossága) 
nem kéne befolyásolniuk a sorrendet. 
29 Access to health care should be based on 
need, not on geographical, social or 
economic circumstances. 
Az egészségügyi ellátáshoz való hozzáférést 
a szükségleteknek kellene meghatároznia, és 
nem a földrajzi, társadalmi vagy gazdasági 
körülményeknek. 
30 Priority should be given to people with rare 
diseases, even when these diseases do not 
necessarily cause more health damage than 
more common ones. 
A ritka betegségben szenvedő emberek 
kezelését előnyben kellene részesíteni, még 
akkor is, ha ezek a betegségek nem 
feltétlenül okoznak nagyobb 
egészségkárosodást, mint a gyakori 
betegségek. 
31 Parents with dependent children should be 
given priority over similar people without 
dependents. 
A gyermekeket nevelő szülők ellátását 
előnyben kellene részesíteni a hasonló, de 
gyermeket nem nevelő emberek ellátásával 
szemben. 
32 People who benefit more from a treatment, 
because it is more effective for them, should 
receive priority over people who benefit less 
from this treatment. 
Azokat az embereket, akiken egy kezelés 
jobban segít, mert náluk hatásosabb, 
előnyben kellene részesíteni azokkal 
szemben, akiknek kevesebb haszna van a 
kezelésből. 
33 It is more important to provide treatments 
that prolong life than treatments that 
improve quality of life. 
Fontosabb gondoskodni azokról az 
ellátásokról, amelyek az életet hosszabbítják 
meg, mint azokról, amelyek az életminőséget 
javítják. 
34 The amount of health care people have had 
in the past should not influence access to 
treatments in the future.   
A beteg által a múltban már igénybevett 
egészségügyi ellátások mértéke nem kéne, 
hogy befolyásolja, hogy mennyi ellátáshoz 
férhet hozzá a jövőben. 
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Appendix 13 Q-method: Factor loadings with 4-factor solution 
 
 
Respondent Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 
1 hu_md_01 0,3528 -0,3619 -0,1763 0,4092
2 hu_md_02 0,2432 0,1328 0,1088 0,6330X
3 hu_md_03 0,6424X 0,3922 0,0989 0,3805
4 hu_md_04 0,4106 0,0632 0,4356 0,5622
5 hu_md_05 0,4262 0,5749X 0,097 0,3574
6 hu_md_06 0,5522X 0,2679 -0,0254 0,2851
7 hu_md_07 0,2721 0,3424 0,2794 0,4368
8 hu_md_08 0,6495X 0,1722 0,0925 0,0737
9 hu_md_09 0,3639 -0,0723 0,2372 0,2747
10 hu_md_10 0,5139 0,3814 0,1917 0,6298
11 hu_md_11 0,1704 0,0501 0,5189 0,5231
12 hu_md_12 0,7151X 0,1597 0,3221 0,2204
13 hu_md_14 0,1123 0,3256 0,4981X 0,0222
14 hu_md_15 0,1955 0,3607 0,294 0,2257
15 hu_md_16 0,1908 0,2158 0,4209 0,5526X
16 hu_md_17 0,4374 0,3861 0,409 0,0779
17 hu_md_18 0,1497 0,1461 0,2667 0,4989X
18 hu_md_19 0,5069X 0,0469 0,0648 0,405
19 hu_md_20 0,5688X 0,1523 0,1832 0,1027
20 hu_md_21 -0,1486 0,3945X 0,165 0,2865
21 hu_md_22 0,5266 0,4036 -0,143 0,4094
22 hu_md_23 0,3294 0,5717X 0,1974 0,2228
23 hu_md_24 0,1174 0,0817 0,6125X 0,2637
24 hu_md_25 0,3502 0,5840X 0,1135 0,0061
25 hu_md_26 0,5005 0,3571 0,1769 0,499
26 hu_md_27 0,123 0,6388X 0,0788 0,0667
27 hu_md_28 0,2227 0,4268 0,486 0,3512
28 hu_md_29 0,5957X 0,076 0,3051 0,4613
29 hu_md_30 0,1596 0,1521 0,2799 0,7259X
30 hu_md_31 0,4273 0,3018 -0,038 0,7068X
31 hu_md_32 0,1414 0,5124X 0,1069 0,3082
32 hu_md_33 0,236 0,3674 0,1466 0,8058X
33 hu_md_34 0,4533X 0,2493 0,2657 0,2239
% E.V. 16% 12% 8% 18%
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Appendix 14 Q-method: Normalized factor scores by factors 
 
Table 1 Z-scores for Factor 1 
No. Statement Z-score 
8 Rescuing people from a certain death should take priority over all other kinds of health care. 2,162 
27 It is more important to prevent ill health than it is to cure ill health once it occurs. 1,805 
15 When having to choose between two treatments that both cost the same, funding should be given to the 
treatment that results in the biggest health gain. 1,549 
29 Access to health care should be based on need, not on geographical, social or economic circumstances. 1,344 
19 Priority should be given to those treatments that generate the most health. 1,265 
4 Patient characteristics like age, gender or income should play no role in prioritizing between people. 1,019 
22 Priority should be given to treatments that restore health to an acceptable level, there’s no use in improving 
health when the final result is still a very poor state of health. 0,889 
32 People who benefit more from a treatment, because it is more effective for them, should receive priority over 
people who benefit less from this treatment. 0,848 
12 Doctors should be the ones to judge which patients get priority on the basis of their medical expertise. 0,745 
14 Adding one year to the end of life for someone who will otherwise die at age 30 is more important than 
adding one year to the life of someone who otherwise would die at age 80. 0,568 
25 People who are in some way responsible for their own illness should receive lower priority than people who 
have the same illness simply due to chance. 0,393 
34 The amount of health care people have had in the past should not influence access to treatments in the future. 0,37 
6 If a treatment adds one month to the life of a patient and costs 7.500 Euros, one should consider whether the 
money could have been better spent on other health care.  0,231 
1 If two groups of patients can benefit from a treatment equally and group A’s health is fairly good and group 
B’s health is poor, group B deserves priority. 0,189 
2 If one treatment results in one life year gained for certain and another in a 50% chance of gaining two life 
years, priority should be given to the first type of treatment.  0,043 
10 A treatment which benefits patients in the short-term should have priority over a treatment with similar 
benefits for patients in the future. 0,037 
24 People should not be allowed to buy themselves priority treatment, even if it doesn’t affect others negatively. -0,04 
20 It is more important to extend one person’s life by one year than to extend 12 people’s lives by one month. -0,059 
18 If two people have the same current condition but the health of one of the two is worsening while that of the 
other is stable, the former should be treated with priority. -0,079 
23 Younger people should be given priority over older people, because they haven’t had their fair share of health 
yet. -0,315 
7 If two patients are waiting for a transplant organ, one with partner and the other single but otherwise identical, 
the first organ to become available should go the patient with partner. -0,393 
13 People who depend heavily on members of their family or neighbours for care should be treated with priority. -0,467 
26 Priority should be given to younger people, because they may benefit from treatment for longer. -0,495 
31 Parents with dependent children should be given priority over similar people without dependents. -0,569 
9 Treatment of illnesses that put the highest burden on patients’ families should receive higher priority. -0,622 
17 There is no sense in saving lives if the quality of those lives will be really bad. -0,658 
28 For non-emergency treatments where there are waiting lists, patients in need of care should be treated on a 
first come first served basis and not be prioritised in other ways (e.g. the severity of the illness).   -0,664 
33 It is more important to provide treatments that prolong life than treatments that improve quality of life. -0,792 
30 Priority should be given to people with rare diseases, even when these diseases do not necessarily cause more 
health damage than more common ones. -0,88 
21 Whether an illness is the result of an unhealthy lifestyle should not be relevant, everyone is just as worthy of 
treatment as everyone else.  -0,898 
11 Priority should be given to people whose quality of life is low over those whose quality of life is moderate, 
even if treatment can only improve their quality of life by a small amount. -1,311 
16 In general, if people from different income groups are suffering from the same condition, people from low 
income groups should be given priority. -1,572 
5 People who are in paid work and so contribute financially to society should be prioritized over people who do 
not work. -1,601 
3 People who have contributed more (e.g. through premiums or taxes) to the health care system should be 
treated with priority over people who have contributed less. -2,044 
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Table 2 Z-scores for Factor 2 
No. Statement Z-score 
27 It is more important to prevent ill health than it is to cure ill health once it occurs. 2,187
12 Doctors should be the ones to judge which patients get priority on the basis of their medical expertise. 1,916
29 Access to health care should be based on need, not on geographical, social or economic circumstances. 1,854
8 Rescuing people from a certain death should take priority over all other kinds of health care. 1,581
18 If two people have the same current condition but the health of one of the two is worsening while that of the 
other is stable, the former should be treated with priority. 1,458
4 Patient characteristics like age, gender or income should play no role in prioritizing between people. 0,824
28 For non-emergency treatments where there are waiting lists, patients in need of care should be treated on a 
first come first served basis and not be prioritised in other ways (e.g. the severity of the illness).   0,775
22 Priority should be given to treatments that restore health to an acceptable level, there’s no use in improving 
health when the final result is still a very poor state of health. 0,731
9 Treatment of illnesses that put the highest burden on patients’ families should receive higher priority. 0,598
19 Priority should be given to those treatments that generate the most health. 0,589
34 The amount of health care people have had in the past should not influence access to treatments in the future. 0,456
24 People should not be allowed to buy themselves priority treatment, even if it doesn’t affect others negatively. 0,213
15 When having to choose between two treatments that both cost the same, funding should be given to the 
treatment that results in the biggest health gain. 0,139
14 Adding one year to the end of life for someone who will otherwise die at age 30 is more important than 
adding one year to the life of someone who otherwise would die at age 80. 0,118
13 People who depend heavily on members of their family or neighbours for care should be treated with priority. 0,036
25 People who are in some way responsible for their own illness should receive lower priority than people who 
have the same illness simply due to chance. -0,146
3 People who have contributed more (e.g. through premiums or taxes) to the health care system should be 
treated with priority over people who have contributed less. -0,153
1 If two groups of patients can benefit from a treatment equally and group A’s health is fairly good and group 
B’s health is poor, group B deserves priority. -0,162
21 Whether an illness is the result of an unhealthy lifestyle should not be relevant, everyone is just as worthy of 
treatment as everyone else.  -0,163
17 There is no sense in saving lives if the quality of those lives will be really bad. -0,232
33 It is more important to provide treatments that prolong life than treatments that improve quality of life. -0,25
32 People who benefit more from a treatment, because it is more effective for them, should receive priority over 
people who benefit less from this treatment. -0,456
10 A treatment which benefits patients in the short-term should have priority over a treatment with similar 
benefits for patients in the future. -0,528
6 If a treatment adds one month to the life of a patient and costs 7.500 Euros, one should consider whether the 
money could have been better spent on other health care.  -0,545
2 If one treatment results in one life year gained for certain and another in a 50% chance of gaining two life 
years, priority should be given to the first type of treatment.  -0,6
5 People who are in paid work and so contribute financially to society should be prioritized over people who do 
not work. -0,741
7 If two patients are waiting for a transplant organ, one with partner and the other single but otherwise identical, 
the first organ to become available should go the patient with partner. -0,852
20 It is more important to extend one person’s life by one year than to extend 12 people’s lives by one month. -0,918
16 In general, if people from different income groups are suffering from the same condition, people from low 
income groups should be given priority. -0,999
23 Younger people should be given priority over older people, because they haven’t had their fair share of health 
yet. -1,179
30 Priority should be given to people with rare diseases, even when these diseases do not necessarily cause more 
health damage than more common ones. -1,197
26 Priority should be given to younger people, because they may benefit from treatment for longer. -1,287
11 Priority should be given to people whose quality of life is low over those whose quality of life is moderate, 
even if treatment can only improve their quality of life by a small amount. -1,416
31 Parents with dependent children should be given priority over similar people without dependents. -1,649
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 Table 3 Z-scores for Factor 3 
No. Statement Z-score 
15 When having to choose between two treatments that both cost the same, funding should be given to the 
treatment that results in the biggest health gain. 1,597 
29 Access to health care should be based on need, not on geographical, social or economic circumstances. 1,496 
19 Priority should be given to those treatments that generate the most health. 1,293 
27 It is more important to prevent ill health than it is to cure ill health once it occurs. 1,265 
8 Rescuing people from a certain death should take priority over all other kinds of health care. 1,223 
4 Patient characteristics like age, gender or income should play no role in prioritizing between people. 1,097 
6 If a treatment adds one month to the life of a patient and costs 7.500 Euros, one should consider whether the 
money could have been better spent on other health care.  1,049 
22 Priority should be given to treatments that restore health to an acceptable level, there’s no use in improving 
health when the final result is still a very poor state of health. 1,013 
25 People who are in some way responsible for their own illness should receive lower priority than people who 
have the same illness simply due to chance. 0,896 
17 There is no sense in saving lives if the quality of those lives will be really bad. 0,797 
18 If two people have the same current condition but the health of one of the two is worsening while that of the 
other is stable, the former should be treated with priority. 0,57 
34 The amount of health care people have had in the past should not influence access to treatments in the future. 0,535 
3 People who have contributed more (e.g. through premiums or taxes) to the health care system should be 
treated with priority over people who have contributed less. 0,446 
12 Doctors should be the ones to judge which patients get priority on the basis of their medical expertise. 0,363 
32 People who benefit more from a treatment, because it is more effective for them, should receive priority over 
people who benefit less from this treatment. 0,357 
9 Treatment of illnesses that put the highest burden on patients’ families should receive higher priority. 0,328 
10 A treatment which benefits patients in the short-term should have priority over a treatment with similar 
benefits for patients in the future. 0,233 
5 People who are in paid work and so contribute financially to society should be prioritized over people who do 
not work. -0,006 
26 Priority should be given to younger people, because they may benefit from treatment for longer. -0,061 
14 Adding one year to the end of life for someone who will otherwise die at age 30 is more important than 
adding one year to the life of someone who otherwise would die at age 80. -0,235 
2 If one treatment results in one life year gained for certain and another in a 50% chance of gaining two life 
years, priority should be given to the first type of treatment.  -0,269 
31 Parents with dependent children should be given priority over similar people without dependents. -0,315 
13 People who depend heavily on members of their family or neighbours for care should be treated with priority. -0,615 
20 It is more important to extend one person’s life by one year than to extend 12 people’s lives by one month. -0,632 
23 Younger people should be given priority over older people, because they haven’t had their fair share of health 
yet. -0,772 
33 It is more important to provide treatments that prolong life than treatments that improve quality of life. -0,915 
1 If two groups of patients can benefit from a treatment equally and group A’s health is fairly good and group 
B’s health is poor, group B deserves priority. -0,953 
28 For non-emergency treatments where there are waiting lists, patients in need of care should be treated on a 
first come first served basis and not be prioritised in other ways (e.g. the severity of the illness).   -1,057 
11 Priority should be given to people whose quality of life is low over those whose quality of life is moderate, 
even if treatment can only improve their quality of life by a small amount. -1,233 
7 If two patients are waiting for a transplant organ, one with partner and the other single but otherwise identical, 
the first organ to become available should go the patient with partner. -1,233 
24 People should not be allowed to buy themselves priority treatment, even if it doesn’t affect others negatively. -1,264 
30 Priority should be given to people with rare diseases, even when these diseases do not necessarily cause more 
health damage than more common ones. -1,621 
21 Whether an illness is the result of an unhealthy lifestyle should not be relevant, everyone is just as worthy of 
treatment as everyone else.  -1,677 
16 In general, if people from different income groups are suffering from the same condition, people from low 
income groups should be given priority. -1,703 
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Appendix 15 Q-method: Distinguishing and consensus statements 
 
 
The statements listed in Tables 1-3. are distinguishing the given factor from any 
other factor at a significance level of 5%. Asterisk (*) indicates significance at p<.01. 
Both the factor Q-sort value and the normalized score are shown. Table 4. presents 
the consensus statements. 
 
Table 1 Distinguishing statements for Factor 1 
No.  Statement Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 
    Rank Z Rank Z Rank Z 
8 Rescuing people from a certain death should take 
priority over all other kinds of health care. 4 2,16 3 1,58 3 1,22
32 People who benefit more from a treatment, because 
it is more effective for them, should receive priority 
over people who benefit less from this treatment. 
2 0,85 -1 -0,46 0 0,36
14 Adding one year to the end of life for someone who 
will otherwise die at age 30 is more important than 
adding one year to the life of someone who 
otherwise would die at age 80. 
1 0,57 1 0,12 0 -0,23
25 People who are in some way responsible for their 
own illness should receive lower priority than 
people who have the same illness simply due to 
chance. 
1 0,39 0 -0,15 2 0,9
6 If a treatment adds one month to the life of a patient 
and costs 7.500 Euros, one should consider whether 
the money could have been better spent on other 
health care.  
1 0,23* -1 -0,55 2 1,05
20 It is more important to extend one person’s life by 
one year than to extend 12 people’s lives by one 
month. 
0 -0,06 -2 -0,92 -1 -0,63
18 If two people have the same current condition but 
the health of one of the two is worsening while that 
of the other is stable, the former should be treated 
with priority. 
0 -0,08* 3 1,46 1 0,57
23 Younger people should be given priority over older 
people, because they haven’t had their fair share of 
health yet. 
0 -0,31 -3 -1,18 -1 -0,77
7 If two patients are waiting for a transplant organ, 
one with partner and the other single but otherwise 
identical, the first organ to become available should 
go the patient with partner. 
-1 -0,39 -2 -0,85 -3 -1,23
9 Treatment of illnesses that put the highest burden 
on patients’ families should receive higher priority. -1 -0,62* 2 0,6 0 0,33
21 Whether an illness is the result of an unhealthy 
lifestyle should not be relevant, everyone is just as 
worthy of treatment as everyone else.  
-3 -0,90* 0 -0,16 -4 -1,68
5 People who are in paid work and so contribute 
financially to society should be prioritized over 
people who do not work. 
-4 -1,60* -2 -0,74 0 -0,01
3 People who have contributed more (e.g. through 
premiums or taxes) to the health care system should 
be treated with priority over people who have 
contributed less. 
-4 -2,04* 0 -0,15 1 0,45
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 Table 2 Distinguishing statements for Factor 2 
No.  Statement Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 
    Rank Z Rank Z Rank Z 
12 Doctors should be the ones to judge which patients 
get priority on the basis of their medical expertise. 2 0,74 4 1,92* 1 0,36 
18 If two people have the same current condition but 
the health of one of the two is worsening while that 
of the other is stable, the former should be treated 
with priority. 
0 -0,08 3 1,46* 1 0,57 
28 For non-emergency treatments where there are 
waiting lists, patients in need of care should be 
treated on a first come first served basis and not be 
prioritised in other ways (e.g. the severity of the 
illness).   
-2 -0,66 2 0,78* -2 -1,06 
19 Priority should be given to those treatments that 
generate the most health. 3 1,27 1 0,59* 3 1,29 
15 When having to choose between two treatments that 
both cost the same, funding should be given to the 
treatment that results in the biggest health gain. 
3 1,55 1 0,14* 4 1,6 
13 People who depend heavily on members of their 
family or neighbours for care should be treated with 
priority. 
-1 -0,47 0 0,04 -1 -0,61 
25 People who are in some way responsible for their 
own illness should receive lower priority than 
people who have the same illness simply due to 
chance. 
1 0,39 0 -0,15 2 0,9 
3 People who have contributed more (e.g. through 
premiums or taxes) to the health care system should 
be treated with priority over people who have 
contributed less. 
-4 -2,04 0 -0,15 1 0,45 
21 Whether an illness is the result of an unhealthy 
lifestyle should not be relevant, everyone is just as 
worthy of treatment as everyone else.  
-3 -0,9 0 -0,16* -4 -1,68 
33 It is more important to provide treatments that 
prolong life than treatments that improve quality of 
life. 
-2 -0,79 -1 -0,25 -2 -0,91 
32 People who benefit more from a treatment, because 
it is more effective for them, should receive priority 
over people who benefit less from this treatment. 
2 0,85 -1 -0,46* 0 0,36 
10 A treatment which benefits patients in the short-
term should have priority over a treatment with 
similar benefits for patients in the future. 
0 0,04 -1 -0,53 0 0,23 
6 If a treatment adds one month to the life of a patient 
and costs 7.500 Euros, one should consider whether 
the money could have been better spent on other 
health care.  
1 0,23 -1 -0,55* 2 1,05 
5 People who are in paid work and so contribute 
financially to society should be prioritized over 
people who do not work. 
-4 -1,6 -2 -0,74* 0 -0,01 
16 In general, if people from different income groups 
are suffering from the same condition, people from 
low income groups should be given priority. 
-3 -1,57 -2 -1 -4 -1,7 
26 Priority should be given to younger people, because 
they may benefit from treatment for longer. -1 -0,49 -3 -1,29* 0 -0,06 
31 Parents with dependent children should be given 
priority over similar people without dependents. -1 -0,57 -4 -1,65* -1 -0,32 
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 Table 3 Distinguishing statements for Factor 3 
No.  Statement Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 
    Rank Z Rank Z Rank Z 
27 It is more important to prevent ill health than it is to 
cure ill health once it occurs. 4 1,8 4 2,19 3 1,26
6 If a treatment adds one month to the life of a patient 
and costs 7.500 Euros, one should consider whether 
the money could have been better spent on other 
health care.  
1 0,23 -1 -0,55 2 1,05*
25 People who are in some way responsible for their 
own illness should receive lower priority than 
people who have the same illness simply due to 
chance. 
1 0,39 0 -0,15 2 0,9
17 There is no sense in saving lives if the quality of 
those lives will be really bad. -2 -0,66 0 -0,23 1 0,80*
18 If two people have the same current condition but 
the health of one of the two is worsening while that 
of the other is stable, the former should be treated 
with priority. 
0 -0,08 3 1,46 1 0,57*
3 People who have contributed more (e.g. through 
premiums or taxes) to the health care system should 
be treated with priority over people who have 
contributed less. 
-4 -2,04 0 -0,15 1 0,45
32 People who benefit more from a treatment, because 
it is more effective for them, should receive priority 
over people who benefit less from this treatment. 
2 0,85 -1 -0,46 0 0,36
5 People who are in paid work and so contribute 
financially to society should be prioritized over 
people who do not work. 
-4 -1,6 -2 -0,74 0 -0,01*
1 If two groups of patients can benefit from a 
treatment equally and group A’s health is fairly 
good and group B’s health is poor, group B 
deserves priority. 
1 0,19 0 -0,16 -2 -0,95*
24 People should not be allowed to buy themselves 
priority treatment, even if it doesn’t affect others 
negatively. 
0 -0,04 1 0,21 -3 -1,26*
21 Whether an illness is the result of an unhealthy 
lifestyle should not be relevant, everyone is just as 
worthy of treatment as everyone else.  
-3 -0,9 0 -0,16 -4 -1,68*
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 Table 4 Consensus statements  
No.  Statement# Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 
    Rank Z Rank Z Rank Z 
4* Patient characteristics like age, gender or income 
should play no role in prioritizing between people. 2 1,02 2 0,82 2 1,1 
11* Priority should be given to people whose quality of 
life is low over those whose quality of life is 
moderate, even if treatment can only improve their 
quality of life by a small amount. 
-3 -1,31 -4 -1,42 -2 -1,23 
22* Priority should be given to treatments that restore 
health to an acceptable level, there’s no use in 
improving health when the final result is still a very 
poor state of health. 
2 0,89 2 0,73 2 1,01 
29 Access to health care should be based on need, not 
on geographical, social or economic circumstances. 3 1,34 3 1,85 4 1,5 
34* The amount of health care people have had in the 
past should not influence access to treatments in the 
future. 
1 0,37 1 0,46 1 0,54 
# All listed statements are non-significant at P>.01, and those flagged with an * are also 
non-significant at P>.05. 
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